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Causes and explanations: A structuralmodel approach
 In Proceedings IJCAI01
, 2001
"... We propose a new definition of actual causes, using structural equations to model counterfactuals. We show that the definition yields a plausible and elegant account of causation that handles well examples which have caused problems for other definitions ..."
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Cited by 121 (10 self)
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We propose a new definition of actual causes, using structural equations to model counterfactuals. We show that the definition yields a plausible and elegant account of causation that handles well examples which have caused problems for other definitions
Probabilities of Causation: Bounds and Identification
 Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
, 2000
"... This paper deals with the problem of estimating the probability of causation, that is, the probability that one event was the real cause of another, in a given scenario. Starting from structuralsemantical definitions of the probabilities of necessary or sufficient causation (or both), we show h ..."
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Cited by 14 (10 self)
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This paper deals with the problem of estimating the probability of causation, that is, the probability that one event was the real cause of another, in a given scenario. Starting from structuralsemantical definitions of the probabilities of necessary or sufficient causation (or both), we show how to bound these quantities from data obtained in experimental and observational studies, under general assumptions concerning the datagenerating process. In particular, we strengthen the results of Pearl (1999) by presenting sharp bounds based on combined experimental and nonexperimental data under no process assumptions, as well as under the mild assumptions of exogeneity (no confounding) and monotonicity (no prevention). These results delineate more precisely the basic assumptions that must be made before statistical measures such as the excessriskratio could be used for assessing attributional quantities such as the probability of causation. 1
Ideas about causation in philosophy and psychology
 Psychological Bulletin
, 1990
"... Philosophical theories summarized here include regularity and necessity theories from Hume to the present; manipulability theory; the theory of powerful particulars; causation as connected changes within a denned state of affairs; departures from "normal " events or from some standard for ..."
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Cited by 12 (0 self)
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Philosophical theories summarized here include regularity and necessity theories from Hume to the present; manipulability theory; the theory of powerful particulars; causation as connected changes within a denned state of affairs; departures from "normal " events or from some standard for comparison; causation as a transfer of something between objects; and causal propagation and production. Issues found in this literature and of relevance for psychology include whether actual causal relations can be perceived or known; what sorts of things people believe can be causes; different levels of causal analysis; the distinction between the causal relation itself and cues to causal relations; causal frames or fields; internal and external causes; and understanding of causation in different realms of the world, such as the natural and artificial realms. A full theory of causal inference by laypeople should address all of these issues. The main purpose of this article is to survey philosophical theories of causation in a manner intended to be suitable for psychologists interested in causation. The article has two sections: The first presents brief summaries of philosophical theories of causation from Aristotle to the present. In the second, issues found in the philosophical literature are used to suggest new approaches to the study of causation in psychology. Philosophical Theories of Causation Several psychologists have written about selected philosophical theories of causation (Cook & Campbell, 1979; Einhorn &
A simple multivariate test for asymmetric hypotheses
 Political Analysis
, 2006
"... In this paper, we argue that claims of necessity and sufficiency involve a type of asymmetric causal claim that is useful in many social scientific contexts. Contrary to some qualitative researchers, we maintain that there is nothing about such asymmetries that should lead scholars to depart from st ..."
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Cited by 4 (0 self)
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In this paper, we argue that claims of necessity and sufficiency involve a type of asymmetric causal claim that is useful in many social scientific contexts. Contrary to some qualitative researchers, we maintain that there is nothing about such asymmetries that should lead scholars to depart from standard social science practice. We take as given that deterministic and monocausal tests are inappropriate in the social world and demonstrate that standard multiplicative interaction models are up to the task of handling asymmetric causal claims in a multivariate, probabilistic manner. We illustrate our argument with examples from the empirical literature linking electoral institutions and party system size. 1
On the Definition of Actual Cause
, 1998
"... This report is based on lecture notes written for CS 262C, Spring 1998, and is organized as follows. Following a review of the SL framework (Section 2) Section 3 provides a comparison to other approaches to causation and suggests an explanation of why the notion of actual cause has encountered diffi ..."
