this paper: default reasoning. In recent years, a number of different semantics for defaults have been proposed, such as preferential structures, ffl-semantics, possibilistic structures, and -rankings, that have been shown to be characterized by the same set of axioms, known as the KLM properties. While this was viewed as a surprise, we show here that it is almost inevitable. In the framework of plausibility measures, we can give a necessary condition for the KLM axioms to be sound, and an additional condition necessary and sufficient to ensure that the KLM axioms are complete. This additional condition is so weak that it is almost always met whenever the axioms are sound. In particular, it is easily seen to hold for all the proposals made in the literature. Categories and Subject Descriptors: F.4.1 [Mathematical Logic and Formal Languages]:

In this paper it is argued that, in order to solve the problem of iterated belief change, both the belief state and its input should be represented as epistemic entrenchment (EE) relations. A belief revision operation is constructed that updates a given EE relation to a new one in light of an evidential EE relation. It is shown that the operation in question satisfies generalized versions of the Gardenfors revision postulates. The account offered is motivated by Spohn's ordinal conditionalization functions, and can be seen as the Jeffrization of a proposal considered by Rott.

: Revision and update operators add new information to some old information represented by a logical theory. Katsuno and Mendelzon show that both revision and update operators can be characterized as accomplishing a minimal change in the old information to accommodate the new information. Arbitration operators add two or more weighted informations together where the weights indicate the relative importance of the informations rather than a strict priority. This paper shows that arbitration operators can be also characterized as accomplishing a minimal change. The operator of model-fitting is also defined and analyzed in the paper. 1 Introduction Arbitration is the process of settling a conflict between two or more persons. Arbitration occurs in many situations. For example, settling a labor dispute by an outsider, reaching a verdict in a trial, evaluating several alternative research hypotheses, negotiating an international peace agreement, or setting the price of a product in a compe...

Abstract not found

We propose a general framework in which to study belief change. We begin by defining belief in terms of knowledge and plausibility: an agent believes ' if he knows that ' is true in all the worlds he considers most plausible. We then consider some properties defining the interaction between knowledge and plausibility, and show how these properties affect the properties of belief. In particular, we show that by assuming two of the most natural properties, belief becomes a KD45 operator. Finally, we add time to the picture. This gives us a framework in which we can talk about knowledge, plausibility (and hence belief), and time, which extends the framework of Halpern and Fagin [HF89] for modeling knowledge in multi-agent systems. We show that our framework is quite expressive and lets us model in a natural way a number of different scenarios for belief change. For example, we show how we can capture an analogue to prior probabilities, which can be updated by "conditioning". In a related ...

We study the problem of combining updates ---a special instance of theory change--- and counterfactual conditionals in propositional knowledgebases. Intuitively, an update means that the world described by the knowledgebase has changed. This is opposed to revisions ---another instance of theory change--- where our knowledge about a static world changes. A counterfactual implication is a statement of the form `If A were the case, then B would also be the case', where the negation of A may be derivable from our current knowledge. We present a decidable logic, called VCU 2 , that has both update and counterfactual implication as connectives in the object language. Our update operator is a generalization of operators previously proposed and studied in the literature. We show that our operator satisfies certain postulates set forth for any reasonable update. The logic VCU 2 is an extension of D. K. Lewis' logic VCU for counterfactual conditionals. The semantics of VCU 2 is that of a m...

We investigate the semantic foundations of a method for modeling agents as entities with a mental state which was suggested by McCarthy and by Newell. Our goals are to formalize this modeling approach and its semantics, to understand the theoretical and practical issues that it raises, and to address some of them. In particular, this requires specifying the model's parameters and how these parameters are to be assigned (i.e., their grounding). We propose a basic model in which the agent is viewed as a qualitative decision maker with beliefs, preferences, and decision strategy; and we show how these components would determine the agent's behavior. We ground this model in the agent's interaction with the world, namely, in its actions. This is done by viewing model construction as a constraint satisfaction problem in which we search for a model consistent with the agent's behavior and with our general background knowledge. In addition, we investigate the conditions under which a mental st...

We propose a model

We describe a model of iterated belief revision that extends the AGM theory of revision to account for the effect of a revision on the conditional beliefs of an agent. In particular, this model ensures that an agent makes as few changes as possible to the conditional component of its belief set. Adopting the Ramsey test, minimal conditional revision provides acceptance conditions for arbitrary right-nested conditionals. We show that problem of determining acceptance of any such nested conditional can be reduced to acceptance tests for unnested conditionals. Thus, iterated revision can be accomplished in a “virtual” manner, using uniterated revision.

. The problem of how to remove information from an agent's stock of beliefs is of paramount concern in the belief change literature. An inquiring agent may remove beliefs for a variety of reasons: a belief may be called into doubt or the agent may simply wish to entertain other possiblities. In the prominent AGM framework [1, 8] for belief change, upon which the work here is based, one of the three central operations, contraction, addresses this concern (the other two deal with the incorporation of new information). Makinson [23] has generalised this work by introducing the notion of a withdrawal operation. Underlying the account proffered by AGM is the idea of rational belief change. A belief change operation should be guided by certain principles or integrity constraints in order to characterise change by a rational agent. One of the most noted principles within the context of AGM is the Principle of Informational Economy. However, adoption of this principle in its purest form has be...