We consider algorithmic problems in a distributed setting where the participants cannot be assumed to follow the algorithm but rather their own self-interest. As such participants, termed agents, are capable of manipulating the algorithm, the algorithm designer should ensure in advance that the agents ’ interests are best served by behaving correctly. Following notions from the field of mechanism design, we suggest a framework for studying such algorithms. Our main technical contribution concerns the study of a representative task scheduling problem for which the standard mechanism design tools do not suffice. Journal of Economic Literature

We study auctions with severe bounds on the communication allowed: each bidder may only transmit t bits of information to the auctioneer. We consider both welfare-maximizing and revenuemaximizing auctions under this communication restriction. For both measures, we determine the optimal auction and show that the loss incurred relative to unconstrained auctions is mild. We prove non-surprising properties of these kinds of auctions, e.g. that discrete prices are informationally ecient, as well as some surprising properties, e.g. that asymmetric auctions are better than symmetric ones.

We describe a general-purpose architecture for applying economic mechanisms for resource allocation in distributed systems. Such economic mechanisms are required in settings such as the Internet, where resources belong to dierent owners. Our architecture is built above standard distributed-object frameworks, and provides a market for arbitrary distributed object resources. We rst describe the abstract elements and properties of an architecture that can be applied over essentially any distributed object-based platform. We then describe the MAJIC