It is well attested that we perceive speech through the filter of our native language: a classic example is that of Japanese listeners who cannot discriminate between the American /l/ and /r/ and identify both as their own /r/ phoneme (Goto, H., 1971. Neuropsychologia 9, 317-323.). Studies in the laboratory have shown, however, that perception of non-native speech sounds can be learned through training (Lively, S.E., Pisoni, D.B., Yamada, R.A., Tohkura, Y.I., Yamada, T., 1994. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 96 (4), 2076-2087). This is consistent with neurophysiological evidence showing considerable experience-dependent plasticity in the brain at the first levels of sensory processing (Edeline, J.-M., Weinberger, N.M., 1993. Behavioral Neuroscience 107, 82103; Merzenich, M.M., Sameshima, K., 1993. Current Opinion in Neurobiology 3, 187-196; Weinberger, N.M., 1993. Current Opinion in Neurobiology 3, 577-579; Kraus, N., McGee, T., Carrel, T.D., King, C., Tremblay, K., Nicol, T., 1995. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 7 (1), 25-32). Outside of the laboratory, however, the situation seems to differ: we here report a study involving Spanish-Catalan bilingual subjects who have had the best opportunities to learn a new contrast but did not do it. Our study demonstrates a striking lack of behavioral plasticity: early and extensive exposure to a second language is not sufficient to attain the ultimate phonological competence of native speakers

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Mapping from acoustic signals to lexical representations is a complex process mediated by a number of different levels of representation. This paper reviews properties of the phonetic and phonological levels, and hypotheses about how category structure is represented at each of these levels, and evaluates these in light of relevant electrophysiological studies of phonetics and phonology. The paper examines evidence for two alternative views of how infant phonetic representations develop into adult representations, a structure-changing view and a structure-adding view, and suggests that each may be better suited to different kinds of phonetic categories. Electrophysiological results are beginning to provide information about phonological representations, but less is known about how the more abstract representations at this level could be coded in the brain.

Symbols enable people to organize and communicate about the world. However, the ways in which symbolic knowledge is learned and then represented in the mind are poorly understood. We present a formal analysis of symbolic learning—in particular, word learning—in terms of prediction and cue competition, and we consider two possible ways in which symbols might be learned: by learning to predict a label from the features of objects and events in the world, and by learning to predict features from a label. This analysis predicts significant differences in symbolic learning depending on the sequencing of objects and labels. We report a computational simulation and two human experiments that confirm these differences, revealing the existence of Feature-Label-Ordering effects in learning. Discrimination learning is facilitated when objects predict labels, but not when labels predict objects. Our results and analysis suggest that the semantic categories people use to understand and communicate about the world can only be learned if labels are predicted from objects. We discuss the implications of this for our understanding of the nature of language and symbolic thought, and in particular, for theories of reference.

One of the deepest and most ancient problems in philosophy is what we might call the problem of knowledge. There seems to be an unbridgeable gap between our abstract, complex, highly structured knowledge of the world, and the concrete, limited and confused information provided by our senses. Since the Meno, there have been two basic ways of approaching this problem, rationalism and empiricism. Each era seems to have its matched pair of advocates of each view, making their way through the centuries like couples in some eternal philosophical gavotte, Plato and Aristotle, Descartes and Locke, Leibniz and Berkeley, Kant and Mill. The rationalist approach says that although it looks as if we learn about the world from our experience, we don’t really. Actually, we knew about it all along. The most important things we know were there to begin with, planted innately in our minds by God or evolution (or chance). The empiricist approach says that although it looks as if our knowledge is far removed from our experience, it isn’t really. If we rearrange the elements of our experience in particular ways, by associating ideas, or putting together stimuli and responses, we’ll end up with our knowledge of the world. There is both a tension and a kind of complementarity between these two ideas,

Recently, speech researchers have begun to examine the formation of speech sound (phonetic) categories and to analyze the internal structure of the consequent categories. One of the most prominent products of this subfield has been the Perceptual Magnet Effect (PME) and the attendant Native Language Magnet (NLM) theory of Kuhl (1991, 2000). In the present paper, a critical review of the evidence for NLM is offered. Because of concerns about the nature of the stimuli, possible confounds inherent in the empirical procedures and failed replications, it is concluded that there is little positive evidence supporting NLM. However, the goal of uncovering the structures of phonetic categories and mechanisms responsible for those structures remains central to an understanding of language acquisition and speech perception more generally. Data from several empirical paradigms investigating the formation and structure of complex auditory categories are beginning to form a coherent picture of phonetic category acquisition.

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A subjective distance between stimuli: quantifying the metric structure of representations

Linguistically modulated perception and cognition: the label-feedback hypothesis