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484
A Concrete Security Treatment of Symmetric Encryption
 Proceedings of the 38th Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, IEEE
, 1997
"... We study notions and schemes for symmetric (ie. private key) encryption in a concrete security framework. We give four di erent notions of security against chosen plaintext attack and analyze the concrete complexity ofreductions among them, providing both upper and lower bounds, and obtaining tight ..."
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Cited by 355 (57 self)
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We study notions and schemes for symmetric (ie. private key) encryption in a concrete security framework. We give four di erent notions of security against chosen plaintext attack and analyze the concrete complexity ofreductions among them, providing both upper and lower bounds, and obtaining tight relations. In this way we classify notions (even though polynomially reducible to each other) as stronger or weaker in terms of concrete security. Next we provide concrete security analyses of methods to encrypt using a block cipher, including the most popular encryption method, CBC. We establish tight bounds (meaning
Universal OneWay Hash Functions and their Cryptographic Applications
, 1989
"... We define a Universal OneWay Hash Function family, a new primitive which enables the compression of elements in the function domain. The main property of this primitive is that given an element x in the domain, it is computationally hard to find a different domain element which collides with x. We ..."
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Cited by 313 (13 self)
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We define a Universal OneWay Hash Function family, a new primitive which enables the compression of elements in the function domain. The main property of this primitive is that given an element x in the domain, it is computationally hard to find a different domain element which collides with x. We prove constructively that universal oneway hash functions exist if any 11 oneway functions exist. Among the various applications of the primitive is a OneWay based Secure Digital Signature Scheme which is existentially secure against adoptive attacks. Previously, all provably secure signature schemes were based on the stronger mathematical assumption that trapdoor oneway functions exist. Key words. cryptography, randomized algorithms AMS subject classifications. 68M10, 68Q20, 68Q22, 68R05, 68R10 Part of this work was done while the authors were at the IBM Almaden Research Center. The first author was supported in part by NSF grant CCR88 13632. A preliminary version of this work app...
Cryptographic Limitations on Learning Boolean Formulae and Finite Automata
 PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTYFIRST ANNUAL ACM SYMPOSIUM ON THEORY OF COMPUTING
, 1989
"... In this paper we prove the intractability of learning several classes of Boolean functions in the distributionfree model (also called the Probably Approximately Correct or PAC model) of learning from examples. These results are representation independent, in that they hold regardless of the syntact ..."
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Cited by 307 (15 self)
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In this paper we prove the intractability of learning several classes of Boolean functions in the distributionfree model (also called the Probably Approximately Correct or PAC model) of learning from examples. These results are representation independent, in that they hold regardless of the syntactic form in which the learner chooses to represent its hypotheses. Our methods reduce the problems of cracking a number of wellknown publickey cryptosystems to the learning problems. We prove that a polynomialtime learning algorithm for Boolean formulae, deterministic finite automata or constantdepth threshold circuits would have dramatic consequences for cryptography and number theory: in particular, such an algorithm could be used to break the RSA cryptosystem, factor Blum integers (composite numbers equivalent to 3 modulo 4), and detect quadratic residues. The results hold even if the learning algorithm is only required to obtain a slight advantage in prediction over random guessing. The techniques used demonstrate an interesting duality between learning and cryptography. We also apply our results to obtain strong intractability results for approximating a generalization of graph coloring.
LEAP: Efficient Security Mechanisms for Largescale Distributed Sensor Networks
, 2003
"... Protocol), a key management protocol for sensor networks that is designed to support innetwork processing, while at the same time restricting the security impact of a node compromise to the immediate network neighborhood of the compromised node. The design of the protocol is motivated by the observ ..."
