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Weak Bisimulation for Probabilistic Timed Automata
 PROC. OF SEFM’03, IEEE CS
, 2003
"... We are interested in describing timed systems that exhibit probabilistic behaviour. To this purpose, we consider a model of Probabilistic Timed Automata and introduce a concept of weak bisimulation for these automata, together with an algorithm to decide it. The weak bisimulation relation is shown t ..."
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Cited by 16 (6 self)
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We are interested in describing timed systems that exhibit probabilistic behaviour. To this purpose, we consider a model of Probabilistic Timed Automata and introduce a concept of weak bisimulation for these automata, together with an algorithm to decide it. The weak bisimulation relation is shown to be preserved when either time, or probability are abstracted away. As an application, we use weak bisimulation for Probabilistic Timed Automata to model and analyze a timing attack on the dining cryptographers protocol.
Security Analysis of a Probabilistic Nonrepudiation Protocol
 Proc. of PAPMPROBMIV ’02, LNCS 2399
, 2002
"... Abstract. Noninterference is a definition of security introduced for the analysis of confidential information flow in computer systems. In this paper, a probabilistic notion of noninterference is used to reveal information leakage which derives from the probabilistic behavior of systems. In partic ..."
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Cited by 13 (3 self)
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Abstract. Noninterference is a definition of security introduced for the analysis of confidential information flow in computer systems. In this paper, a probabilistic notion of noninterference is used to reveal information leakage which derives from the probabilistic behavior of systems. In particular, as a case study, we model and analyze a nonrepudiation protocol which employs a probabilistic algorithm to achieve a fairness property. The analysis, conducted by resorting to a definition of probabilistic noninterference in the context of process algebras, confirms that a solely nondeterministic approach to the information flow theory is not enough to study the security guarantees of cryptographic protocols. 1
Game relations and metrics
 In LICS’07
, 2007
"... We consider twoplayer games played over finite state spaces for an infinite number of rounds. At each state, the players simultaneously choose moves; the moves determine a successor state. It is often advantageous for players to choose probability distributions over moves, rather than single moves. ..."
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Cited by 9 (4 self)
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We consider twoplayer games played over finite state spaces for an infinite number of rounds. At each state, the players simultaneously choose moves; the moves determine a successor state. It is often advantageous for players to choose probability distributions over moves, rather than single moves. Given a goal (e.g., “reach a target state”), the question of winning is thus a probabilistic one: “what is the maximal probability of winning from a given state?”. On these game structures, two fundamental notions are those of equivalences and metrics. Given a set of winning conditions, two states are equivalent if the players can win the same games with the same probability from both states. Metrics provide a bound on the difference in the probabilities of winning across states, capturing a quantitative notion of state “similarity”. We introduce equivalences and metrics for twoplayer game structures, and we show that they characterize the difference in probability of winning games whose goals are expressed in the quantitative µcalculus. The quantitative µcalculus can express a large set of goals, including reachability, safety, and ωregular properties. Thus, we claim that our relations and metrics provide the canonical extensions to games, of the classical notion of bisimulation for transition systems. We develop our results both for equivalences and metrics, which generalize bisimulation, and for asymmetrical versions, which generalize simulation.
Two Formal Approaches for Approximating Noninterference Properties
 FOUNDATIONS OF SECURITY ANALYSIS AND DESIGN II
, 2004
"... The formalisation of security properties for computer systems raises the problem of overcoming also in a formal setting the classical view according to which confidentiality is an absolute property stating the complete absence of any unauthorised disclosure of information. In this paper, we present ..."
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Cited by 7 (4 self)
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The formalisation of security properties for computer systems raises the problem of overcoming also in a formal setting the classical view according to which confidentiality is an absolute property stating the complete absence of any unauthorised disclosure of information. In this paper, we present two formal models in which the notion of noninterference, which is at the basis of a large variety of security properties defined in the recent literature, is approximated. To this aim, the definition of indistinguishability of process behaviour is replaced by a similarity notion, which introduces a quantitative measure ε of the behavioural difference among processes. The first model relies on a programming paradigm called Probabilistic Concurrent Constraint Programming, while the second one is presented in the setting of a probabilistic process algebra. In both models, appropriate notions of distance provide information (the ε) on the security level of the system at hand, in terms of the capability of an external observer of identifying illegal interferences.
