This paper develops axioms and formal semantics for statements of the form "X is causally irrelevant to Y in context Z," which we interpret to mean "Changing X will not affect Y if we hold Z constant." The axiomization of causal irrelevance is contrasted with the axiomization of informational irrelevance, as in "Learning X will not alter our belief in Y , once we know Z." Two versions of causal irrelevance are analyzed, probabilistic and deterministic. We show that, unless stability is assumed, the probabilistic definition yields a very loose structure, that is governed by just two trivial axioms. Under the stability assumption, probabilistic causal irrelevance is isomorphic to path interception in cyclic graphs. Under the deterministic definition, causal irrelevance complies with all of the axioms of path interception in cyclic graphs, with the exception of transitivity. We compare our formalism to that of [Lewis, 1973], and offer a graphical method of proving theorems abou...

This paper surveys methods for representing and reasoning with imperfect information. It opens with an attempt to classify the different types of imperfection that may pervade data, and a discussion of the sources of such imperfections. The classification is then used as a framework for considering work that explicitly concerns the representation of imperfect information, and related work on how imperfect information may be used as a basis for reasoning. The work that is surveyed is drawn from both the field of databases and the field of artificial intelligence. Both of these areas have long been concerned with the problems caused by imperfect information, and this paper stresses the relationships between the approaches developed in each.