This paper empirically tests five structural models of corporate bond pricing: those of Merton (1974), Geske (1977), Leland and Toft (1996), Longsta# and Schwartz (1995), and Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001). We implement the models using a sample of 182 bond prices from firms with simple capital structures during the period 1986-1997. The conventional wisdom is that structural models do not generate spreads as high as those seen in the bond market, and true to expectations we find that the predicted spreads in our implementation of the Merton model are too low. However, most of the other structural models predict spreads that are too high on average. Nevertheless, accuracy is a problem, as the newer models tend to severely overstate the credit risk of firms with high leverage or volatility and yet su#er from a spread underprediction problem with safer bonds. The Leland and Toft model is an exception in that it overpredicts spreads on most bonds, particularly those with high coupons. More accurate structural models must avoid features that increase the credit risk on the riskier bonds while scarcely a#ecting the spreads of the safest bonds.

Copyright c○2004 by the authors. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher.

Abstract not found

This paper explores the e¡ect of equity volatility on corporate bond yields. Panel data for the late 1990s show that idiosyncratic ¢rm-level volatility can explain as much cross-sectional variation in yields as can credit ratings. This ¢nding, together with the upward trend in idiosyncratic equity volatility documented by Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001), helps to explain recent increases in corporate bond yields. DURING THE LATE 1990s, THE U.S. EQUITY and corporate bond markets behaved very di¡erently. As displayed in Figure 1, stock prices rose strongly, while at the same time, corporate bonds performed poorly. The proximate cause of the low returns on corporate bonds was a tendency for the yields on both seasoned and newly issued corporate bonds to increase relative to the yields of U.S.Treasury securities. These increases in corporate^Treasury yield spreads are striking because they occurred at a time when stock prices were rising; the optimism of stock market investors did not seem to be shared by investors in the corporate bond market.

This paper explores the nature of default arrival and recovery implicit in the term structures of sovereign CDS spreads. We argue that term structures of spreads reveal not only the arrival rates of credit events (λ Q), but also the loss rates given credit events. Applying our framework to Mexico, Turkey, and Korea, we show that a single-factor model with λ Q following a lognormal process captures most of the variation in the term structures of spreads. The risk premiums associated with unpredictable variation in λ Q are found to be economically significant and co-vary importantly with several economic measures of global event risk, financial market volatility, and macroeconomic policy. THE BURGEONING MARKET FOR SOVEREIGN CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS (CDS) contracts offers a nearly unique window for viewing investors ’ risk-neutral probabilities of major credit events impinging on sovereign issuers, and their risk-neutral losses of principal in the event of a restructuring or repudiation of external debts. In contrast to many “emerging market ” sovereign bonds, sovereign CDS

We propose a reduced-form model where jumps-to-default are priced because they generate a market-wide jump in credit spreads. While this framework is consistent with a counterparty risk interpretation (e.g., Jarrow and Yu (2001)), it is most naturally interpreted as an updating of beliefs due to an unexpected event. Simple analytic solutions are obtained for the prices of risky debt regardless of the number of firms that share in the contagious response. As a special case, we show that the contagious response can be induced via a liquidity-shock, with no impact on actual default intensities. Empirically, we find that credit events of large firms generate a market wide increase in credit spreads and a significant ‘flight-to-quality ’ response in the Treasury market. A calibration argument suggests that the premium associated with jump-to-default risk for a typical investment grade firm has an upper bound of a few basis points per year, but that the risk premium for contagion-risk may be considerably larger.

wish to thank Andre Haris, Lozan Bakayatov, and Davron Yakubov for their excellent data collection efforts. In addition, we thank the financial assistance of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. All errors remain the responsibility of the authors. Corporate Yield Spreads and Bond Liquidity We examine whether liquidity is priced in corporate yield spreads. Using a battery of liquidity measures covering over 4000 corporate bonds and spanning investment grade and speculative categories, we find that more illiquid bonds earn higher yield spreads; and that an improvement of liquidity causes a significant reduction in yield spreads. These results hold after controlling for common bond-specific, firm-specific, and macroeconomic variables, and are robust to issuers ’ fixed effect and potential endogeneity bias. Our finding mitigates the concern in the default risk literature that neither the level nor the dynamic of yield spreads can be fully explained by default risk determinants, and suggests that liquidity plays an important role in corporate bond valuation.

This paper is a critical survey of models designed for pricing fixed income securities and their associated term structures of market yields. Our primary focus is on the interplay between the theoretical specification of dynamic term structure models and their empirical fit to historical changes in the shapes of yield curves. We begin by overviewing the dynamic term structure models that have been fit to treasury or swap yield curves and in which the risk factors follow diffusions, jump-diffusion, or have “switching regimes. ” Then the goodness-of-fits of these models are assessed relative to their abilities to: (i) match linear projections of changes in yields onto the slope of the yield curve; (ii) match the persistence of conditional volatilities, and the shapes of term structures of unconditional volatilities, of yields; and (iii) to reliably price caps, swaptions, and other fixed-income derivatives. For the case of defaultable securities we explore the relative fits to historical yield spreads. 1

Recent advances in the theory of credit risk allow the use of standard term structure machinery for default risk modeling and estimation. The empirical literature in this area often interprets the drift adjustments of the default intensity’s diffusion state variables as the only default risk premium. We show that this interpretation implies a restriction on the form of possible default risk premia, which can be justified through exact and approximate notions of “diversifiable default risk.” The equivalence between the empirical and martingale default intensities that follows from diversifiable default risk greatly facilitates the pricing and management of credit risk. We emphasize that this is not an equivalence in distribution, and illustrate its importance using credit spread dynamics estimated in Duffee (1999). We also argue that the assumption of diversifiability is implicitly used in certain existing models of mortgage-backed securities.

Abstract not found