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The unbearable automaticity of being
- American Psychologist
, 1999
"... What was noted by E. J. hanger (1978) remains true today: that much of contemporary psychological research is based on the assumption that people are consciously and systematically processing incoming information in order to construe and interpret their world and to plan and engage in courses of act ..."
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Cited by 99 (4 self)
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What was noted by E. J. hanger (1978) remains true today: that much of contemporary psychological research is based on the assumption that people are consciously and systematically processing incoming information in order to construe and interpret their world and to plan and engage in courses of action. As did E. J. hanger, the authors question this assumption. First, they review evidence that the ability to exercise such conscious, intentional control is actually quite limited, so that most of moment-to-moment psychological life must occur through nonconscious means if it is to occur at all. The authors then describe the different possible mechanisms that produce automatic, environmental control over these various phenomena and review evidence establishing both the existence of these mechanisms as well as their consequences for judgments, emotions, and
Apparent mental causation: Sources of the experience of will
- American Psychologist
, 1999
"... The experience of willing an act arises from interpreting one's thought as the cause of the act. Conscious will is thus experienced as a function of the priority, consistency, and exclusivity of the thought about the action. The thought must occur before the action, be consistent with the action, an ..."
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Cited by 27 (0 self)
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The experience of willing an act arises from interpreting one's thought as the cause of the act. Conscious will is thus experienced as a function of the priority, consistency, and exclusivity of the thought about the action. The thought must occur before the action, be consistent with the action, and not be accompanied by other causes. An experiment illustrating the role of priority found that people can arrive at the mistaken belief that they have intentionally caused an action that in fact they were forced to perform when they are simply led to think about the action just before its occurrence. Conscious will is a pervasive human experience. We all have the sense that we do things, that we cause our acts, that we are agents. As William James (1890) observed, "the whole sting and excitement of our voluntary life... depends on our sense that in it things are really being decided from one moment to another, and that it is not the dull rattling off of a chain that was forged innumerable ages ago " (p. 453). And yet, the very notion of the will seems to contradict the core assumption of psychological science. After all, psychology examines how behavior is caused by mechanisms—the rattling off of genetic, unconscious, neural, cognitive, emotional, social, and yet other chains that lead, dully or not, to the things people do. If the things we do are caused by such mechanisms, how is it that we nonetheless experience willfully doing them? Our approach to this problem is to look for yet another chain—to examine the mechanisms that produce the experience of conscious will itself. In this article, we do this by exploring the possibility that the experience of will is a result of the same mental processes that people use in the perception of causality more generally. Quite simply, it may be that people experience conscious will when they interpret their own thought as the cause of their action. This idea means that people can experience conscious will quite independent of any actual causal connection between
Psychology Old and New
- In T. Baldwin (Ed.), Cambridge history of philosophy
"... e _H_i_s_t_o_r_y _o_f _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y: _1_8_7_0-_1_9_4_5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). - within faculties or schools of philosophy. 'Philosophy' at this time had both broad and narrow senses. Broadly, it was roughly equivalent to the 'arts and sciences'; narrowly, it might be re ..."
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e _H_i_s_t_o_r_y _o_f _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y: _1_8_7_0-_1_9_4_5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). - within faculties or schools of philosophy. 'Philosophy' at this time had both broad and narrow senses. Broadly, it was roughly equivalent to the 'arts and sciences'; narrowly, it might be restricted to logic, metaphysics, moral philosophy, and natural philosophy (though the latter was becoming separate as 'natural science'). Psychology was variously positioned under these rubrics, sometimes in metaphysics (Lotze 1881 [1886]), sometimes as an autonomous division of philosophy (Mill 1846, p. 532), but most often as an empirical natural science (Beneke 1845, p. 5; Wundt 1863, 1:iv). It was known under various titles, including 'moral science', 'mental science', 'theory of the mind', 'physiology of the mind', and _S_e_e_l_e_n_l_e_h_r_e or theory of the soul. During the period 1870-1914 the existing discipline of psychology was transformed. British thinkers including Herbert
The Passions of the soul and Descartes’s machine psychology
, 2006
"... This article was originally published in a journal published by Elsevier, and the attached copy is provided by Elsevier for the author’s benefit and for the benefit of the author’s institution, for non-commercial research and educational use including without limitation use in instruction at your in ..."
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This article was originally published in a journal published by Elsevier, and the attached copy is provided by Elsevier for the author’s benefit and for the benefit of the author’s institution, for non-commercial research and educational use including without limitation use in instruction at your institution, sending it to specific colleagues that you know, and providing a copy to your institution’s administrator. All other uses, reproduction and distribution, including without limitation commercial reprints, selling or licensing copies or access, or posting on open internet sites, your personal or institution’s website or repository, are prohibited. For exceptions, permission may be sought for such use through Elsevier’s permissions site at:
II. The Relation Between Perception and Behavior III. The Direct Effects of Perception on Behavior Produces Imitation IV. The Three Musketeers of Social Perception V. Social Perception Elicits Corresponding Behavior
"... Preparation of this chapter was supported by a fellowship of the Royal Netherlands ..."
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Preparation of this chapter was supported by a fellowship of the Royal Netherlands

