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A Constructive Proof of Gleason’s Theorem
 J. Func. Anal
, 1999
"... Gleason's theorem states that any totally additive measure on the closed subspaces, or projections, of a Hilbert space of dimension greater than two is given by a positive operator of trace class. In this paper we give a constructive proof of that theorem. A measure on the projections of a real or c ..."
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Cited by 12 (2 self)
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Gleason's theorem states that any totally additive measure on the closed subspaces, or projections, of a Hilbert space of dimension greater than two is given by a positive operator of trace class. In this paper we give a constructive proof of that theorem. A measure on the projections of a real or complex Hilbert space assigns to
PLURALISM IN MATHEMATICS
, 2004
"... We defend pluralism in mathematics, and in particular Errett Bishop’s constructive approach to mathematics, on pragmatic grounds, avoiding the philosophical issues which have dissuaded many mathematicians from taking it seriously. We also explain the computational value of interval arithmetic. ..."
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Cited by 2 (1 self)
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We defend pluralism in mathematics, and in particular Errett Bishop’s constructive approach to mathematics, on pragmatic grounds, avoiding the philosophical issues which have dissuaded many mathematicians from taking it seriously. We also explain the computational value of interval arithmetic.
Constructive Mathematics and Quantum Physics
, 1999
"... This paper is dedicated to the memory of Prof. Gottfried T. Ru ttimann ..."
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This paper is dedicated to the memory of Prof. Gottfried T. Ru ttimann
Epistemic truth and excluded middle*
"... Abstract: Can an epistemic conception of truth and an endorsement of the excluded middle (together with other principles of classical logic abandoned by the intuitionists) cohabit in a plausible philosophical view? In PART I I describe the general problem concerning the relation between the epistemi ..."
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Abstract: Can an epistemic conception of truth and an endorsement of the excluded middle (together with other principles of classical logic abandoned by the intuitionists) cohabit in a plausible philosophical view? In PART I I describe the general problem concerning the relation between the epistemic conception of truth and the principle of excluded middle. In PART II I give a historical overview of different attitudes regarding the problem. In PART III I sketch a possible holistic solution. Part I The Problem §1. The epistemic conception of truth. The epistemic conception of truth can be formulated in many ways. But the basic idea is that truth is explained in terms of epistemic notions, like experience, argument, proof, knowledge, etc. One way of formulating this idea is by saying that truth and knowability coincide, i.e. for every statement S