Results 1  10
of
100
Worstcase equilibria
 IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM ON THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF COMPUTER SCIENCE
, 1999
"... In a system in which noncooperative agents share a common resource, we propose the ratio between the worst possible Nash equilibrium and the social optimum as a measure of the effectiveness of the system. Deriving upper and lower bounds for this ratio in a model in which several agents share a ver ..."
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Cited by 631 (19 self)
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In a system in which noncooperative agents share a common resource, we propose the ratio between the worst possible Nash equilibrium and the social optimum as a measure of the effectiveness of the system. Deriving upper and lower bounds for this ratio in a model in which several agents share a very simple network leads to some interesting mathematics, results, and open problems.
Algorithmic mechanism design
 Games and Economic Behavior
, 1999
"... We consider algorithmic problems in a distributed setting where the participants cannot be assumed to follow the algorithm but rather their own selfinterest. As such participants, termed agents, are capable of manipulating the algorithm, the algorithm designer should ensure in advance that the agen ..."
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Cited by 563 (17 self)
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We consider algorithmic problems in a distributed setting where the participants cannot be assumed to follow the algorithm but rather their own selfinterest. As such participants, termed agents, are capable of manipulating the algorithm, the algorithm designer should ensure in advance that the agents ’ interests are best served by behaving correctly. Following notions from the field of mechanism design, we suggest a framework for studying such algorithms. Our main technical contribution concerns the study of a representative task scheduling problem for which the standard mechanism design tools do not suffice. Journal of Economic Literature
Sharing the Cost of Multicast Transmissions
 Journal of Computer and System Sciences
, 2001
"... We investigate costsharing algorithms for multicast transmission. Economic considerations point to two distinct mechanisms, marginal cost and Shapley value, as the two solutions most appropriate in this context. We prove that the former has a natural algorithm that uses only two messages per link o ..."
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Cited by 254 (18 self)
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We investigate costsharing algorithms for multicast transmission. Economic considerations point to two distinct mechanisms, marginal cost and Shapley value, as the two solutions most appropriate in this context. We prove that the former has a natural algorithm that uses only two messages per link of the multicast tree, while we give evidence that the latter requires a quadratic total number of messages. We also show that the welfare value achieved by an optimal multicast tree is NPhard to approximate within any constant factor, even for boundeddegree networks. The lowerbound proof for the Shapley value uses a novel algebraic technique for bounding from below the number of messages exchanged in a distributed computation; this technique may prove useful in other contexts as well. 1
Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design: Recent Results and Future Directions
 In Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Discrete Algorithms and Methods for Mobile Computing and Communications
, 2002
"... Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design (DAMD) combines theoretical computer science's traditional focus on computational tractability with its more recent interest in incentive compatibility and distributed computing. The Internet's decentralized nature, in which distributed computation and autono ..."
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Cited by 239 (17 self)
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Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design (DAMD) combines theoretical computer science's traditional focus on computational tractability with its more recent interest in incentive compatibility and distributed computing. The Internet's decentralized nature, in which distributed computation and autonomous agents prevail, makes DAMD a very natural approach for many Internet problems. This paper first outlines the basics of DAMD and then reviews previous DAMD results on multicast cost sharing and interdomain routing. The remainder of the paper describes several promising research directions and poses some specific open problems.
On Selfish Routing in InternetLike Environments
 in Proceedings of ACM SIGCOMM
, 2003
"... Abstract — A recent trend in routing research is to avoid inefficiencies in networklevel routing by allowing hosts to either choose routes themselves (e.g., source routing) or use overlay routing networks (e.g., Detour or RON). Such approaches result in selfish routing, because routing decisions ar ..."
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Cited by 126 (8 self)
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Abstract — A recent trend in routing research is to avoid inefficiencies in networklevel routing by allowing hosts to either choose routes themselves (e.g., source routing) or use overlay routing networks (e.g., Detour or RON). Such approaches result in selfish routing, because routing decisions are no longer based on systemwide criteria but are instead designed to optimize hostbased or overlaybased metrics. A series of theoretical results showing that selfish routing can result in suboptimal system behavior have cast doubts on this approach. In this paper, we use a gametheoretic approach to investigate the performance of selfish routing in Internetlike environments, using realistic topologies and traffic demands in our simulations. We show that in contrast to theoretical worst cases, selfish routing achieves close to optimal average latency in such environments. However, such performance benefit comes at the expense of significantly increased congestion on certain links. Moreover, the adaptive nature of selfish overlays can significantly reduce the effectiveness of traffic engineering by making network traffic less predictable.
The Structure and Complexity of Nash Equilibria for a Selfish Routing Game
, 2002
"... In this work, we study the combinatorial structure and the computational complexity of Nash equilibria for a certain game that models sel sh routing over a network consisting of m parallel links. We assume a collection of n users, each employing a mixed strategy, which is a probability distribu ..."
