The experience of willing an act arises from interpreting one's thought as the cause of the act. Conscious will is thus experienced as a function of the priority, consistency, and exclusivity of the thought about the action. The thought must occur before the action, be consistent with the action, and not be accompanied by other causes. An experiment illustrating the role of priority found that people can arrive at the mistaken belief that they have intentionally caused an action that in fact they were forced to perform when they are simply led to think about the action just before its occurrence. Conscious will is a pervasive human experience. We all have the sense that we do things, that we cause our acts, that we are agents. As William James (1890) observed, "the whole sting and excitement of our voluntary life... depends on our sense that in it things are really being decided from one moment to another, and that it is not the dull rattling off of a chain that was forged innumerable ages ago " (p. 453). And yet, the very notion of the will seems to contradict the core assumption of psychological science. After all, psychology examines how behavior is caused by mechanisms—the rattling off of genetic, unconscious, neural, cognitive, emotional, social, and yet other chains that lead, dully or not, to the things people do. If the things we do are caused by such mechanisms, how is it that we nonetheless experience willfully doing them? Our approach to this problem is to look for yet another chain—to examine the mechanisms that produce the experience of conscious will itself. In this article, we do this by exploring the possibility that the experience of will is a result of the same mental processes that people use in the perception of causality more generally. Quite simply, it may be that people experience conscious will when they interpret their own thought as the cause of their action. This idea means that people can experience conscious will quite independent of any actual causal connection between

this paper is to consider the extent to which we are aware of the functioning of some

ABSTRACT: Most of us have a very firm belief in mental causation; that is, we firmly believe that our own distinctly mental properties are causally efficacious in the production of our behavior. This belief is dominating in contemporary philosophy of mind as a part of the causal explanatory exclusion problem for non-reductive materialists. I do not discuss the exclusion problem; rather, I assess the conception of mental causation that is presupposed in the current debate. I propose that in order to make sense of our firm belief in mental causation we need to operate with a broader conception of it than is normally seen, focusing on common-sense aspects concerning the timing, awareness, control, and tracking of mental causation. However, prominent studies in social psychology and cognitive neuroscience show that mental causation is not as self-evident, robust, and pervasive as our firm belief in it would suggest. There is therefore a tension between the common-sense, broad conception of mental causation and our empirical evidence for mental causation. A full defense of mental causation is not just a matter of securing causal efficacy but also of situating our notion of mental properties in relation to difficult issues concerning awareness, control, and judgment.

We introduce quasi-movements and define them as volitional movements which are minimized by the subject to such an extent that finally they become undetectable by objective measures. They are intended as overt movements, but the absence of the measurable motor responses and the subjective experience make quasi-movements similar to motor imagery. We used the amplitude dynamics of electroencephalographic alpha oscillations as a marker of the regional involvement of cortical areas in three experimental tasks: movement execution, kinesthetic motor imagery, and quasi-movements. All three conditions were associated with a significant suppression of alpha oscillations over the sensorimotor hand area of the contralateral hemisphere. This suppression was strongest for executed movements, and stronger for quasi-movements than for motor imagery. The topography of alpha suppression was similar in all three conditions. Proprioceptive sensations related to quasi-movements contribute to the assumption that the “sense of movement ” can originate from central efferent processes. Quasi-movements are also congruent with the postulated continuity between motor imagery and movement preparation/execution. We also show that in healthy subjects quasi-movements can be effectively used in brain–computer interface research leading to a significantly smaller classification error (∼47 % of relative decrease) in comparison to the errors obtained with conventionally used motor imagery strategies.