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A Constructive Proof of Gleason’s Theorem
 J. Func. Anal
, 1999
"... Gleason's theorem states that any totally additive measure on the closed subspaces, or projections, of a Hilbert space of dimension greater than two is given by a positive operator of trace class. In this paper we give a constructive proof of that theorem. A measure on the projections of a real ..."
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Gleason's theorem states that any totally additive measure on the closed subspaces, or projections, of a Hilbert space of dimension greater than two is given by a positive operator of trace class. In this paper we give a constructive proof of that theorem. A measure on the projections of a real or complex Hilbert space assigns to
Constructive Mathematics and Quantum Physics
, 1999
"... This paper is dedicated to the memory of Prof. Gottfried T. Ru ttimann ..."
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This paper is dedicated to the memory of Prof. Gottfried T. Ru ttimann
A DEFENCE OF MATHEMATICAL PLURALISM
, 2004
"... We approach the philosophy of mathematics via a discussion of the differences between classical mathematics and constructive mathematics, arguing that each is a valid activity within its own context. ..."
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We approach the philosophy of mathematics via a discussion of the differences between classical mathematics and constructive mathematics, arguing that each is a valid activity within its own context.
PLURALISM IN MATHEMATICS
, 2004
"... We defend pluralism in mathematics, and in particular Errett Bishop’s constructive approach to mathematics, on pragmatic grounds, avoiding the philosophical issues which have dissuaded many mathematicians from taking it seriously. We also explain the computational value of interval arithmetic. ..."
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We defend pluralism in mathematics, and in particular Errett Bishop’s constructive approach to mathematics, on pragmatic grounds, avoiding the philosophical issues which have dissuaded many mathematicians from taking it seriously. We also explain the computational value of interval arithmetic.
Epistemic truth and excluded middle*
"... Abstract: Can an epistemic conception of truth and an endorsement of the excluded middle (together with other principles of classical logic abandoned by the intuitionists) cohabit in a plausible philosophical view? In PART I I describe the general problem concerning the relation between the epistemi ..."
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Abstract: Can an epistemic conception of truth and an endorsement of the excluded middle (together with other principles of classical logic abandoned by the intuitionists) cohabit in a plausible philosophical view? In PART I I describe the general problem concerning the relation between the epistemic conception of truth and the principle of excluded middle. In PART II I give a historical overview of different attitudes regarding the problem. In PART III I sketch a possible holistic solution. Part I The Problem §1. The epistemic conception of truth. The epistemic conception of truth can be formulated in many ways. But the basic idea is that truth is explained in terms of epistemic notions, like experience, argument, proof, knowledge, etc. One way of formulating this idea is by saying that truth and knowability coincide, i.e. for every statement S
A Constructivist Perspective on Physics
, 2002
"... This paper examines the problem of extending the programme of mathematical constructivism to applied mathematics. I am not concerned with the question of whether conventional mathematical physics makes essential use of the principle of excluded middle, but rather with the more fundamental question o ..."
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This paper examines the problem of extending the programme of mathematical constructivism to applied mathematics. I am not concerned with the question of whether conventional mathematical physics makes essential use of the principle of excluded middle, but rather with the more fundamental question of whether the concept of physical infinity is constructively intelligible. I consider two kinds of physical infinity: a countably infinite constellation of stars and the infinitely divisible spacetime continuum. I argue (contrary to Hellman) that these do not pose any insuperable problem for constructivism, and that constructivism may have a useful new perspective to offer on physics. References ...