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Watermarking, Tamper-Proofing, and Obfuscation - Tools for Software Protection
- Software Engineering, IEEE Transactions on
, 2002
"... We identify three types of attack on the intellectual property contained in software and three corresponding technical defenses. A defense against reverse engineering is obfuscation, a process that renders software unintelligible but still functional. A defense against software piracy is watermarkin ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 62 (1 self)
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We identify three types of attack on the intellectual property contained in software and three corresponding technical defenses. A defense against reverse engineering is obfuscation, a process that renders software unintelligible but still functional. A defense against software piracy is watermarking, a process that makes it possible to determine the origin of software. A defense against tampering is tamper-proofing, so that unauthorized modifications to software (for example, to remove a watermark) will result in nonfunctional code. We briefly survey the available technology for each type of defense.
The Subjective Value of Information: An experimental comparison of willingness to purchase or sell information
"... Subjective valuations determine the demand for information. Users formulated value judgments regarding information are important for the design of information systems. This paper focuses on information as content. We begin with the "Endowment Effect" extension of "Prospect Theory". In a simple compu ..."
Abstract
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Subjective valuations determine the demand for information. Users formulated value judgments regarding information are important for the design of information systems. This paper focuses on information as content. We begin with the "Endowment Effect" extension of "Prospect Theory". In a simple computer simulated business game, two groups of fourteen and seventeen participants simulated a management task in which they were provided opportunities to buy or sell information. The bidding mechanism was incentive compatible. Results show that, in agreement with Endowment Effect theory, people value information they own much more than information not owned by them. Our findings indicate a place for the subjective value of information on the WTA/WTP ratio continuum that emerges from pertinent literature. The ratio for information is similar to that of market goods. Participants had a strong inclination to purchase but not to sell information although the profit data suggests that the use of information had no objective benefit for profit-making. This preference is attributed to risk aversion rather than to loss aversion which is the most widely-accepted explanation of the Endowment Effect. 3