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Cited by 101 (22 self)
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In this work, we study the combinatorial structure and the computational complexity of Nash equilibria for a certain game that models sel sh routing over a network consisting of m parallel links. We assume a collection of n users, each employing a mixed strategy, which is a probability distribution over links, to control the routing of its own assigned trac. In a Nash equilibrium, each user sel shly routes its trac on those links that minimize its expected latency cost, given the network congestion caused by the other users. The social cost of a Nash equilibrium is the expectation, over all random choices of the users, of the maximum, over all links, latency through a link.
The POPCORN Market  an Online Market for Computational Resources
 ICE 98
, 1998
"... The POPCORN project provides an infrastructure for globally distributed computation over the whole Internet. It provides any programmer connected to the Internet with a single huge virtual parallel computer composed of all processors on the Interne ~ which care to participate at any given moment. PO ..."
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Cited by 93 (1 self)
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The POPCORN project provides an infrastructure for globally distributed computation over the whole Internet. It provides any programmer connected to the Internet with a single huge virtual parallel computer composed of all processors on the Interne ~ which care to participate at any given moment. POPCORN provides a marketbased mechanism for trade in CPU time to motivate processors to provide their CPU cycles for other peoples ’ computations. “Selling” CPU time is as easy as visiting a certain web site with a Javaenabled browser. “Buying” CPU time is done by writing a paraIIel program using the POPCORN paradigm. A third entity in the POPCORN system is a “market” for CPU time, which is where buyers and seIlers meet and trade. The POPCORN system may be visited on our website:
Convergence time to nash equilibria
 In ICALP
, 2003
"... Abstract. We study the number of steps required to reach a pure Nash Equilibrium in a load balancing scenario where each job behaves selfishly and attempts to migrate to a machine which will minimize its cost. We consider a variety of load balancing models, including identical, restricted, related a ..."
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Cited by 82 (5 self)
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Abstract. We study the number of steps required to reach a pure Nash Equilibrium in a load balancing scenario where each job behaves selfishly and attempts to migrate to a machine which will minimize its cost. We consider a variety of load balancing models, including identical, restricted, related and unrelated machines. Our results have a crucial dependence on the weights assigned to jobs. We consider arbitrary weights, integer weights, K distinct weights and identical (unit) weights. We look both at an arbitrary schedule (where the only restriction is that a job migrates to a machine which lowers its cost) and specific efficient schedulers (such as allowing the largest weight job to move first). 1
Programming telecommunication networks
 IEEE Network
, 1997
"... The recent move towards market deregulation and open competition has sparked a wave of serious introspection in the telecommunications service industry. Telecom providers and operators are now required to open up their primary revenue channels to competing industries. In this paper, we examine the s ..."
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Cited by 81 (4 self)
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The recent move towards market deregulation and open competition has sparked a wave of serious introspection in the telecommunications service industry. Telecom providers and operators are now required to open up their primary revenue channels to competing industries. In this paper, we examine the service structure of two major global communication networks  the Telephone Network and the Internet and explore their weaknesses and strengths. Building upon the experience we gained during the development of the initial xbind prototypes, we discuss the realization of an open programable networking environment based on a new service architecture for advanced telecommunication services. Our approach to the problem stems from two angles  one conceptual, the other implementational. In the first, we attempt to develop a service model that is open and reflects the economic market structure of the future telecommunications service industry. We believe that investigating such a model will help cl...
Nash Equilibria of Packet Forwarding Strategies in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
, 2006
"... In selforganizing ad hoc networks, all the networking functions rely on the contribution of the participants. As a basic example, nodes have to forward packets for each other in order to enable multihop communication. In recent years, incentive mechanisms have been proposed to give nodes incentive ..."
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Cited by 70 (10 self)
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In selforganizing ad hoc networks, all the networking functions rely on the contribution of the participants. As a basic example, nodes have to forward packets for each other in order to enable multihop communication. In recent years, incentive mechanisms have been proposed to give nodes incentive to cooperate, especially in packet forwarding. However, the need for these mechanisms was not formally justified. In this paper, we address the problem of whether cooperation can exist without incentive mechanisms. We propose a model based on game theory and graph theory to investigate equilibrium conditions of packet forwarding strategies. We prove theorems about the equilibrium conditions for both cooperative and noncooperative strategies. We perform simulations to estimate the probability that the conditions for a cooperative equilibrium hold in randomly generated network scenarios. As the problem is involved, we deliberately restrict ourselves to a static configuration. We conclude that in static ad hoc networks— where the relationships between the nodes are likely to be stable—cooperation needs to be encouraged.