This paper proposes a research direction to study the development of `artificial social intelligence' of autonomous robots which should result in `individualized robot societies'. The approach is highly inspired by the `social intelligence hypothesis', derived from the investigation of primate societies, suggesting that primate intelligence originally evolved to solve social problems and was only later extended to problems outside the social domain. We suggest that it might be a general principle in the evolution of intelligence, applicable to both natural and artificial systems. Arguments are presented why the investigation of social intelligence for artifacts is not only an interesting research issue for the study of biological principles, but may be a necessary prerequisite for those scenarios in which autonomous robots are integrated into human societies, interacting and communicating both with humans and with each other. As a starting point to study experimentally the development ...

This paper is meant as a basis for discussion towards a framework for cognitive architectures integrating remembering, rehearsal, language and empathy. It describes the programmatic background of our concrete work on intelligent autonomous agents. The goal is to motivate a common framework which should inspire research on `artificial cognition' for autonomous robots as well as investigations on cognition in humans or other animals. 1 Introduction Our professional background are biology and artificial intelligence and we are mainly interested in the construction of intelligent autonomous agents based on biological and psychological findings and models. This paper outlines our research framework which grew out of considerations on cognition for artifacts, although we are aware that the successful implementation of these ideas is still a future goal. Instead of reviewing intensively literature of cognitive science and escpecially of cognitive psychology we focus on some points which are ...

This paper addresses the relationship between social intelligence and narrative intelligence, with a particular emphasis on 1) the phylogenetic origins of primate (narrative) intelligence, and 2) the ontogenetic origin of autobiographical stories. The `Narrative Intelligence Hypothesis` (NIH) is introduced according to which the evolutionary origin of stories and narrativity was correlated with increasing social dynamics in primate societies, in particular the need to communicate about third-party relationships. Requirements for artificial socially intelligent story-tellers are outlined, and the issue of testing social intelligence is discussed.

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Individuals value information that improves decision making. When social interactions complicate the decision process, acquiring information about others should be particularly valuable [1]. In primate societies, kinship, dominance, and reproductive status regulate social interactions [2, 3] and should therefore systematically influence the value of social information, but this has never been demonstrated. Here, we show that monkeys differentially value the opportunity to acquire visual information about particular classes of social images. Male rhesus macaques sacrificed fluid for the opportunity to view female perinea and the faces of highstatus monkeys but required fluid overpayment to view the faces of low-status monkeys. Social value was highly consistent across subjects, independent of particular images displayed, and only partially predictive of how long subjects chose to view each image. These data demonstrate that visual orienting decisions reflect the specific social content of visual information and provide the first experimental evidence that monkeys spontaneously discriminate images of others based on social status. Results and Discussion Most primates live in complex societies where the cultivation and exploitation of social relationships is associated with

At first glance, birds and non-human primates (hereafter primates) seem very different. Birds have beaks, feathers, produce offspring that gestate in shells, and can fly. Primates are covered in hair, have forward facing eyes and grasping hands, and while some are arboreal, none of them can fly. Although there

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The ‘Hard Problem ’ in Social Context Do you think the quotation in my title is reasonable or unreasonable? I find it unreasonable, but I know that many will not. Two people can react to the same idea, opinion, or data in opposite ways, and the reasons

This paper explores the evolution of player’s models of how other people think – their ‘theories of mind’. There is considerable experimental evidence that when people face an unfamiliar game they do not play a Nash equilibrium, but rather they behave in accordance with the cognitive hierarchy (Camerer, Ho & Chong 2004 QJE) and level-k (Stahl & Wilson 1995, GEB, Nagel 1995 AER) models. The evolution of di¤erent theories of mind is formalized as the evolution of di¤erent cognitive types within the cognitive hierarchy and level-k models. The models are also extended to allow for partial observation of the opponent’s types. It is found that evolution of types does not in general lead to Nash behavior in unfamiliar games. Under plausible assumptions evolution leads to states where di¤erent, relatively unsophisticated, types co-exist, in line with the experimental evidence. This result holds both with and without partial observation of types.

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