This paper is the first in a series whose objective is to study notions of large sets in the context of formal theories of constructivity. The two theories considered are Aczel's constructive set theory (CZF) and Martin-Lof's intuitionistic theory of types. This paper treats Mahlo's -numbers which give rise classically to the enumerations of inaccessibles of all transfinite orders. We extend the axioms of CZF and show that the resulting theory, when augmented by the tertium non datur, is equivalent to ZF plus the assertion that there are inaccessibles of all transfinite orders. Finally the theorems of that extension of CZF are interpreted in an extension of Martin-Lof's intuitionistic theory of types by a universe. 1 Prefatory and historical remarks The paper is organized as follows: After recalling Mahlo's -numbers and relating the history of universes in Martin-Lof type theory in section 1, we study notions of inaccessibility in the context of Aczel's constructive set theo...

A central theme running through all the main areas of Mathematical Logic is the classification of sets, functions or theories, by means of transfinite hierarchies whose ordinal levels measure their `rank' or `complexity' in some sense appropriate to the underlying context. In Proof Theory this is manifest in the assignment of `proof theoretic ordinals' to theories, gauging their `consistency strength' and `computational power'. Ordinal-theoretic proof theory came into existence in 1936, springing forth from Gentzen's head in the course of his consistency proof of arithmetic. To put it roughly, ordinal analyses attach ordinals in a given representation system to formal theories. Though this area of mathematical logic has is roots in Hilbert's "Beweistheorie " - the aim of which was to lay to rest all worries about the foundations of mathematics once and for all by securing mathematics via an absolute proof of consistency - technical results in pro...

The unfolding of schematic formal systems is a novel concept which was initiated in Feferman [6]. This paper is mainly concerned with the proof-theoretic analysis of various unfolding systems for non-nitist arithmetic NFA. In particular, we examine two restricted unfoldings U 0 (NFA) and U 1 (NFA), as well as a full unfolding, U(NFA). The principal results then state: (i) U 0 (NFA) is equivalent to PA; (ii) U 1 (NFA) is equivalent to RA<! ; (iii) U(NFA) is equivalent to RA< 0 . Thus U(NFA) is proof-theoretically equivalent to predicative analysis.

This paper was written while the first author was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (Stanford, CA) whose facilities and support, under grants from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and the National Science Foundation, have been greatly appreciated.

. Charles Sanders Peirce and Kurt Godel both conceived of the limitedness of human thought as possible to be overcome by intuitively formed statements, which should be rich in verifiable consequences in order to lead to justifiable extensions. Peirce developed to this purpose a theory of abductive reasoning, whereas Godel theorized about axioms of infinity. Even though Godel largely concerned himself with mathematical thought only, as opposed to Peirce's much broader programme concerning all scientific thought, we carry out a comparison between the views held by both in order to-hopefully- shed an interesting light on a (mathematical) conception of the transfinity of thought. 1 Introduction "To infinity ... and beyond!" - the transfinity of thought. Our knowledge, our theories, our thought, is necessarily incomplete. We have but limited means to understand a reality - our picture of that reality, phrased in terms of theories, will always be imperfect. The issue at the heart of the mat...

this paper. The exposition here diverges from the presentation given at the conference in two regards. Firstly, the talk began with a broad introduction, explaining the current rationale and goals of ordinal-theoretic proof theory, which take the place of the original Hilbert Program. Since this part of the talk is now incorporated in the first two sections of the BSL-paper [48] there is no point in reproducing it here. Secondly, we shall omit those parts of the talk concerned with infinitary proof systems of ramified set theory as they can also be found in [48] and even more detailed in [45]. Thirdly, thanks to the aforementioned omissions, the advantage of present paper over the talk is to allow for a much more detailed account of the actual information furnished by ordinal analyses and the role of large cardinal hypotheses in devising ordinal representation systems. 2 Observations on ordinal analyses

The concept of the (full) unfolding U(S) of a schematic system S is used to answer the following question: Which operations and predicates, and which principles concerning them, ought to be accepted if one has accepted S? The program to determine U(S) for various systems S of foundational significance was previously carried out for a system of non-finitist arithmetic, NFA; it was shown that U(NFA) is prooftheoretically equivalent to predicative analysis. In the present paper we work out the unfolding notions for a basic schematic system of finitist arithmetic, FA, and for an extension of that by a form BR of the so-called Bar Rule. It is shown that U(FA) and U(FA + BR) are proof-theoretically equivalent, respectively, to Primitive Recursive Arithmetic, PRA, and to Peano Arithmetic, PA.

[t]he analysis of the phrase “how many ” unambiguously leads to a definite meaning for the question [“How many different sets of integers do their exist?”]: the problem is to find out which one of the א’s is the number of points of a straight line … Cantor, after having proved that this number is greater than א0, conjectured that it is א1. An equivalent proposition is this: any infinite subset of the continuum has the power either of the set of integers or of the whole continuum. This is Cantor’s continuum hypothesis. … But, although Cantor’s set theory has now had a development of more than sixty years and the [continuum] problem is evidently of great importance for it, nothing has been proved so far relative to the question of what the power of the continuum is or whether its subsets satisfy the condition just stated, except that … it is true for a certain infinitesimal fraction of these subsets, [namely] the analytic sets. Not even an upper bound, however high, can be assigned for the power of the continuum. It is undecided whether this number is regular or singular, accessible or inaccessible, and (except for König’s negative result) what its character of cofinality is. Gödel 1947, 516-517 [in Gödel 1990, 178]

We study weak theories of truth over combinatory logic and their relationship to weak systems of explicit mathematics. In particular, we consider two truth theories TPR and TPT of primitive recursive and feasible strength. The latter theory is a novel abstract truth-theoretic setting which is able to interpret expressive feasible subsystems of explicit mathematics. 1

The paper discusses the transition from informal concepts to mathematically precise notions; examples are given, and in some detail the case of lawless sequences, a concept of intuitionistic mathematics, is discussed. A final section comments on philosophical discussions concerning intuitionistic logic in connection with a "theory of meaning". What I have to tell here is not a new story, and it does not contain any really new ideas. The main difference with my earlier discussions of the same topics ([TD88, chapter16],[Tro91]) is in the emphasis. This paper starts with some examples of the transition from informal concepts to mathematically precise notions, followed by a more detailed discussion of one of these examples, the intuitionistic notion of a choice sequence, arguing for the lasting interest of this notion for the philosophy of mathematics. In a final section, I describe my own position relative to some of the philosophical discussions concerning intuitionistic logic in the wr...