It is argued that inflation targeting is best understood as a commitment to a targeting rule rather than an instrument rule, eitherageneral targeting rule (explicit objectives for monetary policy) or a specific targeting rule (a criterion for (the forecasts of) the target variables to be fulfilled), essentially the equality of the marginal rates of transformation and substitution between the target variables. Targeting rules allow the use of judgment and extramodel information, are more robust and easier to verify than optimal instrument rules, and they can nevertheless bring the economy close to the socially optimal equilibrium.

Central banks have several reasons for extracting information from asset prices. Asset prices may embody more accurate and more up-to-date macroeconomic data than what is currently published or directly available to policy makers. Aberrations in some asset prices may indicate

Inflation targeting is a monetary-policy strategy that is characterized by an announced numerical inflation target, an implementation of monetary policy that gives a major role to an inflation forecast and has been called forecast targeting, and a high degree of transparency and accountability. It was introduced in New Zealand in 1990, has been very successful in terms of stabilizing both inflation and the real economy, and has, as of 2010, been adopted by about 25 industrialized and emerging-market economies. The chapter discusses the history, macroeconomic effects, theory, practice, and future of inflation targeting.

The optimal weights on indicators in models with partial information about the state of the economy and forward-looking variables are derived and interpreted, both for equilibria under discretion and under commitment. An example of optimal monetary policy with a partially observable potential output and a forward-looking indicator is examined. The optimal response to the optimal estimate of potential output displays certainty-equivalence, whereas the optimal response to the imperfect observation of output depends on the noise in this observation.

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It is a pleasure to be asked to comment upon Lars Svensson’s thoughtful and ambitious paper, though it raises far too many issues for me to attempt to address them all in the limited time available here. Svensson offers a thorough review of the recent scholarly literature on the conduct of monetary policy, and also reviews one of the most important recent developments in central bank practice as well, namely the evolving methodology of “inflation forecast targeting.” In my own remarks, I would like to develop further a single theme, which is the advantage of central bank commitment to a systematic approach to monetary policy. This theme also figures in Svensson’s discussion, but I believe that its consequences extend even further than he indicates.

One of the prominent ways to analyze the robustness of monetary policy under model uncertainty consists of the following three steps. First, choose a reference model of the economy. Next, define a set of perturbations around this model, where the set is structured so that the uncertainty is focused on potentially important weaknesses of the reference model. Finally, choose policy so that it works best for the worst model from the set. Previous applications of this approach allowed only for purely backward-looking models. This paper extends the analysis of robustness to models that may include forward-looking components. Empirical part of the paper studies simple policy rules under model, data and shock uncertainty in a small model of the US economy with rational expectations. Key words: structured uncertainty, rational expectations, robustness.

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In recent years, activist monetary policy rules responding to inflation and the level of economic activity have been advanced as a means of achieving effective output stabilization without inflation. Advocates of such policies suggest that their flexibility may yield substantial stabilization benefits while avoiding the excesses of overzealous discretionary fine-tuning such as is thought to characterize the experience of the 1960s and 1970s. In this paper, I demonstrate that these conclusions are misguided. To illustrate this fact, I construct a database with data available to policymakers in real time from 1965 to 1993 and, using an estimated model, I perform counterfactual simulations under alternative informational assumptions regarding the knowledge policymakers can reasonably have had about the state of the economy when policy decisions were made. Using realistic informational assumptions overturns findings favoring activist policies in favor of prudent policies that ignore short-run stabilization concerns altogether. The evidence points to misperceptions of the economy’s productive capacity