Rational models of cognition typically consider the abstract computational problems posed by the environment, assuming that people are capable of optimally solving those problems. This differs from more traditional formal models of cognition, which focus on the psychological processes responsible for behavior. A basic challenge for rational models is thus explaining how optimal solutions can be approximated by psychological processes. We outline a general strategy for answering this question, namely to explore the psychological plausibility of approximation algorithms developed in computer science and statistics. In particular, we argue that Monte Carlo methods provide a source of “rational process models” that connect optimal solutions to psychological processes. We support this argument through a detailed example, applying this approach to Anderson’s (1990, 1991) Rational Model of Categorization (RMC), which involves a particularly challenging computational problem. Drawing on a connection between the RMC and ideas from nonparametric Bayesian statistics, we propose two alternative algorithms for approximate inference in this model. The algorithms we consider include Gibbs sampling, a procedure

We argue that the apparent inconsistency between people's intuitions about chance and the normative predictions of probability theory, as expressed in judgments about randomness and coincidences, can be resolved by focussing on the evidence observations provide about the processes that generated them, rather than their likelihood. This argument is supported by probabilistic modeling of sequence and number production, together with two experiments that examine people's judgments about coincidences.

v Declaration .................................... ix Acknowledgements................................ xi 1Prelude 1 TheVeryIdeaofRepresentation......................... 2 TypesofSimilarity ................................ 8 IsSimilarityIndeterminate? ........................... 11 TheRoleofSimilarityinCognition....................... 11 Summary&GeneralDiscussion......................... 14 2 Theories of Similarity 17 SimilarityDataSets................................ 17 SpatialRepresentation .............................. 21 FeaturalRepresentation.............................. 31 TreeRepresentation................................ 40 NetworkRepresentation ............................. 47 Alignment-BasedSimilarityModels....................... 48 TransformationalSimilarityModels ....................... 50 Summary&GeneralDiscussion......................... 54 i 3 On Representational Complexity 55 ApproachestoModelSelection ......................... 57 ChoosinganAdditiveClusteringRepresentation ................ 67 ChoosinganAdditiveTreeRepresentation ................... 82 ChoosingaSpatialRepresentation........................ 94 Summary&GeneralDiscussion......................... 95 4 Featural Representation 97 AMenagerieofFeaturalModels......................... 98 ClusteringModels.................................104 GeometricComplexityCriteria..........................106 AlgorithmsforFittingFeaturalModels .....................107 MonteCarloStudyI:DotheAlgorithmsWork? ................109 RepresentationsofKinshipTerms ........................117 MonteCarloStudyII:Complexity........................122 ExperimentI:Faces................................125 ExperimentII:Countries .............................1...

How do people determine which elements of a set are most representative of that set? We extend an existing Bayesian measure of representativeness, which indicates the representativeness of a sample from a distribution, to define a measure of the representativeness of an item to a set. We show that this measure is formally related to a machine learning method known as Bayesian Sets. Building on this connection, we derive an analytic expression for the representativeness of objects described by a sparse vector of binary features. We then apply this measure to a large database of images, using it to determine which images are the most representative members of different sets. Comparing the resulting predictions to human judgments of representativeness provides a test of this measure with naturalistic stimuli, and illustrates how databases that are more commonly used in computer vision and machine learning can be used to evaluate psychological theories. 1