Abstract. We argue that the significance of the spatial boundary in autopoiesis has been overstated. It has the important task of distinguishing a living system as a unity in space but should not be seen as playing the additional role of delimiting the processes that make up the autopoietic system. We demonstrate the relevance of this to a current debate about the compatibility of the extended mind hypothesis with the enactive approach and show that a radically extended interpretation of autopoiesis was intended in one of the original works on the subject. Additionally we argue that the definitions of basic terms in the autopoietic literature can and should be made more precise, and we make some progress towards such a goal. 1

In our attempts to understand the evolution of biological, cognitive and cultural systems, critical questions arise concerning the origin of meaning. I argue that the key to success in attempts to create computational systems that exhibit the same capacities as their natural counterparts to evolve new and creative ways of interacting with their environment, beyond that which is simply “programmed into ” the system from the start, lies in answering these questions. The nature of the problem is laid bare when we consider the origin and evolution of life. A fundamental question is this: how is it possible for organisms, that follow their own goals and behave according to their own rules, to emerge in a world governed by the laws of physics and chemistry? More generally, how can agents and agency emerge in a system