This paper analyzes the determinants of initial public offerings (IPOs) in Italy. We compare the ex ante and the ex post characteristics of IPOs with those of a large sample of privately held companies. The likelihood of an IPO is positively related to the company's size and the industry's market-to-book ratio. Companies appear to go public not to finance future investments and growth, but rather to rebalance their accounts after a period of high investment and growth. IPOs are also followed by a reduction in the cost of credit and an increased turnover in control. These findings highlight some important differences between the role played by the equity market in Italy (and likely in other Continental European countries) and in the United States. This paper is part of the research project on "The decision to go public and the stock market as a source of capital," promoted by the Ente "Luigi Einaudi" per gli studi monetari bancari e finanziari. The suggestions we received from Espen E...

Carolina at Chapel Hill for helpful comments and suggestions and Jay Ritter and Michel Vetsuypens for We examine data on analyst following for a sample of initial public offerings completed over the 1975-1987 period to see how they relate to three well-documented IPO anomalies. We find that higher underpricing leads to increased analyst following. Analysts are overoptimistic about the earnings potential of recent IPOs and about their long term growth prospects. More firms complete IPOs when analysts are particularly optimistic about the growth prospects of recent IPOs. In the long run, IPOs have better stock price performance when analysts ascribe low growth potential to these firms than when they ascribe high growth potential. These results suggest that the anomalies documented in the IPO market may, at least partially, be driven by overoptimism. 1 1.

We review the theory and evidence on IPO activity: why firms go public, why they reward first-day investors with considerable underpricing, and how IPOs perform in the long run. Our perspective is threefold: First, we believe that many IPO phenomena are not stationary. Second, we believe research into share allocation issues is the most promising area of research in IPOs at the moment. Third, we argue that asymmetric information is not the primary driver of many IPO phenomena.

Pittsburgh is gratefully acknowledged. JEL classification: G24, C21

of a selection-bias correction for venture capital returns, and who also made many useful comments and suggestions. I gratefully acknowledge the contribution of Shawn Blosser, who assembled the venture capital data. I thank many seminar participants and two anonymous referees for important comments and suggestions. I gratefully acknowledge research support from NSF grants administered by the NBER and from CRSP. Data, programs, and an appendix describing data procedures and algebra can be found at

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We provide evidence that firms attempting IPOs condition offer terms and the decision whether to carry through with an offering on the experience of their primary market contemporaries. Moreover, while initial returns and IPO volume are positively correlated in the aggregate, the correlation is negative among contemporaneous offerings subject to a common valuation factor. Our findings are consistent with investment banks implicitly bundling offerings subject to a common valuation factor to achieve more equitable internalization of information production costs and thereby preventing coordination failures in primary equity markets.

Many financial markets are characterized by strong relationships and networks, rather than arm’s-length, spot-market transactions. We examine the performance consequences of this organizational choice in the context of relationships established when VCs syndicate portfolio company investments. VC firms that enjoy more influential network positions have significantly better fund performance, as measured by the proportion of investments that are successfully exited through an IPO or sale to another company. Similarly, the portfolio companies of betternetworked VC firms are significantly more likely to survive to subsequent financing and to eventual exit. Finally, we provide initial evidence on the evolution of VC networks.

Powell and K.W. Koput, Co-PIs). We appreciate the helpful comments of Gernot

This paper describes board size and composition and investigates the role of venture capital in a sample of 1,116 IPO firms. First, venture capital-backed firms have fewer insider and instrumental directors and more independent outsiders. Second, we consider board composition as the outcome of a bargain between the CEO and outside shareholders. Representation of independent outsiders on the board decreases with the power of the CEO- tenure and voting control- and increases with the power of outside investors- venture capital backing and venture firm reputation. Third, within the sample of venture financed firms and also consistent with a bargaining model, the probability that a founder remains as CEO is decreasing in venture firm reputation. Finally, we examine the influence of venture capital backing and board structure on firm outcomes in the ten years after the IPO.