A theoretical framework for grounding language is introduced that provides a computational path from sensing and motor action to words and speech acts. The approach combines concepts from semiotics and schema theory to develop a holistic approach to linguistic meaning. Schemas serve as structured beliefs that are grounded in an agent’s physical environment through a causal-predictive cycle of action and perception. Words and basic speech acts are interpreted in terms of grounded schemas. The framework reflects lessons learned from implementations of several language processing robots. It provides a basis for the analysis and design of situated, multimodal communication systems that straddle symbolic and non-symbolic realms.

Worked examples are instructional devices that provide an expert's problem solution for a learner to study. Worked-examples research is a cognitive-experimental program that has relevance to classroom in-struction and the broader educational research community. A frame-work for organizing the findings of this research is proposed, leading to instructional design principles. For instance, one instructional de-sign principle suggests that effective examples have highly integrated components. They employ multiple modalities in presentation and em-phasize conceptual structure by labeling or segmenting. At the lesson level, effective instruction employs multiple examples for each concep-tual problem type, varies example formats within problem type, and employs surface features to signal deep structure. Also, examples should be presented in close proximity to matched practice problems. More-over, learners can be encouraged through direct training or by the structure of the worked example to actively self:explain examples. Worked examples are associated with early stages of skill develop-ment, but the design principles are relevant to constructivist research and teaching. The Historical Context In recent years, learning from "worked examples " has received a consider-able amount of attention from researchers (e.g., Chi, Bassok, Lewis, Reimann, & Glaser, 1989; Ward & Sweller, 1990), particularly in such fields as mathematics, physics, and computer programming. Although there is no precise definition, worked examples share certain family resemblance (Wittgenstein, 1953). As instructional devices, they typically include a problem statement and a proce-dure for solving the problem; together, these are meant to show how other similar problems might be solved. In a sense, they provide an expert's problem-

The authors wish to express their appreciation to James Pichert for his aid in constructing materials and examples for this study. Sometimes the order of authors indicates disproportionate contributions. In this case each author had an integral role in the research. The research

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Exemplar, prototype, and connectionist models typically assume that events constitute the basic unit of learning and representation in categorization. In these models, each learning event updates a statistical representation of a category independently of other learning events. An implication is that events involving the same individual affect learning independently and are not integrated into a single structure that represents the individual in an internal model of the world. A series of experiments demonstrates that human subjects track individuals across events, establish representations of them, and use these representations in categorization. These findings are consistent with ‘‘representationalism,’ ’ the view that an internal model of the world constitutes a physical level of representation in the brain, and that the brain does not simply capture the statistical properties of events in an undifferentiated dynamical system. Although categorization is an inherently statistical process that produces generalization, pattern completion, frequency effects, and adaptive learning, it is also an inherently representational process that establishes an internal model of the world. As a result, representational structures evolve in memory to track the histories of individuals, accumulate information about them, and simulate

As the scope and complexity of modern task demands exceed the capability of individuals to perform, teams are emerging to shoulder the burgeoning requirements. Accordingly, researchers have striven to understand and enhance human performance in team settings. The purpose of this review is to summarize that research, from the theoretical underpinnings that drive it, to the identi ® cation of team-level elements of success, to the methodologies and instruments that capture and measure those characteristics. Further speci ® ed are three important avenues to creating successful teams: team selection, task design and team training. In other words, one can select the right people, provide them with a task engineered for superior performance and train them in the appropriate skills to accomplish that task. Under task design, new technologies and automation are examined that both support and impede team functioning. Finally, throughout are provided critical remarks about what is known about teamwork and what is needed to be known to move the science and practice of team performance forward. The paper concludes with the identi ® cation of team issues that require further investigation.

Many presence studies show the importance of display variables in determining presence. However, very little empirical evidence exists to support the notion of “the suspension of disbelief ” or other psychological determinants of presence. We argue from a cognitive presence perspective that presence can be considered as an extension of perception, a process which is known to be significantly affected by the perceiver’s mental state. We support our argument by presenting the results of a large study (n=103) in which users were conceptually primed by reading a booklet either related to or unrelated to a VE and then were left to explore that VE with either a high quality or low quality display. We found a significant interaction effect between display quality and priming, showing that the mental state of the user sets a context which affects their experience of presence as measured using two scales. We conclude that, like perception, presence does not simply occur as a consequence of sensory input only, but that it is a constructive process in which the VE user creates an experience using both sensory and psychological inputs.

Traditional accounts of sequential behavior assume that schemas and goals play a causal role in the control of behavior. In contrast, M. Botvinick and D. C. Plaut (2004) argued that, at least in routine behavior, schemas and goals are epiphenomenal. The authors evaluate the Botvinick and Plaut account by contrasting the simple recurrent network model of Botvinick and Plaut with their own more traditional hierarchically structured interactive activation model (R. P. Cooper & T. Shallice, 2000). The authors present a range of arguments and additional simulations that demonstrate theoretical and empirical difficulties for both Botvinick and Plaut’s model and their theoretical position. The authors conclude that explicit hierarchically organized and causally efficacious schema and goal representations are required to provide an adequate account of the flexibility of sequential behavior.

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