Heuristics are efficient cognitive processes that ignore information. In contrast to the widely held view that less processing reduces accuracy, the study of heuristics shows that less information, computation, and time can in fact improve accuracy. We review the major progress made so far: (a) the discovery of less-is-more effects; (b) the study of the ecological rationality of heuristics, which examines in which environments a given strategy succeeds or fails, and why; (c) an advancement from vague labels to computational models of heuristics; (d) the development of a systematic theory of heuristics that identifies their building blocks and the evolved capacities they exploit, and views the cognitive system as relying on an ‘‘adaptive toolbox;’ ’ and (e) the development of an empirical methodology that accounts for individual differences, conducts competitive tests, and has provided evidence for people’s adaptive use of heuristics. Homo heuristicus has a biased mind and ignores part of the available information, yet a biased mind can handle uncertainty more efficiently and robustly than an unbiased mind relying on more resource-intensive and general-purpose processing strategies.

An evidence accumulation model of forced-choice decision making is proposed to unify the fast and frugal take the best (TTB) model and the alternative rational (RAT) model with which it is usually contrasted. The basic idea is to treat the TTB model as a sequential-sampling process that terminates as soon as any evidence in favor of a decision is found and the rational approach as a sequential-sampling process that terminates only when all available information has been assessed. The unified TTB and RAT models were tested in an experiment in which participants learned to make correct judgments for a set of real-world stimuli on the basis of feedback, and were then asked to make additional judgments without feedback for cases in which the TTB and the rational models made different predictions. The results show that, in both experiments, there was strong intraparticipant consistency in the use of either the TTB or the rational model but large interparticipant differences in which model was used. The unified model is shown to be able to capture the differences in decision making across participants in an interpretable way and is preferred by the minimum description length model selection criterion. A simple but pervasive type of decision requires choosing which of two alternatives has the greater (or the lesser) value on some variable of interest. Examples of

Much research on judgment and decision making has focussed on the adequacy of classical rationality as a description of human reasoning. But more recently it has been argued that classical rationality should also be rejected even as normative standards for human reasoning. For example, Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) and Gigerenzer and Todd (1999a) argue that reasoning involves ‘‘fast and frugal’ ’ algorithms which are not justified by rational norms, but which succeed in the environment. They provide three lines of argument for this view, based on: (A) the importance of the environment; (B) the existence of cognitive limitations; and (C) the fact that an algorithm with no apparent rational basis, Take-the-Best, succeeds in an judgment task (judging which of two cities is the larger, based on lists of features of each city). We reconsider (A)–(C), arguing that standard patterns of explanation in psychology and the social and biological sciences, use rational norms to explain why simple cognitive algorithms can succeed. We also present new computer simulations that compare Take-the-Best with other cognitive models (which use connectionist, exemplarbased, and decision-tree algorithms). Although Take-the-Best still performs well, it does not perform noticeably better than the other models. We conclude that these results provide no strong reason to prefer Take-the-Best over alternative cognitive models.

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The authors develop and test generalized versions of take-the-best (TTB) and rational (RAT) models of multiattribute paired-comparison inference. The generalized models make allowances for subjective attribute weighting, probabilistic orders of attribute inspection, and noisy decision making. A key new test involves a response-time (RT) approach. TTB predicts that RT is determined solely by the expected time required to locate the 1st discriminating attribute, whereas RAT predicts that RT is determined by the difference in summed evidence between the 2 alternatives. Critical test pairs are used that partially decouple these 2 factors. Under conditions in which ideal observer TTB and RAT strategies yield equivalent decisions, both the RT results and the estimated attribute weights suggest that the vast majority of subjects adopted the generalized TTB strategy. The RT approach is also validated in an experimental condition in which use of a RAT strategy is essentially forced upon subjects.