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Cited by 297 (20 self)
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Protocol), a key management protocol for sensor networks that is designed to support innetwork processing, while at the same time restricting the security impact of a node compromise to the immediate network neighborhood of the compromised node. The design of the protocol is motivated by the observation that different types of messages exchanged between sensor nodes have different security requirements, and that a single keying mechanism is not suitable for meeting these different security requirements. LEAP supports the establishment of four types of keys for each sensor node – an individual key shared with the base station, a pairwise key shared with another sensor node, a cluster key shared with multiple neighboring nodes, and a group key that is shared by all the nodes in the network. The protocol used for establishing and updating these keys
Analysis of keyexchange protocols and their use for building secure channels
, 2001
"... Abstract. We present a formalism for the analysis of keyexchange protocols that combines previous definitional approaches and results in a definition of security that enjoys some important analytical benefits: (i) any keyexchange protocol that satisfies the security definition can be composed with ..."
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Cited by 266 (16 self)
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Abstract. We present a formalism for the analysis of keyexchange protocols that combines previous definitional approaches and results in a definition of security that enjoys some important analytical benefits: (i) any keyexchange protocol that satisfies the security definition can be composed with symmetric encryption and authentication functions to provide provably secure communication channels (as defined here); and (ii) the definition allows for simple modular proofs of security: one can design and prove security of keyexchange protocols in an idealized model where the communication links are perfectly authenticated, and then translate them using general tools to obtain security in the realistic setting of adversarycontrolled links. We exemplify the usability of our results by applying them to obtain the proof of two classes of keyexchange protocols, DiffieHellman and keytransport, authenticated via symmetric or asymmetric techniques. 1
Publickey Cryptosystems Provably Secure against Chosen Ciphertext Attacks
 In Proc. of the 22nd STOC
, 1995
"... We show how to construct a publickey cryptosystem (as originally defined by Diffie and Hellman) secure against chosen ciphertext attacks, given a publickey cryptosystem secure against passive eavesdropping and a noninteractive zeroknowledge proof system in the shared string model. No such secure ..."
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Cited by 253 (18 self)
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We show how to construct a publickey cryptosystem (as originally defined by Diffie and Hellman) secure against chosen ciphertext attacks, given a publickey cryptosystem secure against passive eavesdropping and a noninteractive zeroknowledge proof system in the shared string model. No such secure cryptosystems were known before. Key words. cryptography, randomized algorithms AMS subject classifications. 68M10, 68Q20, 68Q22, 68R05, 68R10 A preliminary version of this paper appeared in the Proc. of the Twenty Second ACM Symposium of Theory of Computing. y Incumbent of the Morris and Rose Goldman Career Development Chair, Dept. of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science, Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot 76100, Israel. Work performed while at the IBM Almaden Research Center. Research supported by an Alon Fellowship and a grant from the Israel Science Foundation administered by the Israeli Academy of Sciences. Email: naor@wisdom.weizmann.ac.il. z IBM Research Division, T.J ...
Bit Commitment Using PseudoRandomness
 Journal of Cryptology
, 1991
"... We show how a pseudorandom generator can provide a bit commitment protocol. We also analyze the number of bits communicated when parties commit to many bits simultaneously, and show that the assumption of the existence of pseudorandom generators suffices to assure amortized O(1) bits of communicat ..."
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Cited by 234 (16 self)
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We show how a pseudorandom generator can provide a bit commitment protocol. We also analyze the number of bits communicated when parties commit to many bits simultaneously, and show that the assumption of the existence of pseudorandom generators suffices to assure amortized O(1) bits of communication per bit commitment.
Provably Secure Session Key Distribution  The Three Party Case
, 1995
"... We study session key distribution in the threeparty setting of Needham and Schroeder. (This is the trust model assumed by the popular Kerberos authentication system.) Such protocols are basic building blocks for contemporary distributed systems  yet the underlying problem has, up until now, lacke ..."
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Cited by 209 (6 self)
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We study session key distribution in the threeparty setting of Needham and Schroeder. (This is the trust model assumed by the popular Kerberos authentication system.) Such protocols are basic building blocks for contemporary distributed systems  yet the underlying problem has, up until now, lacked a definition or provablygood solution. One consequence is that incorrect protocols have proliferated. This paper provides the first treatment of this problem in the complexitytheoretic framework of modern cryptography. We present a definition, protocol, and a proof that the protocol satisfies the definition, assuming the (minimal) assumption of a pseudorandom function. When this assumption is appropriately instantiated, our protocols are simple and efficient.