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Efficient generation of shared RSA keys
 Advances in Cryptology  CRYPTO 97
, 1997
"... We describe efficient techniques for a number of parties to jointly generate an RSA key. At the end of the protocol an RSA modulus N = pq is publicly known. None of the parties know the factorization of N. In addition a public encryption exponent is publicly known and each party holds a share of the ..."
Abstract

Cited by 132 (5 self)
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We describe efficient techniques for a number of parties to jointly generate an RSA key. At the end of the protocol an RSA modulus N = pq is publicly known. None of the parties know the factorization of N. In addition a public encryption exponent is publicly known and each party holds a share of the private exponent that enables threshold decryption. Our protocols are efficient in computation and communication. All results are presented in the honest but curious settings (passive adversary).
Two Party RSA Key Generation
 In Crypto ’99, LNCS 1666
, 1999
"... . We present a protocol for two parties to generate an RSA key in a distributed manner. At the end of the protocol the public key: a modulus N = PQ, and an encryption exponent e are known to both parties. Individually, neither party obtains information about the decryption key d and the prime fa ..."
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Cited by 29 (0 self)
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. We present a protocol for two parties to generate an RSA key in a distributed manner. At the end of the protocol the public key: a modulus N = PQ, and an encryption exponent e are known to both parties. Individually, neither party obtains information about the decryption key d and the prime factors of N : P and Q. However, d is shared among the parties so that threshold decryption is possible. 1 Introduction We show how two parties can jointly generate RSA public and private keys. Following the execution of our protocol each party learns the public key: N = PQ and e, but does not know the factorization of N or the decryption exponent d. The exponent d is shared among the two players in such a way that joint decryption of ciphertexts is possible. Generation of RSA keys in a private, distributed manner figures prominently in several cryptographic protocols. An example is threshold cryptography, see [12] for a survey. In a threshold RSA signature scheme there are k parties who ...
Efficient Generation of Shared RSA keys (Extended Abstract)
 In Kaliski [103
"... We describe efficient techniques for three (or more) parties to jointly generate an RSA key. At the end of the protocol an RSA modulus N = pq is publicly known. None of the parties know the factorization of N . In addition a public encryption exponent is publicly known and each party holds a share o ..."
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Cited by 6 (1 self)
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We describe efficient techniques for three (or more) parties to jointly generate an RSA key. At the end of the protocol an RSA modulus N = pq is publicly known. None of the parties know the factorization of N . In addition a public encryption exponent is publicly known and each party holds a share of the private exponent that enables threshold decryption. Our protocols are efficient in computation and communication.
Sets of integers and quasiintegers with pairwise common divisor
 Acta Arith
, 1996
"... u ∈ N: u, s−1 ..."
Experimental Performance of Shared RSA Modulus Generation
 In proceedings of SODA '99
, 1998
"... y ..."
EULER’S CONSTANT: EULER’S WORK AND MODERN DEVELOPMENTS
, 2013
"... Abstract. This paper has two parts. The first part surveys Euler’s work on the constant γ =0.57721 ·· · bearing his name, together with some of his related work on the gamma function, values of the zeta function, and divergent series. The second part describes various mathematical developments invol ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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Abstract. This paper has two parts. The first part surveys Euler’s work on the constant γ =0.57721 ·· · bearing his name, together with some of his related work on the gamma function, values of the zeta function, and divergent series. The second part describes various mathematical developments involving Euler’s constant, as well as another constant, the Euler–Gompertz constant. These developments include connections with arithmetic functions and the Riemann hypothesis, and with sieve methods, random permutations, and random matrix products. It also includes recent results on Diophantine approximation and transcendence related to Euler’s constant. Contents
Maximal Sets of Numbers Not Containing K+1 Pairwise Coprime Integers
"... For positive integers k; n let f(n; k) be the maximal cardinality of subsets of integers in the interval ! 1; n ? , which don't have k + 1 pairwise coprimes. The set E (n; k) of integers in ! 1; n ? , which are divisible by one of the first k primes, certainly does not have k + 1 pairwise copr ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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For positive integers k; n let f(n; k) be the maximal cardinality of subsets of integers in the interval ! 1; n ? , which don't have k + 1 pairwise coprimes. The set E (n; k) of integers in ! 1; n ? , which are divisible by one of the first k primes, certainly does not have k + 1 pairwise coprimes. Whereas we disproved in [1] an old conjecture of Erdős ([4], [5], [6], [7]) by showing that the equality (1) f(n; k) = jE (n; k)j does not always hold, we prove here that (1) holds for every k and all relative to k sufficiently large n .
Two Party RSA Key Generation (Extended Abstract)
"... Abstract. We present a protocol for two parties to generate an RSA key in a distributed manner. At the end of the protocol the public key: a modulus N = PQ, and an encryption exponent e are known to both parties. Individually, neither party obtains information about the decryption key d and the prim ..."
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Abstract. We present a protocol for two parties to generate an RSA key in a distributed manner. At the end of the protocol the public key: a modulus N = PQ, and an encryption exponent e are known to both parties. Individually, neither party obtains information about the decryption key d and the prime factors of N: P and Q. However, d is shared among the parties so that threshold decryption is possible. 1