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165
Evolutionary Game Theory
, 1995
"... Abstract. Experimentalists frequently claim that human subjects in the laboratory violate gametheoretic predictions. It is here argued that this claim is usually premature. The paper elaborates on this theme by way of raising some conceptual and methodological issues in connection with the very def ..."
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Cited by 736 (11 self)
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Abstract. Experimentalists frequently claim that human subjects in the laboratory violate gametheoretic predictions. It is here argued that this claim is usually premature. The paper elaborates on this theme by way of raising some conceptual and methodological issues in connection with the very definition of a game and of players ’ preferences, in particular with respect to potential context dependence, interpersonal preference dependence, backward induction and incomplete information.
Quantal Response Equilibria For Normal Form Games
 NORMAL FORM GAMES, GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
, 1995
"... We investigate the use of standard statistical models for quantal choice in a game theoretic setting. Players choose strategies based on relative expected utility, and assume other players do so as well. We define a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) as a fixed point of this process, and establish e ..."
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Cited by 477 (26 self)
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We investigate the use of standard statistical models for quantal choice in a game theoretic setting. Players choose strategies based on relative expected utility, and assume other players do so as well. We define a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) as a fixed point of this process, and establish existence. For a logit specification of the error structure, we show that as the error goes to zero, QRE approaches a subset of Nash equilibria and also implies a unique selection from the set of Nash equilibria in generic games. We fit the model to a variety of experimental data sets by using maximum likelihood estimatation.
A game theoretic framework for bandwidth allocation and pricing in broadband networks
 IEEE/ACM Trans. on Networking
, 2000
"... Abstract—In this paper, we present a game theoretic framework for bandwidth allocation for elastic services in highspeed networks. The framework is based on the idea of the Nash bargaining solution from cooperative game theory, which not only provides the rate settings of users that are Pareto opti ..."
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Cited by 191 (5 self)
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Abstract—In this paper, we present a game theoretic framework for bandwidth allocation for elastic services in highspeed networks. The framework is based on the idea of the Nash bargaining solution from cooperative game theory, which not only provides the rate settings of users that are Pareto optimal from the point of view of the whole system, but are also consistent with the fairness axioms of game theory. We first consider the centralized problem and then show that this procedure can be decentralized so that greedy optimization by users yields the system optimal bandwidth allocations. We propose a distributed algorithm for implementing the optimal and fair bandwidth allocation and provide conditions for its convergence. The paper concludes with the pricing of elastic connections based on users ’ bandwidth requirements and users’ budget. We show that the above bargaining framework can be used to characterize a rate allocation and a pricing policy which takes into account users ’ budget in a fair way and such that the total network revenue is maximized. Index Terms—Bandwidth allocation, elastic traffic, game theory, Nash bargaining solution, pricing. I.
A crash course in implementation theory
 SOC CHOICE WELFARE
, 2001
"... This paper is meant to familiarize the audience with some of the fundamental results in the theory of implementation and provide a quick progression to some open questions in the literature. ..."
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Cited by 87 (2 self)
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This paper is meant to familiarize the audience with some of the fundamental results in the theory of implementation and provide a quick progression to some open questions in the literature.
Evolutionary Games in Economics
 Econometrica
, 1991
"... Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at ..."
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Cited by 73 (3 self)
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Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth
 Century Economics.” Quarterly Journal of Economics
"... In the �eld of economics, perhaps the most important break with the past—one that leaves open huge areas for future work—lies in the economics of information. It is now recognized that information is imperfect, obtaining information can be costly, there are important asymmetries of information, and ..."
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Cited by 72 (0 self)
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In the �eld of economics, perhaps the most important break with the past—one that leaves open huge areas for future work—lies in the economics of information. It is now recognized that information is imperfect, obtaining information can be costly, there are important asymmetries of information, and the extent of information asymmetries is affected by actions of �rms and individuals. This recognition deeply affects the understanding of wisdom inherited from the past, such as the fundamental welfare theorem and some of the basic characterization of a market economy, and provides explanations of economic and social phenomena that otherwise would be hard to understand. I.
Efficient Computation of Behavior Strategies
 GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
, 1996
"... We propose the sequence form as a new strategic description for an extensive game with perfect recall. It is similar to the normal form but has linear instead of exponential complexity, and allows a direct representation and efficient computation of behavior strategies. Pure strategies and their mix ..."
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Cited by 50 (8 self)
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We propose the sequence form as a new strategic description for an extensive game with perfect recall. It is similar to the normal form but has linear instead of exponential complexity, and allows a direct representation and efficient computation of behavior strategies. Pure strategies and their mixed strategy probabilities are replaced by sequences of consecutive choices and their realization probabilities. A zerosum game is solved by a corresponding linear program that has linear size in the size of the game tree. General twoperson games are studied in the paper by Koller, Megiddo, and von Stengel in this journal issue.
Deterministic approximation of stochastic evolution in games
, 2002
"... This paper provides deterministic approximation results for stochastic processes that arise when finite populations recurrently play finite games. The processes are Markov chains, and the approximation is defined in continuous time as a system of ordinary differential equations of the type studied ..."
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Cited by 47 (3 self)
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This paper provides deterministic approximation results for stochastic processes that arise when finite populations recurrently play finite games. The processes are Markov chains, and the approximation is defined in continuous time as a system of ordinary differential equations of the type studied in evolutionary game theory. We establish precise connections between the longrun behavior of the discrete stochastic process, for large populations, and its deterministic flow approximation. In particular, we provide probabilistic bounds on exit times from and visitation rates to neighborhoods of attractors to the deterministic flow. We sharpen these results in the special case of ergodic processes.
Laws of Large Numbers for Dynamical Systems with Randomly Matched Individuals
 Journal of Economic Theory
, 1992
"... Biologists and economists have analyzed populations where each individual interacts with randomly selected individuals. The random matching generates a very complicated stochastic system. Consequently biologists and economists have approximated such a system with a deterministic system. The justitic ..."
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Cited by 37 (0 self)
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Biologists and economists have analyzed populations where each individual interacts with randomly selected individuals. The random matching generates a very complicated stochastic system. Consequently biologists and economists have approximated such a system with a deterministic system. The justitication for such an approximation is that the population is assumed to be very large and thus some law of large numbers must hold. This paper gives a characterization of random matching schemes for countably infinite populations. In particular this paper shows that there exists a random matching scheme such that the stochastic system and the deterministic system are the same. Journal of Economic Literature Classification