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Cited by 3 (1 self)
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This report is based on lecture notes written for CS 262C, Spring 1998, and is organized as follows. Following a review of the SL framework (Section 2) Section 3 provides a comparison to other approaches to causation and suggests an explanation of why the notion of actual cause has encountered difficulties in those approaches. Section 3 defines "actual cause" and illustrates, through examples, how the "probability that event X = x actually caused event
Causality and Causation: The Inadequacy of the Received View
"... ©This paper is not for reproduction without permission of the author. The attempt to 'analyze ' causation seems to have reached an impasse; the proposals on hand seem so widely divergent that one wonders whether they are all analyses of one and the same concept. (Kim 1995: 112). The object ..."
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©This paper is not for reproduction without permission of the author. The attempt to 'analyze ' causation seems to have reached an impasse; the proposals on hand seem so widely divergent that one wonders whether they are all analyses of one and the same concept. (Kim 1995: 112). The objective of this article is twofold: (1) to point out that the current theories of causation are radically inadequate, (2) to show the historical roots of this inadequacy. The structure of this article is as follows: first, I will give a general sketch of the most important contemporary approaches to causation. Next, in the second part, I will briefly discuss the historical development of the concept of cause; I will show that the history of the concept of cause reveals a complex evolution marked by two decisive milestones: (I) the Aristotelian (scholastic) Conception, and (II) the Scientific Conception, which are two mutually incompatible conceptions. In the third part, I will discuss some fundamental presuppositions of the received view regarding causation. I will show that this view is inadequate in several respects, and that this inadequacy is (partly) due to the failure to recognize the historical roots of concepts related to causation. More particularly, it will be shown that the received view is based upon two incompatible categoreal frameworks, which have their origin in,
unknown title
"... Omissions are puzzling, so puzzling that people tend to say puzzling things about them and give up otherwise attractive philosophical theories in order to accommodate them. 1 In this paper I suggest that omissions make trouble (serious trouble, and trouble of a new, sui generis kind) for “causalism, ..."
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Omissions are puzzling, so puzzling that people tend to say puzzling things about them and give up otherwise attractive philosophical theories in order to accommodate them. 1 In this paper I suggest that omissions make trouble (serious trouble, and trouble of a new, sui generis kind) for “causalism, ” the standard view or family of views about agency.
Probabilities
"... This paper deals with the problem of estimating the probability of causation, that is, the probability that one event was the real cause of another, in a given scenario. Starting from structuralsemantical definitions of the probabilities of necessary or sufficient causation (or both), we show how t ..."
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This paper deals with the problem of estimating the probability of causation, that is, the probability that one event was the real cause of another, in a given scenario. Starting from structuralsemantical definitions of the probabilities of necessary or sufficient causation (or both), we show how to bound these quantities from data obtained in experimental and observational studies, under general assumptions concerning the datagenerating process. In particular, we strengthen the results of Pearl [39] by presenting sharp bounds based on combined experimental and nonexperimental data under no process assumptions, as well as under the mild assumptions of exogeneity (no confounding) and monotonicity (no prevention). These results delineate more precisely the basic assumptions that must be made before statistical measures such as the excessriskratio could be used for assessing attributional quantities such as the probability of causation. 1.
The Mathematics of Causal Relations
, 2008
"... This paper introduces empirical researchers to recent advances in causal inference and stresses the paradigmatic shifts that must be undertaken in moving from traditional statistical analysis to causal analysis of multivariate data. Special emphasis is placed on the assumptions that underly all caus ..."
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This paper introduces empirical researchers to recent advances in causal inference and stresses the paradigmatic shifts that must be undertaken in moving from traditional statistical analysis to causal analysis of multivariate data. Special emphasis is placed on the assumptions that underly all causal inferences, the languages used in formulating those assumptions, and the conditional nature of causal claims inferred from nonexperimental studies. In particular, the paper advocates a formalism based on nonparametric structural equations [Pearl, 2000a] which provides both a mathematical foundation for the analysis of counterfactuals and a conceptually transparent language for expressing causal knowledge. This framework gives rise to a friendly calculus of causation that uni es the graphical, potential outcome (NeymanRubin) and structural equation approaches and resolves longstanding problems in several of the sciences. These include questions of confounding, causal e ect estimation, policy analysis, legal responsibility, direct and indirect e ects, instrumental variables, surrogate designs, and the integration of data from experimental and observational studies.