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Efficient generation of shared RSA keys
 Advances in Cryptology  CRYPTO 97
, 1997
"... We describe efficient techniques for a number of parties to jointly generate an RSA key. At the end of the protocol an RSA modulus N = pq is publicly known. None of the parties know the factorization of N. In addition a public encryption exponent is publicly known and each party holds a share of the ..."
Abstract

Cited by 132 (5 self)
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We describe efficient techniques for a number of parties to jointly generate an RSA key. At the end of the protocol an RSA modulus N = pq is publicly known. None of the parties know the factorization of N. In addition a public encryption exponent is publicly known and each party holds a share of the private exponent that enables threshold decryption. Our protocols are efficient in computation and communication. All results are presented in the honest but curious settings (passive adversary).
Experimenting with Shared Generation of RSA keys
, 1999
"... We describe an implementation of a distributed algorithm to generate a shared RSA key. At the end of the computation, an RSA modulus N = pq is publicly known. All servers involved in the computation are convinced that N is a product of two large primes, however none of them know the factorization of ..."
Abstract

Cited by 38 (0 self)
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We describe an implementation of a distributed algorithm to generate a shared RSA key. At the end of the computation, an RSA modulus N = pq is publicly known. All servers involved in the computation are convinced that N is a product of two large primes, however none of them know the factorization of N . In addition, a public encryption exponentispublicly known and each server holds a share of the private exponent. Such a sharing of an RSA key has many applications and can be used to secure sensitive private keys. Previously, the only known method to generate a shared RSA key was through a trusted dealer. Our implementation demonstrates the e#ectiveness of shared RSA key generation, eliminating the need for a trusted dealer. 1 Introduction To protect an RSA private key, one may break it into a number of pieces #shares# and store each piece at a separate location. Sensitive private keys, such as Certi#cation Authority #CA# keys, can be protected in this way. Fortunately, for the RSA cr...
Generating a Product of Three Primes with an Unknown Factorization
 Proc. 3rd Algorithmic Number Theory Symposium (ANTSIII
, 1998
"... We describe protocols for three or more parties to jointly generate a composite N = pqr which is the product of three primes. After our protocols terminate N is publicly known, but neither party knows the factorization of N . Our protocols require the design of a new type of distributed primality te ..."
Abstract

Cited by 6 (1 self)
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We describe protocols for three or more parties to jointly generate a composite N = pqr which is the product of three primes. After our protocols terminate N is publicly known, but neither party knows the factorization of N . Our protocols require the design of a new type of distributed primality test for testing that a given number is a product of three primes. We explain the cryptographic motivation and origin of this problem.