Introduction to the constructive point of view in the foundations of mathematics, in particular intuitionism due to L.E.J. Brouwer, constructive recursive mathematics due to A.A. Markov, and Bishop’s constructive mathematics. The constructive interpretation and formalization of logic is described. For constructive (intuitionistic) arithmetic, Kleene’s realizability interpretation is given; this provides an example of the possibility of a constructive mathematical practice which diverges from classical mathematics. The crucial notion in intuitionistic analysis, choice sequence, is briefly described and some principles which are valid for choice sequences are discussed. The second half of the article deals with some aspects of proof theory, i.e., the study of formal proofs as combinatorial objects. Gentzen’s fundamental contributions are outlined: his introduction of the so-called Gentzen systems which use sequents instead of formulas and his result on first-order arithmetic showing that (suitably formalized) transfinite induction up to the ordinal "0 cannot be proved in first-order arithmetic.

We explain Stalmarck's proof procedure for classical propositional logic. The method is implemented in a commercial tool that has been used successfully in real industrial verification projects. Here, we present the proof system underlying the method, and motivate the various design decisions that have resulted in a system that copes well with the large formulas encountered in industrial-scale verification. 1

The logics of formal inconsistency (LFIs) are paraconsistent logics which permit us to internalize the concepts of consistency or inconsistency inside our object language, introducing new operators to talk about them, and allowing us, in principle, to logically separate the notions of contradictoriness and of inconsistency. We present the formal definitions of these logics in the context of General Abstract Logics, argue that they in fact represent the majority of all paraconsistent logics existing up to this point, if not the most exceptional ones, and we single out a subclass of them called C-systems, as the LFIs that are built over the positive basis of some given consistent logic. Given precise characterizations of some received logical principles, we point out that the gist of paraconsistent logic lies in the Principle of Explosion, rather than in the Principle of Non-Contradiction, and we also sharply distinguish these two from the Principle of Non-Triviality, considering the next various weaker formulations of explosion, and investigating their interrelations. Subsequently, we present the syntactical formulations of some of the main C-systems based on classical logic, showing how several well-known logics in the literature can be recast as such a kind of C-systems, and carefully study their properties and shortcomings, showing for instance how they can be used to faithfully

The behavioural semantics of specifications with higher-order logical formulae as axioms is analyzed. A characterization of behavioural abstraction via behavioural satisfaction of formulae in which the equality symbol is interpreted as indistinguishability, which is due to Reichel and was recently generalized to the case of first-order logic by Bidoit et al, is further generalized to this case. The fact that higher-order logic is powerful enough to express the indistinguishability relation is used to characterize behavioural satisfaction in terms of ordinary satisfaction, and to develop new methods for reasoning about specifications under behavioural semantics. 1 Introduction An important ingredient in the use of algebraic specifications to describe data abstractions is the concept of behavioural equivalence between algebras, which seems to appropriately capture the "black box" character of data abstractions, see e.g. [GGM76], [GM82], [ST87] and [ST95]. Roughly speaking (since there ...

abstract. The family of normal propositional modal logic systems is given a very systematic organisation by their model theory. This model theory is generally given using frame semantics, and it is systematic in the sense that for the most important systems we have a clean, exact correspondence between their constitutive axioms as they are usually given in a Hilbert-Lewis style and conditions on the accessibility relation on frames. By contrast, the usual structural proof theory of modal logic, as given in Gentzen systems, is ad-hoc. While we can formulate several modal logics in the sequent calculus that enjoy cut-elimination, their formalisation arises through system-bysystem fine tuning to ensure that the cut-elimination holds, and the correspondence to the axioms of the Hilbert-Lewis systems becomes opaque. This paper introduces a systematic presentation for the systems K, D, M, S4, and S5 in the calculus of structures, a structural proof theory that employs deep inference. Because of this, we are able to axiomatise the modal logics in a manner directly analogous to the Hilbert-Lewis axiomatisation. We show that the calculus possesses a cut-elimination property directly analogous to cut-elimination for the sequent calculus for these systems, and we discuss the extension to several other modal logics. 1

