An ad-hoc mobile network is a collection of mobile nodes that are dynamically and arbitrarily located in such a manner that the interconnections between nodes are capable of changing on a continual basis. In order to facilitate communication within the network, a routing protocol is used to discover routes between nodes. The primary goal of such an ad-hoc network routing protocol is correct and efficient route establishment between a pair of nodes so that messages may be delivered in a timely manner. Route construction should be done with a minimum of overhead and bandwidth consumption. This paper examines routing protocols for ad-hoc networks and evaluates these protocols based on a given set of parameters. The paper provides an overview of eight different protocols by presenting their characteristics and functionality, and then provides a comparison and discussion of their respective merits and drawbacks.

As sensor networks edge closer towards wide-spread deployment, security issues become a central concern. So far, the main research focus has been on making sensor networks feasible and useful, and less emphasis was placed on security. We design a suite of security...

This paper presents the expected transmission count metric (ETX), which finds high-throughput paths on multi-hop wireless networks. ETX minimizes the expected total number of packet transmissions (including retransmissions) required to successfully deliver a packet to the ultimate destination. The ETX metric incorporates the effects of link loss ratios, asymmetry in the loss ratios between the two directions of each link, and interference among the successive links of a path. In contrast, the minimum hop-count metric chooses arbitrarily among the different paths of the same minimum length, regardless of the often large differences in throughput among those paths, and ignoring the possibility that a longer path might offer higher throughput. This

Abstract — Ad hoc networks are characterized by multihop wireless connectivity, frequently changing network topology and the need for efficient dynamic routing protocols. We compare the performance of two prominent ondemand routing protocols for mobile ad hoc networks — Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) and Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing (AODV). A detailed simulation model with MAC and physical layer models is used to study interlayer interactions and their performance implications. We demonstrate that even though DSR and AODV share a similar on-demand behavior, the differences in the protocol mechanics can lead to significant performance differentials. The performance differentials are analyzed using varying network load, mobility and network size. Based on the observations, we make recommendations about how the performance of either protocol can be improved.

For such self-organizing infrastructures as mobile ad hoc networks , envisioned to operate in an open, collaborative, and highly volatile environment, the importance of secu- rity cannot be underrated. The provision of comprehen- sive secure communication mandates that both route dis- covery and data forwarding be safeguarded. The discussed here Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) [1] counters malicious behavior that targets the discovery of topological informa- tion. The protection of the data transmission is a separate problem: an intermittently misbehaving attacker could first comply with the route discovery to make itself part of a route, and then corrupt the in-transit data. Protection of data transmission is addressed through our related Secure Message Transmission Protocol (SMT), which provides a flexible, end-to-end secure data forwarding scheme that naturally complement SRP. Here we discuss the design of SRP only, while SMT is the subject of another publication.

Abstract — As mobile ad hoc network applications are deployed, security emerges as a central requirement. In this paper, we introduce the wormhole attack, a severe attack in ad hoc networks that is particularly challenging to defend against. The wormhole attack is possible even if the attacker has not compromised any hosts, and even if all communication provides authenticity and confidentiality. In the wormhole attack, an attacker records packets (or bits) at one location in the network, tunnels them (possibly selectively) to another location, and retransmits them there into the network. The wormhole attack can form a serious threat in wireless networks, especially against many ad hoc network routing protocols and location-based wireless security systems. For example, most existing ad hoc network routing protocols, without some mechanism to defend against the wormhole attack, would be unable to find routes longer than one or two hops, severely disrupting communication. We present a new, general mechanism, called packet leashes, for detecting and thus defending against wormhole attacks, and we present a specific protocol, called TIK, that implements leashes. I.

We consider routing security in wireless sensor networks. Many sensor network routing protocols have been proposed, but none of them have been designed with security as agq1( We propose securitygcur forrouting in sensor networks, show how attacks agacks ad-hoc and peer-to-peer networks can be adapted into powerful attacks agacks sensor networks, introduce two classes of novel attacks agacks sensor networks----sinkholes and HELLO floods, and analyze the security of all the major sensor networkrouting protocols. We describe crippling attacks against all of them and sug@(5 countermeasures anddesig considerations. This is the first such analysis of secure routing in sensor networks.

This study examines the random waypoint model widely used in the simulation studies of mobile ad hoc networks. Our findings show that this model fails to provide a steady state in that the average nodal speed consistently decreases over time, and therefore should not be directly used for simulation. We show how unreliable results can be obtained by using this model. In particular, certain ad hoc routing metrics can drop by as much as 40% over the course of a 900-second simulation using the random waypoint model. We give both an intuitive and a formal explanation for this phenomenon. We also propose a simple fix of the problem and discuss a few alternatives. Our modified random waypoint model is able to reach a steady state and simulation results are presented.

An ad hoc network is a collection of wireless computers (nodes), communicating among themselves over possibly multihop paths, without the help of any infrastructure such as base stations or access points. Although many previous ad hoc network routing protocols have been based in part on distance vector approaches, they have generally assumed a trusted environment. In this paper, we design and evaluate the Secure Efficient Ad hoc Distance vector routing protocol (SEAD), a secure ad hoc network routing protocol based on the design of the Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector routing protocol. In order to support use with nodes of limited CPU processing capability, and to guard against Denial-of-Service attacks in which an attacker attempts to cause other nodes to consume excess network bandwidth or processing time, we use efficient one-way hash functions and do not use asymmetric cryptographic operations in the protocol. SEAD performs well over the range of scenarios we tested, and is robust against multiple uncoordinated attackers creating incorrect routing state in any other node, even in spite of any active attackers or compromised nodes in the network.

Most recent ad hoc network research has focused on providing routing services without considering security. In this paper, we detail security threats against ad hoc routing protocols, specifically examining AODV and DSR. In light of these threats, we identify three different environments with distinct security requirements. We propose a solution to one, the managed-open scenario where no network infrastructure is pre-deployed, but a small amount of prior security coordination is expected. Our protocol, ARAN, is based on certificates and successfully defeats all identified attacks.