. Humans have different problem solving strategies at their disposal and they can flexibly employ several strategies when solving a complex problem, whereas previous theorem proving and planning systems typically employ a single strategy or a hard coded combination of a few strategies. We introduce multi-strategy proof planning that allows for combining a number of strategies and for switching flexibly between strategies in a proof planning process. Thereby proof planning becomes more robust since it does not necessarily fail if one problem solving mechanism fails. Rather it can reason about preference of strategies and about failures. Moreover, our strategies provide a means for structuring the vast amount of knowledge such that the planner can cope with the otherwise overwhelming knowledge in mathematics. 1 Introduction The choice of an appropriate problem solving strategy is a crucial human skill and is typically guided by some meta-level reasoning. Trained mathematicia...

One way to ensure correctness of the inference performed by computer theorem provers is to force all proofs to be done step by step in a simple, more or less traditional, deductive system. Using techniques pioneered in Edinburgh LCF, this can be made palatable. However, some believe such an approach will never be efficient enough for large, complex proofs. One alternative, commonly called reflection, is to analyze proofs using a second layer of logic, a metalogic, and so justify abbreviating or simplifying proofs, making the kinds of shortcuts humans often do or appealing to specialized decision algorithms. In this paper we contrast the fully-expansive LCF approach with the use of reflection. We put forward arguments to suggest that the inadequacy of the LCF approach has not been adequately demonstrated, and neither has the practical utility of reflection (notwithstanding its undoubted intellectual interest). The LCF system with which we are most concerned is the HOL proof ...

We describe an emerging field, that of nonclassical computability and nonclassical computing machinery. According to the nonclassicist, the set of well-defined computations is not exhausted by the computations that can be carried out by a Turing machine. We provide an overview of the field and a philosophical defence of its foundations.

Contents 1 Introduction : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 2 2 The expressive power of second order Logic : : : : : : : : : : : 3 2.1 The language of second order logic : : : : : : : : : : : : : 3 2.2 Expressing size : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 4 2.3 Defining data types : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 6 2.4 Describing processes : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 8 2.5 Expressing convergence using second order validity : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 9 2.6 Truth definitions: the analytical hierarchy : : : : : : : : 10 2.7 Inductive definitions : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 13 3 Canonical semantics of higher order logic : : : : : : : : : : : : 15 3.1 Tarskian semantics of second order logic : : : : : : : : : 15 3.2 Function and re

This paper compares two different styles of reasoning with inductively defined predicates, each style being encapsulated by a corresponding sequent calculus proof system. The first system supports traditional proof by induction, with induction rules formulated as sequent rules for introducing inductively defined predicates on the left of sequents. We show this system to be cut-free complete with respect to a natural class of Henkin models; the eliminability of cut follows as a corollary. The second system uses infinite (non-well-founded) proofs to represent arguments by infinite descent. In this system, the left rules for inductively defined predicates are simple case-split rules, and an infinitary, global condition on proof trees is required to ensure soundness. We show this system to be cut-free complete with respect to standard models, and again infer the eliminability of cut. The second infinitary system is unsuitable for formal reasoning. However, it has a natural restriction to proofs given by regular trees, i.e. to those proofs representable by finite graphs. This restricted “cyclic ” system subsumes the first system for proof by induction. We conjecture that the two systems are in fact equivalent, i.e., that proof by induction is equivalent to regular proof by infinite descent.

We present a new way of using Binary Decision Diagrams in automata based algorithms for solving the satisfiability problem of quantifier-free Presburger arithmetic. Unlike in previous approaches [5, 2, 19], we translate the satisfiability problem into a model checking problem and use the existing BDD-based model checker SMV [13] as our primary engine.

Proof planning is a paradigm for the automation of proof that focuses on encoding intelligence to guide the proof process. The idea is to capture common patterns of reasoning which can be used to derive abstract descriptions of proofs known as proof plans. These can then be executed to provide fully formal proofs. This thesis concerns the development and analysis of a novel approach to proof planning that focuses on an explicit representation of choices during search. We embody our approach as a proof planner for the generic proof assistant Isabelle and use the Isar language, which is human-readable and machine-checkable, to represent proof plans. Within this framework we develop an inductive theorem prover as a case study of our approach to proof planning. Our prover uses the difference reduction heuristic known as rippling to automate the step cases of the inductive proofs. The development of a flexible approach to rippling that supports its various modifications and extensions is the second major focus of this thesis. Here, our inductive theorem prover provides a context in which to evaluate rippling experimentally. This work results in an efficient and powerful inductive theorem prover for Isabelle as well as proposals for further improving the efficiency of rippling. We also draw observations in order

In earlier papers a critic for automatically generalizing conjectures in the context of failed inductive proofs was presented. The critic exploits the partial success of the search control heuristic known as rippling. Through empirical testing a natural generalization and extension of the basic critic emerged. Here we describe our extended generalization critic together with some promising experimental results. 1 Introduction A major obstacle to the automation of proof by mathematical induction is the need for generalization. A generalization is underpinned by the cut-rule of inference. In a goal-directed framework, therefore, a generalization introduces an infinite branching point into the search space. It is known [13] that the cut-elimination theorem does not hold for inductive theories. Consequently heuristics for controlling generalization play an important role in the automation of inductive proof. There are a number of different kinds of generalization. In this paper we present...

The first three papers on Geometry of Interaction [9, 10, 11] did establish the universality of the feedback equation as an explanation of logic; this equation corresponds to the fundamental operation of logic, namely cut-elimination, i.e., logical consequence; this is also the oldest approach to logic, syllogistics! But the equation was essentially studied for those Hilbert space operators coming from actual logical proofs. In this paper, we take the opposite viewpoint, on the arguable basis that operator algebra is more primitive than logic: we study the general feedback equation of Geometry of Interaction, h(x⊕y) = x ′ ⊕σ(y), where h,σ are hermitian, �h � ≤ 1, and σ is a partial symmetry, σ 3 = σ. We show that the normal form which yields the solution σ�h�(x) = x ′ in the invertible case can be extended in a unique way to the general case, by various techniques, basically order-continuity and associativity. From this we expect a definite break with essentialism à la Tarski: an interpretation of logic which does not presuppose logic! 1

this paper presented at the 1993 Eastern APA meetings in Atlanta --- comments which I incorporate in my response to Mendelson's response. I'm grateful to Michael McMenamin for providing, in his unpublished "Deciding Uncountable Sets and Church's Thesis," an excellent objection to my attack on Church's Thesis (which I rebut below).