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If You’re So Smart, Why Aren’t You Rich? Belief Selection in Complete and Incomplete Markets
, 2001
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Building a Reputation under Frequent Decisions
, 2005
"... I study reputation games with frequent decisions and persistently imperfect monitoring. In these games, as the period length tends to zero, the monitoring structure approaches a continuous-time limit, and, further, the limit monitoring is non-trivially imperfect. I show that for any prior probabilit ..."
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I study reputation games with frequent decisions and persistently imperfect monitoring. In these games, as the period length tends to zero, the monitoring structure approaches a continuous-time limit, and, further, the limit monitoring is non-trivially imperfect. I show that for any prior probability on the long-run player’s types that assigns positive probability to commitment types, if the long-run player’s instantaneous discount rate is close enough to zero, there is a lower bound on the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of the long-run player which converges, as the period length tends to zero, to a number arbitrarily close to the long-run player’s commitment payoff. 1
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"... this paper we show that there is no chance. More formally, we show that under a very unrestrictive definition of what it means to draw priors "randomly," the probability that two priors have any chance of ..."
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this paper we show that there is no chance. More formally, we show that under a very unrestrictive definition of what it means to draw priors "randomly," the probability that two priors have any chance of
