Abstract not found

Developmental robotics is an emerging field located at the intersection of robotics, cognitive science and developmental sciences. This paper elucidates the main reasons and key motivations behind the convergence of fields with seemingly disparate interests, and shows why developmental robotics might prove to be beneficial for all fields involved. The methodology advocated is synthetic and two-pronged: on the one hand, it employs robots to instantiate models originating from developmental sciences; on the other hand, it aims to develop better robotic systems by exploiting insights gained from studies on ontogenetic development. This paper gives a survey of the relevant research issues and points to some future research directions.

The emerging viewpoint of embodied cognition holds that cognitive processes are deeply rooted in the body’s interactions with the world. This position actually houses a number of distinct claims, some of which are more controversial than others. This paper distinguishes and evaluates the following six claims: 1) cognition is situated; 2) cognition is time-pressured; 3) we off-load cognitive work onto the environment; 4) the environment is part of the cognitive system; 5) cognition is for action; 6) off-line cognition is body-based. Of these, the first three and the fifth appear to be at least partially true, and their usefulness is best evaluated in terms of the range of their applicability. The fourth claim, I argue, is deeply problematic. The sixth claim has received the least attention in the literature on embodied cognition, but it may in fact be the best documented and most powerful of the six claims.

In this paper I discuss in which conditions a population of embodied and situated agents that have to solve problems that requires cooperation might develop forms of ritualized interaction and communication. After reviewing the most relevant literature I will try to identify the the main open research problems and the most promising research directions. More specifially I will discuss: (a) the type of problems, the agents’ characteristics, and the environmental/social conditions that might facilitate the emergence of an ability to interact and communicate, and (b) the behavioral and cognitive capabilities that are crucial for the development of forms of communication of different complexity. 1.

What is the enactive approach to cognition? Over the last 15 years this banner has grown to become a respectable alternative to traditional frameworks in cognitive science. It is at the same time a label with different interpretations and upon which different doubts have been cast. This paper elaborates on the core ideas that define the enactive approach and their implications: autonomy, sensemaking, emergence, embodiment, and experience. These are coherent, radical and very powerful concepts that establish clear methodological guidelines for research. The paper also looks at the problems that arise from taking these ideas seriously. The enactive approach has plenty of room for elaboration in many different areas and many challenges to respond to. In particular, we concentrate on the problems surrounding several theories of value-appraisal and valuegeneration. The enactive view takes the task of understanding meaning and value very seriously and elaborates a proper scientific alternative to reductionist attempts to tackle these issues by functional localization. Another area where the enactive framework can make a significant contribution is social interaction and

this paper we investigate the claim that complex causal interactions cause trouble for the notion of inner representational vehicles. We review some of the cases supposed to put pressure on a representational-vehicle based understanding and conclude that the threat, even in these ongoing, interactive cases, is more apparent than real. The main contribution of the present paper, however, is to go beyond this negative thesis

A suitable project for the new Millenium is to radically reconfigure our image of human rationality. Such a project is already underway, within the Cognitive Sciences, under the umbrellas of work in Situated Cognition, Distributed and Decentralized Cognition, Real-world Robotics and Artificial Life. Such approaches

Abstract — In this paper we try to develop predictors in order to drive a simulated car around a track without the most recent sensor data. In order to test the predictive abilities of our car we developed two experiments: one where the sensor data was interrupted for a certain time and another where the sensor data is constantly delayed by a certain amount. The predictors are based on neural networks, and we compare backpropagation and evolutionary computation as methods of training these. In the end we found that predictors with good driving performance do not sample the set of predictors which minimize the prediction error in the sensors. I.

This paper proposes a brain-inspired cognitive architecture that incorporates approximations to the concepts of consciousness, emotion, and imagination. To emulate the empirically established cognitive efficacy of conscious as opposed to unconscious information processing in the mammalian brain, the architecture adopts a model of information flow from global workspace theory. Cognitive functions such as anticipation and planning are realised through internal simulation of interaction with the environment. Action selection, in both actual and internally simulated interaction with the environment, is mediated by affect. An implementation of the architecture is described which is based on weightless neurons and is used to control a simulated robot. 1

External representation is the use of the physical