Results 1 - 10
of
13
Metarepresentation in linguistic communication
- UCL Working Papers in Linguistics 11
, 1999
"... This paper is designed to illustrate and consider the relations between three types of metarepresentational ability used in verbal comprehension: the ability to metarepresent attributed thoughts, the ability to metarepresent attributed utterances, and the ability to metarepresent abstract, non-attri ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 16 (3 self)
- Add to MetaCart
This paper is designed to illustrate and consider the relations between three types of metarepresentational ability used in verbal comprehension: the ability to metarepresent attributed thoughts, the ability to metarepresent attributed utterances, and the ability to metarepresent abstract, non-attributed representations (e.g. sentence types, utterance types, propositions). Aspects of these abilities have been separately considered in the literatures on “theory of mind”, Gricean pragmatics and quotation. The aim of this paper is to show how the results of these separate strands of research might be integrated with an empirically plausible pragmatic theory. 1
On an alleged connection between indirect speech and the theory of meaning
- Mind and Language
, 1997
"... Abstract: A semantic theory T for a language L should assign content to utterances of sentences of L. One common assumption is that T will assign p to some S of L just in case in uttering S a speaker A says that p. We will argue that this assumption is mistaken. 1. ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 8 (0 self)
- Add to MetaCart
Abstract: A semantic theory T for a language L should assign content to utterances of sentences of L. One common assumption is that T will assign p to some S of L just in case in uttering S a speaker A says that p. We will argue that this assumption is mistaken. 1.
Varieties of Quotation
, 1997
"... this paper. The assorted data thus far adduced provide strong support for the desirability of an account satisfying C1-C4 and show at least that any semantics not satisfying C1-C4 leaves much unexplained. ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 4 (1 self)
- Add to MetaCart
this paper. The assorted data thus far adduced provide strong support for the desirability of an account satisfying C1-C4 and show at least that any semantics not satisfying C1-C4 leaves much unexplained.
Rationality, meaning and the analysis of delusion
- Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology
"... ON WHAT I will call a rationalist approach to delusion, delusion is a matter of topdown disturbance in some fundamental beliefs of the subject, which may consequently affect experiences and actions. On an empiricist approach, in contrast, delusion is a rational response to highly unusual experiences ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 2 (0 self)
- Add to MetaCart
ON WHAT I will call a rationalist approach to delusion, delusion is a matter of topdown disturbance in some fundamental beliefs of the subject, which may consequently affect experiences and actions. On an empiricist approach, in contrast, delusion is a rational response to highly unusual experiences that the subject has, perhaps as a result of organic damage. Ellis and Young (1990) recently provided an empiricist analysis of the Capgras and Cotard delusions. I want to begin with some remarks on just why it is important to the empiricist approach that it should acknowledge the rationality of the subject’s delusional responses to unusual stimuli. We will see that when the rationale for the rationality constraint is fully set out, it is questionable whether Ellis and Young’s approach actually succeeds in giving its place to the rationality constraint. In conclusion, I will look briefly at the prospects for a rationalist approach and at what other approaches might be possible.
"Knowledge is Elsewhere": Natural Language Semantics meets the X-Files
"... this paper, I will outline briefly what I think can be said about natural language semantics, and how this position is both defensible and preferable to FL's resounding silence over the many semantic phenomena demanding explanation. 2 Generative Lexicon Theory and Knowledge of Language ..."
Abstract
- Add to MetaCart
this paper, I will outline briefly what I think can be said about natural language semantics, and how this position is both defensible and preferable to FL's resounding silence over the many semantic phenomena demanding explanation. 2 Generative Lexicon Theory and Knowledge of Language
Boolean Algebras And Natural Language: A Measurement Theoretic Approach
"... this paper I discuss several accounts of the way Boolean algebra applies to the logical sentential connectives of natural languages. In the second section I present a superior account, modeled after the use of numbers in measurement ..."
Abstract
- Add to MetaCart
this paper I discuss several accounts of the way Boolean algebra applies to the logical sentential connectives of natural languages. In the second section I present a superior account, modeled after the use of numbers in measurement
MSc in Logic
, 2009
"... under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Martin Stokhof, and submitted to the ..."
Appendix Footnotes
"... 2. Scope ambiguities in belief sentences 3. Singular terms in belief sentences 4. The ambiguity of the de re/de dicto distinction III. Opacity in belief sentences 1. 'That'-clauses as complex demonstratives 2. Semantic innocence 3. The attitudinatives as dependent expressions 4. Opacity, substitutio ..."
Abstract
- Add to MetaCart
2. Scope ambiguities in belief sentences 3. Singular terms in belief sentences 4. The ambiguity of the de re/de dicto distinction III. Opacity in belief sentences 1. 'That'-clauses as complex demonstratives 2. Semantic innocence 3. The attitudinatives as dependent expressions 4. Opacity, substitution, and quantification
Logical Form and Language
"... World, asserted famously that ‘every philosophical problem, when it is subjected to the necessary analysis and purification, is found either to be not really philosophical at all, or else to be, in the sense in which we are using the word, logical ’ (Russell 1993, p. 42). He went on to characterize ..."
Abstract
- Add to MetaCart
World, asserted famously that ‘every philosophical problem, when it is subjected to the necessary analysis and purification, is found either to be not really philosophical at all, or else to be, in the sense in which we are using the word, logical ’ (Russell 1993, p. 42). He went on to characterize that portion of logic that concerned the study of forms of propositions, or, as he called them, ‘logical forms’. This portion of logic he called ‘philosophical logic’. Russell asserted that... some kind of knowledge of logical forms, though with most people it is not explicit, is involved in all understanding of discourse. It is the business of philosophical logic to extract this knowledge from its concrete integuments, and to render it explicit and pure. (p. 53) Perhaps no one still endorses quite this grand a view of the role of logic and the investigation of logical form in philosophy. But talk of logical form retains a central role in analytic philosophy. Given its widespread use in philosophy and linguistics, it is rather surprising that the concept of logical form has not received more attention by philosophers than it has. The concern of this paper is to say something about what talk of logical form comes to, in a tradition that stretches back to (and arguably beyond) Russell’s use of that expression. This will not be exactly Russell’s conception. For we do not endorse Russell’s view that propositions are

