Results 1 -
2 of
2
Alonzo Church's contributions to philosophy and Intensional Logic
, 1998
"... Entities in Semantical Analysis" [20] 12 (hereafter, "NAESA"), it is said that one should give rules of sense (and of sense values) but a few years later, Church allows also the desirability of specifying rules of synonymy and rules of non-synonymy in connection with a formalized language, at leas ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 1 (0 self)
- Add to MetaCart
Entities in Semantical Analysis" [20] 12 (hereafter, "NAESA"), it is said that one should give rules of sense (and of sense values) but a few years later, Church allows also the desirability of specifying rules of synonymy and rules of non-synonymy in connection with a formalized language, at least for 10 IML, p. 53. See also XV 221, 1950. Similar considerations about proof appear in John Myhill [52] and in the writings of other logicians. 11 Typically, if one is just formulating a logic, rather than a full-fledged formalized language, there are few denoting expressions. In certain formulations of the propositional calculus there occurs a sentential constant, say `f ', which denotes the truth-value f (falsehood) and in Church's formulations of the Logic of Sense and Denotation (cf. 3.3.1), there are more denoters. 12 Aptly renamed "Intensional Semantics" for publication in Martinich [50]. Church was never really happy with the original title. 132 C. ANTHONY ANDERSON certain ...
Revamping the Restriction Strategy by
, 2007
"... This study continues the anti-realist’s quest for a principled way to avoid Fitch’s paradox. It is proposed that the Cartesian restriction on the anti-realist’s knowability principle ‘ϕ, therefore ✸Kϕ ’ should be formulated as a consistency requirement not on the premise ϕ of an application of the r ..."
Abstract
- Add to MetaCart
This study continues the anti-realist’s quest for a principled way to avoid Fitch’s paradox. It is proposed that the Cartesian restriction on the anti-realist’s knowability principle ‘ϕ, therefore ✸Kϕ ’ should be formulated as a consistency requirement not on the premise ϕ of an application of the rule, but rather on the set of assumptions on which the relevant occurrence of ϕ depends. It is stressed, by reference to illustrative proofs, how important it is to have proofs in normal form before applying the proposed restriction. A similar restriction is proposed for the converse inference, the so-called Rule of Factiveness ‘✸Kϕ therefore ϕ’. The proposed restriction appears to block another Fitch-style derivation that uses the KK-thesis in order to get around the Cartesian restriction on applications of the knowability principle. ∗ To appear in Joseph Salerno, ed., All Truths are Known: New Essays on the Knowability Paradox, Oxford University Press. This paper would not have been written without the stimulation, encouragement and criticism that I have enjoyed from Joseph Salerno, Salvatore Florio, Christina Moisa, Nicholaos Jones, and Patrick Reeder.