A Quantitative Approach to Noninterference for Probabilistic Systems
, 2003
"... We present a technique for measuring the security of a system which relies on a probabilistic process algebraic formalisation of noninterference. We define a mathematical model for this technique which consists of a linear space of processes and linear transformations on them. In this model the meas ..."
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Cited by 5 (1 self)
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We present a technique for measuring the security of a system which relies on a probabilistic process algebraic formalisation of noninterference. We define a mathematical model for this technique which consists of a linear space of processes and linear transformations on them. In this model the measured quantity corresponds to the norm of a suitably defined linear operator associated to the system. The probabilistic model we adopt is reactive in the sense that processes can react to the environment with a probabilistic choice on a set of inputs; it is also generative in the sense that outputs autonomously chosen by the system are governed by a probability distribution. In this setting, noninterference is formulated in terms of a probabilistic notion of weak bisimulation. We show how the probabilistic information in this notion can be used to estimate the maximal information leakage, i.e. the security degree of a system against a most powerful attacker.
Model checking Quantitative Linear Time Logic
"... This paper considers QLtl, a quantitative analagon of Ltl and presents algorithms for model checking QLtl over quantitative versions of Kripke structures and Markov chains. Keywords: Linear temporal logic, Quantitative verification, Automata. ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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This paper considers QLtl, a quantitative analagon of Ltl and presents algorithms for model checking QLtl over quantitative versions of Kripke structures and Markov chains. Keywords: Linear temporal logic, Quantitative verification, Automata.
Time and Probability based Information Flow Analysis
"... Abstract—In multilevel systems it is important to avoid unwanted indirect information flow from higher levels to lower levels, namely the so called covert channels. Initial studies of information flow analysis were performed by abstracting away from time and probability. It is already known that sys ..."
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Abstract—In multilevel systems it is important to avoid unwanted indirect information flow from higher levels to lower levels, namely the so called covert channels. Initial studies of information flow analysis were performed by abstracting away from time and probability. It is already known that systems that are proved to be secure in a possibilistic framework may turn out to be insecure when time or probability are considered. Recently, work has been done in order to consider also aspects either of time or of probability, but not both. In this paper we propose a general framework, based on Probabilistic Timed Automata, where both probabilistic and timing covert channels can be studied. We define a NonInterference security property and a Non Deducibility on Composition security property, which allow expressing information flow in a timed and probabilistic setting. We then compare these properties with analogous ones defined in contexts where either time or probability or neither of them are taken into account. This permits a classification of the properties depending on their discerning power. As an application, we study a system with covert channels that we are able to discover by applying our techniques.
AND MARIËLLE STOELINGA 4
, 806
"... Abstract. We consider twoplayer games played over finite state spaces for an infinite number of rounds. At each state, the players simultaneously choose moves; the moves determine a successor state. It is often advantageous for players to choose probability distributions over moves, rather than sin ..."
Abstract
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Abstract. We consider twoplayer games played over finite state spaces for an infinite number of rounds. At each state, the players simultaneously choose moves; the moves determine a successor state. It is often advantageous for players to choose probability distributions over moves, rather than single moves. Given a goal (e.g., “reach a target state”), the question of winning is thus a probabilistic one: “what is the maximal probability of winning from a given state?”. On these game structures, two fundamental notions are those of equivalences and metrics. Given a set of winning conditions, two states are equivalent if the players can win the same games with the same probability from both states. Metrics provide a bound on the difference in the probabilities of winning across states, capturing a quantitative notion of state “similarity”. We introduce equivalences and metrics for twoplayer game structures, and we show that they characterize the difference in probability of winning games whose goals are expressed in the quantitative µcalculus. The quantitative µcalculus can express a large set of goals, including reachability, safety, and ωregular properties. Thus, we claim that our relations and metrics provide the canonical extensions to games, of the classical notion of bisimulation for transition systems. We develop our results both for equivalences and metrics, which generalize bisimulation, and for asymmetrical versions, which generalize simulation.