Abstract. We propose a modular formal ontology of the biomedical domain with two components, one for biological objects, corresponding broadly to anatomy, and one for biological processes, corresponding broadly to physiology. The result constitutes what might be described as a joint venture between two perspectives – of

Sponsor: ESC Contract No.: FA9721-04-0001

The paper presents a new method for generating typologies of formal-ontological relations. The guiding idea is that formal relations are those sorts of relations which hold between entities which are constituents of distinct ontologies. We provide examples of ontologies (in the spirit of Zemach’s classic “Four Ontologies ” of 1970), and show how these can be used to give a rich typology of formal relations in a way which also throws light on the opposition between threeand four-dimensionalism. There are many candidate formal-ontological relations, for instance: identity and difference, parthood and overlap, inherence and dependence, participation and location. Our task in what follows is to provide a principle for generating the complete family of such relations. This will mean providing an account of what formal-ontological relations are, and of how they differ from relations of other types (for instance from static material relations such as lies on and fits into, from material relational events such as kisses and thumps, from comparative relations such as is taller than and is further from Witwatersrand than, and from family relations such as is the brother of and is consanguineous with). The starting point for our endeavours is a philosophical position which we call realist perspectivalism (Grenon 2003a; Smith and Brogaard 2003). This consists in the view that any given domain of reality can be viewed from a number of different ontological perspectives, all of which can have equal claim to veridicality. Compare the way in which medical science is divided into anatomy and physiology: the former tells us about the structures of the human

The well-known distinction between field-based and object-based approaches to spatial information is generalised to arbitrary locational frameworks, including in particular space, time and space-time. We systematically explore the different ways in which these approaches can be combined, and address the relative merits of a fully four-dimensional approach as against a more conventional ‘three-plus-one’-dimensional approach. We single out as especially interesting in this respect a class of phenomena, here called multiaspect phenomena, which seem to present different aspects when considered from different points of view. Such phenomena (e.g., floods, wildfires, processions) are proposed as the most natural candidates for treatment as fully four-dimensional entities (‘hyperobjects’), but it remains problematic how to model them so as to do justice to their multi-aspectual nature. The paper ends with a range of important researchable questions aimed at clearing up some of the difficulties raised.

Abstract. Ontologies have been part of developing information systems in Shell for some twenty years, taking the form of data models and reference data used within information systems. A problem in reusing or integrating systems is the context that they assume, which may not be valid beyond the scope of an implementation. Lessons learnt include trying to ensure that the context is explicit, and that what are really local rules in a global context are not defined as global rules in a local context. These lessons have been applied in the development of International Standards to provide an architecture for integration and a data model that includes both a foundation ontology that has been developed on a well defined and consistent basis, and provides a framework for extension of the ontology through reference data.

Abstract not found

In this critical notice we argue against William Craig’s recent attempt to reconcile presentism (roughly, the view that only the present is real) with relativity theory. Craig’s defense of his position boils down to endorsing a “neo-Lorentzian interpretation ” of special relativity. We contend that his reconstruction of Lorentz’s theory and its historical development is fatally flawed and that his arguments for reviving this theory fail on many counts.

In the present paper I aim at introducing a formal framework to deal with persistence and change of material objects in time. I first consider three main ontological theories: perdurantism ([6], [7], [16]), endurantism ([18]) and sequentialism ([2]); then develop a formal account for these theories, by making use of semantics for quantified modal logics: Kripke semantics ([3], [10]), the substantial interpretation ([5]) and counterpart semantics ([1]) respectively. I show that each interpretation soundly formalizes the corresponding ontological account, by referring to three features of these semantics: (i) the nature of individuals appearing in the domains of these structures, (ii) the principles on identity sound with respect to each account, (iii) the representation and solution of ontological problems within the logical frameworks. I conclude that Kripke semantics, the substantial interpretation and counterpart semantics are a sound formalization for perdurantism, endurantism and sequentialism respectively. Finally I outline some applications of these formalisms, in order to cope with

Even if we are able to decide on a canonical formulation of our theory, there is the further problem of metaphysical underdetermination with respect to, for example, whether the entities postulated by a theory are individuals or not... We need to recognise the failure of our best theories to determine even the most fundamental ontological characteristic of the purported entities they feature... What is required is a shift to a different ontological basis altogether, one for which questions of individuality simply do not arise. Perhaps we should view the individuals and nonindividuals packages, like particle and field pictures, as different representations of the same structure. There is an analogy here with the debate about substantivalism in general relativity. (Ladyman, 1998) In his paper “What is Structural Realism? ” (1998) James Ladyman drew a distinction between epistemological structural realism (ESR) and metaphysical (or ontic) structural realism (OSR). In recent years this distinction has set much of the agenda for philosophers of science interested in scientific realism. It has also led to the emergence of a related discussion in the philosophy of physics that concerns the alleged difficulties of interpreting general relativity that revolve around the question of the ontological status of spacetime points. Ladyman drew a suggestive analogy between the perennial debate between substantivalist and relationalist interpretations of spacetime on the one hand, and the debate about whether quantum mechanics treats identical particles as individuals or as ‘non-individuals ’ on the other. In both cases, Ladyman’s suggestion is that a structural realist interpretation of the physics—in particular, an ontic structural realism—might

Abstract. The so-called “argument from vagueness”, the clearest formulation of which is to be found in Ted Sider’s book Four-dimensionalism, is among the most powerful and innovative arguments offered in support of the view that objects are four-dimensional perdurants. The argument is defective—I submit—and in a number of ways that is worth looking into. But each “defect”, each gap in the argument, corresponds to a model of change that is independently problematic and that can hardly be built into the common-sense picture of the world. So once all the gaps of the argument are filled in, the three-dimensionalist is left with the burden of a response that cannot rely on a passive plea for common sense. The argument is not a threat to common sense as such; it is a threat to the three-dimensionalist faithfulness to common sense.