The authors review their own empirical work inspired by the adaptive toolbox metaphor. The review examines factors influencing strategy selection and execution in multi-attribute inference tasks (e.g., information costs, time pressure, memory retrieval, dynamic environments, stimulus formats, intelligence). An emergent theme is the re-evaluation of contingency model claims about the elevated cognitive costs of compensatory in comparison with non-compensatory strategies. Contrary to common assertions about the impact of cognitive complexity, the empirical data suggest that manipulated variables exert their influence at the meta-level of deciding how to decide (i.e., which strategy to select) rather than at the level of strategy execution. An alternative conceptualisation of strategy selection, namely threshold adjustment in an evidence accumulation model, is also discussed and the difficulty in distinguishing empirically between these metaphors is acknowledged.

v Declaration .................................... ix Acknowledgements................................ xi 1Prelude 1 TheVeryIdeaofRepresentation......................... 2 TypesofSimilarity ................................ 8 IsSimilarityIndeterminate? ........................... 11 TheRoleofSimilarityinCognition....................... 11 Summary&GeneralDiscussion......................... 14 2 Theories of Similarity 17 SimilarityDataSets................................ 17 SpatialRepresentation .............................. 21 FeaturalRepresentation.............................. 31 TreeRepresentation................................ 40 NetworkRepresentation ............................. 47 Alignment-BasedSimilarityModels....................... 48 TransformationalSimilarityModels ....................... 50 Summary&GeneralDiscussion......................... 54 i 3 On Representational Complexity 55 ApproachestoModelSelection ......................... 57 ChoosinganAdditiveClusteringRepresentation ................ 67 ChoosinganAdditiveTreeRepresentation ................... 82 ChoosingaSpatialRepresentation........................ 94 Summary&GeneralDiscussion......................... 95 4 Featural Representation 97 AMenagerieofFeaturalModels......................... 98 ClusteringModels.................................104 GeometricComplexityCriteria..........................106 AlgorithmsforFittingFeaturalModels .....................107 MonteCarloStudyI:DotheAlgorithmsWork? ................109 RepresentationsofKinshipTerms ........................117 MonteCarloStudyII:Complexity........................122 ExperimentI:Faces................................125 ExperimentII:Countries .............................1...

Take The Best (TTB) is a simple one-reason decisionmaking strategy that searches through cues in the order of cue validities. Interestingly, this heuristic performs comparably to, or even better than, more complex information-demanding strategies such as multiple regression. The question of how a cue ordering is learned, however, has been only recently addressed by Dieckmann and Todd (2004). Surprisingly, these authors showed that learning cue orders through feedback––by updating cue validities––leads to a slow convergence to the ecological cue validities. Various other simple learning algorithms do not provide good results either. In the present paper, we provide a solution to this problem. Specifically, in a series of computer simulations, we show that simple social rules such as “imitate the successful ” help to overcome the limitations of individual learning reported by Dieckmann and Todd (2004). Thus, the dilemma of individual learning can be collectively solved. In line with the spirit of bounded rationality, we found that several simple social rules performed comparably to, or better than computationally demanding social rules. We relate our results to previous findings on bounded rationality in the social context. Fast and Frugal Heuristics In our everyday lives, we make decisions frequently. However, the information we need for that might not always be available, and it might not be possible to consider all alternatives as fully as we would wish because of our limitations in time and cognitive processing power, and the complexity of the environment. How do we make such decisions? One recent approach, promoted by the Center for

What is the nature of moral behavior? According to the study of bounded rationality, it results not from character traits or rational deliberation alone, but from the interplay between mind and environment. In this view, moral behavior is based on pragmatic social heuristics rather than moral rules or maximization principles. These social heuristics are not good or bad per se, but solely in relation to the environments in which they are used. This has methodological implications for the study of morality: Behavior needs to be studied in social groups as well as in isolation, in natural environments as well as in labs. It also has implications for moral policy: Only by accepting the fact that behavior is a function of both mind and environmental structures can realistic prescriptive means of achieving moral goals be developed.

Simple lexicographic decision heuristics that consider cues one at a time in a particular order and stop searching for cues as soon as a decision can be made have been shown to be both accurate and frugal in their use of information. But much of the simplicity and success of these heuristics comes from using an appropriate cue order. For instance, the Take The Best heuristic uses validity order for cues, which requires considerable computation, potentially undermining the computational advantages of the simple decision mechanism. But many cue orders can achieve good decision performance, and studies of sequential search for data records have proposed a number of simple ordering rules that may be of use in constructing appropriate decision cue orders as well. Here we consider a range of simple cue ordering mechanisms, including tallying, swapping, and move-to-front rules, and show that they can