We present well-ordering proofs for Martin-Lof's type theory with W-type and one universe. These proofs, together with an embedding of the type theory in a set theoretical system as carried out in [Set93] show that the proof theoretical strength of the type theory is precisely ## 1# I+# , which is slightly more than the strength of Feferman's theory T 0 , classical set theory KPI and the subsystem of analysis (# 1 2 -CA)+(BI). The strength of intensional and extensional version, of the version a la Tarski and a la Russell are shown to be the same. 0 Introduction 0.1 Proof theory and Type Theory Proof theory and type theory have been two answers of mathematical logic to the crisis of the foundations of mathematics at the beginning of the century. Proof theory was originally established by Hilbert in order to prove the consistency of theories by using finitary methods. When Godel showed that Hilbert's program cannot be carried out as originally intended, the focus of proof theory ch...

We prove the completeness of extended SLDNF-resolution for the new class of #-programs with respect to the three-valued completion of a logic program. Not only the class of allowed programs but also the class of definite programs are contained in the class of #-programs. To understand better the three-valued completion of a logic program we introduce a formal system for three-valued logic in which one can derive exactly the three-valued consequences of the completion of a logic program. The system is proof theoretically interesting, since it is a fragment of Gentzen's sequent calculus LK. Keywords: Logic programming; three-valued logic; negation as failure; SLDNFresolution; sequent calculus. 1

This is a survey of some of the principal developments in proof theory from its inception in the 1920s, at the hands of David Hilbert, up to the 1960s. Hilbert's aim was to use this as a tool in his nitary consistency program to eliminate the \actual in nite " in mathematics from proofs of purely nitary statements. One of the main approaches that turned out to be the most useful in pursuit of this program was that due to Gerhard Gentzen, in the 1930s, via his calculi of \sequents" and his Cut-Elimination Theorem for them. Following that we trace how and why prima facie in nitary concepts, such as ordinals, and in nitary methods, such as the use of in nitely long proofs, gradually came to dominate proof-theoretical developments. In this rst lecture I will give anoverview of the developments in proof theory since Hilbert's initiative in establishing the subject in the 1920s. For this purpose I am following the rst part of a series of expository lectures that I gave for the Logic Colloquium `94 held in Clermont-Ferrand 21-23 July 1994, but haven't published. The theme of my lectures there was that although Hilbert established his theory of proofs as a part of his foundational program and, for philosophical reasons whichwe shall get into, aimed to have it developed in a completely nitistic way, the actual work in proof theory This is the rst of three lectures that I delivered at the conference, Proof Theory: History

Abstract. Proofs of termination are essential for establishing the correct behavior of computing systems. There are various ways of establishing termination, but the most general involves the use of ordinals. An example of a theorem proving system in which ordinals are used to prove termination is ACL2. In ACL2, every function defined must be shown to terminate using the ordinals up to ɛ0. We use a compact notation for the ordinals up to ɛ0 (exponentially more succinct than the one used by ACL2) and define efficient algorithms for ordinal addition, subtraction, multiplication, and exponentiation. In this paper we describe our notation and algorithms, prove their correctness, and analyze their complexity. 1

. We describe a model-theoretic approach to ordinal analysis via the finite combinatorial notion of an #-large set of natural numbers. In contrast to syntactic approaches that use cut elimination, this approach involves constructing finite sets of numbers with combinatorial properties that, in nonstandard instances, give rise to models of the theory being analyzed. This method is applied to obtain ordinal analyses of a number of interesting subsystems of first- and second-order arithmetic. x1. Introduction. Two of proof theory's defining goals are the justification of classical theories on constructive grounds, and the extraction of constructive information from classical proofs. Since Gentzen, ordinal analysis has been a major component in these pursuits, and the assignment of recursive ordinals to theories has proven to be an illuminating way of measuring their constructive strength. The traditional approach to ordinal analysis, which uses cut-elimination procedures to transfor...