This article develops a model of organizational knowledge acquisition in terms of modern psychological, sociological, economic and management theories by deconstructing the terms involved: an organization as a collective agent having goals and capabilities to achieve them; knowledge as the hidden state variables imputed to an agent as the basis of its capabilities; and acquisition as the reproduction of dispositions. This form of model enables one to relate the knowledge processes involved to existing models of organizational processes, and to understand such phenomena as knowledge economics and knowledge management. The breadth of the notion of organization encompasses markets, firms and societies; the operational definition of knowledge clarifies its role and the utility of the notion; and the focus on reproduction of dispositions in knowledge acquisition enables the management of knowledge acquisition to be analyzed. ______________________________________________________________________________________ 1.

To be published in Behavioral and Brain Sciences (in press)

Abstract not found

This paper explores specific issues concerning linguistic theory and the use of simplicity criteria in the early Transformational Generative Grammar literature. In particular, the influence of Nelson Goodman and Willard Van Orman Quine upon the work of Noam Chomsky during the 1950s is assessed. The main topics considered include the development of constructional system theory, the use of mechanical procedures for measuring the formal simplicity of extralogical bases in constructional systems, and the way in which Chomsky adapted these techniques in order to facilitate the analysis of natural language. In this context, the influence of constructive nominalism upon Chomsky’s early work is also considered. Finally, the relationship between the notion of simplicity in 1950s-style generative grammar and more recent discussions of economy in the Minimalist Program is assessed.

1 introduction In this paper we present some of our school’s results in the area of building up relativity theory (RT) as a hierarchy of theories in the sense of logic. We use plain first-order logic (FOL) as in the foundation of mathematics (FOM) and we build on experience gained in FOM. The main aims of our school are the following: We want to base the theory on simple, unambiguous axioms with clear meanings. It should be absolutely understandable for any reader what the axioms say and the reader can decide about each axiom whether he likes it. The theory should be built up from these axioms in a straightforward, logical manner. We want to provide an analysis of the logical structure of the theory. We investigate which axioms are needed for which predictions of RT. We want to make RT more transparent logically, easier to understand, easier to change, modular, and easier to teach. We want to obtain deeper understanding of RT. Our work can be considered as a case-study showing that the Vienna

Scientific discourse leaves implicit a vast amount of knowledge, assumes that this background knowledge is taken into account—even taken for granted—and treated as undisputed. In particular, the terminology in the empirical sciences is treated as antecedently understood. The background knowledge surrounding a theory is usually assumed to be true or approximately true. This is in sharp contrast with logic, which explicitly ignores underlying presuppositions and assumes uninterpreted languages. We discuss the problems that background knowledge may cause for the formalization of scientific theories. In particular, we will show how some of these problems can be addressed in the context of the computational representation of scientific theories.

Such are those thick & gloomie shadows dampe Oft seene in charnel vaults, & sepulchers, Lingering, & sitting by a new made grave, As loath to leave the bodie that it lov'd, & link’t it selfe by carnall sensualtie To a degenerate, & degraded state. Sec. Bro. How charming is divine philosophy! Not harsh, & crabbed, as dull fooles suppose, But musicall as is Apollo's lute, And a perpetuall feast of nectar'd sweets Where no crude surfeit reigns. John Milton. Comus (1634).

Statistics education in psychology often falls disappointingly short of its goals. The increasing use of qualitative approaches in statistics education research has extended and enriched our understanding of statistical cognition processes, and thus facilitated improvements in statistical education and practices. Yet conceptual analysis, a fundamental part of the scientific method and arguably the primary qualitative method insofar as it is logically prior and equally applicable to all other empirical research methods—quantitative, qualitative, and mixed—has been largely overlooked. In this paper we present the case for this approach, and then report results from a conceptual analysis of statistics education in psychology. The results highlight a number of major problems that have received little attention in standard statistics education research.

The possibility of adopting a philosophical stance, talking about philosophical knowledge, and characterizing its relation to empirical knowledge forms an important set of foundational problems for the program of naturalism. Against the background of earlier 20 th century analytic philosophy these issues are specifically acute, because naturalism rejects the very principles that such pure analytic and aprioristic philosophy relied on to demarcate itself from the special sciences. If the philosophical tradition is seen as depending on the autonomy of the conceptual sphere, then to keep the tradition alive, the program of naturalism will have to be able to provide some account of the nature and role of philosophical knowledge. This paper will introduce the program of naturalism and the rejection of pure philosophy on the basis of W.V. Quine’s work, in particular (section 1). A discussion of naturalized epistemology and of the applications of naturalism in the philosophy of mind will then be offered (section 2). Naturalism has also been a major trend of thought in contemporary philosophy of science. After having dealt with Arthur Fine’s ”natural ontological attitude ” and some other forms of naturalism (section 3), we shall take a look at the scientific study of religion in the cognitivist paradigm as an example of the contrast between philosophical and special-scientific empirical knowledge (section 4). Finally, concluding reflections will pull these themes together (section 5).

I believe that philosophy can be helped to its feet again only if it devotes itself seriously and fervently to investigations of cognitive processes and the methods of science. There it has a real and legitimate task.... Philosophy has obviously come to a standstill because it... still has taken no new life