1.1 Four assays of quality................................................................ 4 1.2 The structure of appearance.................................................... 11 1.3 Intrinsic versus relational........................................................ 13 1.4 Four refutations....................................................................... 17 2. Qualities and their Places................................................................ 25 2.1 The appearance of space......................................................... 25 2.2 Some brain-mind mysteries..................................................... 26 2.3 Spatial qualia........................................................................... 33 2.4 Appearances partitioned.......................................................... 35 2.5 Ties that bind........................................................................... 38 2.6 Feature-placing introduced...................................................... 43 3 Places Phenomenal and Real............................................................ 47 3.1 Space-time regions.................................................................. 47 3.2 Three varieties of visual field.................................................. 50 3.3 Why I am not an array of impressions..................................... 55 3.4 Why I am not an intentional object......................................... 58 3.5 Sensory identification.............................................................. 61 3.6 Some examples of sensory reference....................................... 66

Before one can even begin to model consciousness and what exactly it means that it is a subjective phenomenon one needs a theory about what a first-person perspective really is. This theory has to be conceptually convincing, empirically plausible and, most of all, open to new developments. The chosen conceptual framework must be able to accommodate scientific progress. Its basic assumptions have to be plastic as it were, so that new details and empirical data can continuously be fed into the theoretical model as it grows and becomes more refined. This paper makes an attempt at sketching the outlines of such a theory, offering a representationalist analysis of the phenomenal first-person perspective. Three phenomenal target properties are centrally relevant: “mineness” (phenomenal appropriation; the sense of ownership), “selfhood ” (the conscious experience of being someone), and “perspectivalness ” (a structural feature: phenomenal space as a whole is organized around a center, a supramodal point of view). This contribution analyzes these properties on a representational as well as on a functional level of description. The author introduces new conceptual

Philosophers and logicians use the term “indexical ” for words such as “I”, “you” and “tomorrow”. Demonstratives such as “this ” and “that ” and demonstratives phrases such as “this man ” and “that computer ” are usually reckoned as a subcategory of index-icals. (Following [Kaplan, 1989a].) The “context-dependence ” of indexicals is often taken as a defining feature: what an indexical designates shifts from context to context. But there are many kinds of shiftiness, with corresponding conceptions of context. Un-til we clarify what we mean by “context”, this defining feature remains unclear. In sections 1–3, which are largely drawn from [Perry, forthcoming(a)], I try to clarify the sense in which indexicals are context-dependent and make some distinctions among the ways indexicals depend on context. In sections 3–6, I contrast indexicality with another phenomenon that I call “unarticulated constituents.” 1 1 Presemantic Uses of Context Sometimes we use context to figure out with which meaning a word is being used, or which of several words that look or sound alike is being used, or even which language

The proper treatment of computationalism, as the thesis that cognition is computable, is presented and defended. Some arguments of James H. Fetzer against computationalism are examined and found wanting, and his positive theory of minds as semiotic systems is shown to be consistent with computationalism. An objection is raised to an argument of Selmer Bringsjord against one strand of computationalism, namely, that Turing-Testfpassing artifacts are persons, it is argued that, whether or not this objection holds, such artifacts will inevitably be persons.

Abstract Interpretive constraints on anaphors in intensional complements suggest that de re LFs can’t yield de se truth conditions and, in fact, generate anti-de se inferences in the pragmatics.

Abstract Does natural language syntactically distinguish de se ascription from de re ascription? Though Maier (2009) argues for a negative answer, we present a new argument for the existence of dedicated de se LFs, motivated by distributional constraints on de se anaphors. In fact, we’ll argue something stronger: in general, de se LFs are the only way to arrive at de se truth conditions. A proposed Economy-like constraint on de re “introduction ” guarantees this and carries over to potentially problematic cases first noted by Zimmermann (1991). The paper includes an introduction to the syntax and semantics of de se and de re ascriptions. 1 Informal preliminaries Lewis (1979) argues that some attitudes are fundamentally self-locating—viz. de se. 1 Imagine I’m walking around my neighborhood and happen to forget who and where I am. Suppose a passerby, noting my confusion, comes up to me and utters, “Simon Charlow is at the intersection of so-and-so in Brooklyn. ” Her best intentions aside, this probably isn’t much help (suppose also that I forgot about Grice). In order for me to realize where I am, I need to realize, “I’m Simon Charlow, ” and consider this bit of knowledge alongside

It is generally assumed that if it is possible to believe that p without believing that q, then there is some difference between the object of the thought that p and the object of the thought that q. This assumption is challenged in the present paper, opening the way to an account of epistemic opacity that improves on existing accounts, not least because it casts doubt on various arguments that attempt to derive startling ontological conclusions from seemingly innocent epistemic premises. Propositional attitudes and the language we use to ascribe them are a perennial source of interest to both linguists and philosophers. Linguistically, the practice of ascribing propositional attitudes defies regimentation of the kind to which it seems possible to subject much of the remainder of human discourse. In particular, our use of such indispensable verbs as “believes ” and “wants ” appears to violate the otherwise fruitful and well-confirmed principle that the semantic value of a sentence is a function of the semantic values of its component expressions together

In the tradition of quantified modal logic, it was assumed that significantly different linguistic systems underlie reference to individuals, to times and to 'possible worlds'. Various results from recent research in formal semantics suggest that this is not so, and that there is in fact a pervasive symmetry between the linguistic means with which we refer to these three domains. Reference to individuals, times and worlds is uniformly effected through generalized quantifiers, definite descriptions, and pronouns, and in each domain grammatical features situate the reference of terms as near, far or 'further' from the actual or from a reported speech act. We outline various directions in which a program of ontological symmetry could be developed, and we offer in the Appendix a symmetric fragment developed in a logic that can be seen as a compromise between an extensional and an intensional system.

Abstract not found