Abstract not found

Analogue to digital (A-D) converters with a fixed conversion time are subject to errors due to metastability. These errors will occur in all converter designs with a bounded time for decisions, and are potentially severe. We estimate the frequency of these errors in a successive approximation converter, and compare the results with asynchronous designs using both a fully speed-independent, and a bundled data approach. It is shown that an asynchronous converter is more reliable than its synchronous counterpart, and that the bundled data design is also faster, on average, than the synchronous design. We also demonstrate tradeoffs involved in asynchronous converter designs, such as speed, robustness to delay variations, circuit size and design scalability. Keywords: analogue to digital conversion, arbitration, asynchronous circuits, metastability, signal transition graphs, synchronisers. 1 Introduction N-bit analogue to digital (A-D) converters are usually specified to have a fixed conv...

Part One of my dissertation is about composite objects: things with proper parts, like plates, planets, plants and people. I begin chapter 1 by pointing out that if one were to judge by the way we normally speak about composite objects, one would suppose that we were all completely certain of a theory I call folk mereology. For instance, we seem to be completely convinced that whenever some things are piled up, there is an object---a pile---which they compose. I point out that folk mereology is neither an analytic truth nor a theory for which we have conclusive empirical evidence. So what are we to make of the feeling that it makes no sense to deny folk mereology? What this shows, I claim, is that the standard which an assertion about composite objects has to meet in order to be correct is not strict and literal truth, but something less demanding.

. A lot of work in metaphysics relies on linguistic analysis and intuitions. Do we want to know what sort of things there are or could be? Then let's see what sort of things there must be in order for what we truthfully say to be true. Do we want to see whether x is distinct from y? Then let's see whether there is any statement that is true of x but not of y. And so on. In this paper I argue that this way of proceeding is full of traps and is bound to be pretty useless unless we already have a good idea of what sort of things there are, and of how we are going to count them. 1. Introduction When we set ourselves to draw up an inventory of the world---a catalogue of all there is, was, and will or could be---we have to face two tasks. First, we have to figure out what sort of things there are, i.e., we must identify and characterize the categories under which the items in the inventory will fall. For example, we might want to draw a distinction between such things as chairs and tables,...

This paper introduces a novel approach to the semantics of plurals that is not based on the traditional distributive/collective distinction between predicates. Rather, the semantic number of nouns, verbs and adjectives is classified according to their behaviour under replacement of a plural determiner (e.g. all, plural no) by its singular counterpart (e.g. every, singular no). It is proposed that predicates that are insensitive to this replacement range over atomic entities, whereas number sensitive predicates range over sets of such atoms. This modeltheoretic property, together with morpho-syntactic number of predicates and the quantificational/non-quantificational distinction between noun phrases, governs the availability of collective interpretations. The emerging system offers a general solution to some long-standing problems concerning the differences between every, all and simple plural definites. 1 Introduction In a widely cited work, Vendler (1967:70-76) points ou...

We define a knowledge representation and inference formalism that is well suited to natural language processing. In this formalism every subformula of a formula is closed. We motivate this by observing that any formal language with (potentially) open sentences is an inappropriate medium for the representation of natural language sentences. Open sentences in such languages are a consequence of the separation of variables from their quantifier and type constraints, typically in the antecedents of rules. This is inconsistent with the use of descriptions and noun phrases corresponding to variables in language. Variables in natural language are constructions that are typed and quantified as they are used. A consequence of this is that variables in natural language may be freely reused in dialog. This leads to the use of pronouns and discourse phenomena such as ellipsis involving reuse of entire subformulas. We present an augmentation to the representation of variables so that variables are ...

In this paper a new branch of philosophy is presented, called neutrosophy, which studies the origin, nature, and scope of neutralities, as well as their interactions with different ideational spectra. The Fundamental Thesis: Any idea <A> is T % true, I % indeterminate, and F % false, where T, I, F are standard or non-standard subsets included in the non-standard unit interval �- 0, 1 + �. The Fundamental Theory: Every idea <A> tends to be neutralized, diminished, balanced by <Non-A> ideas (not only <Anti-A> as Hegel asserted)- as a state of equilibrium. Neutrosophy is the base of neutrosophic logic, a multiple value logic which generalizes the fuzzy logic, of neutrosophic set which generalizes the fuzzy set, and of neutrosphic probability and neutrosophic statistics, which generalize the classical and imprecise probability and statistics respectively.

. This paper considers the construction of Petri nets to simulate the computation performed by decision systems. Algorithms are given to construct Petri nets which correspond to decision rules, information systems, and real- time decision systems. Rough as well as roughly fuzzy Petri net extensions of coloured Petri net are used to create highly parallel programs to simulate reasoning system computations. Constructed nets make it possible to evaluate the design of decision system tables, and to trace computations in rules derived from decision tables. Start places of nets are connected to Dill process receptors which await input from the environment. Time-consumption during the propagation of outputs from sensors in a decision system is monitored with timers called approximated time windows, which measure durations between firings of decision transitions relative to time granules with names such as early, ontime, and late. Guards on decision transitions are propositional functions whic...

As a theory of reasoning, logic has—or ought to have—nothing to do with metaphysics. It ought to have nothing to do with questions concerning what there is, or whether there is anything at all. It is precisely because of its metaphysical commitments that Aristotelian syllogistics, for example, was eventually deemed inadequate as a canon of pure logical reasoning. The inference from an A-form statement such as (1) All humans are mortal to the corresponding I-form statement, (2) Some humans are mortal, is syllogistically valid. But it depends on the existence of humans beings and should not, therefore, count as valid as a matter of pure logic. (It depends on the existence of human beings because, in a world with no such beings, (2) would be false whereas (1) would be true, although vacuously.) Likewise, modern quantification theory 1 has been found inadequate insofar as it sanctions as valid the inference from a universal statement such as

The following publication is a short version of this SEKI-Report: