The dynamical hypothesis is the claim that cognitive agents are dynamical systems. It stands opposed to the dominant computational hypothesis, the claim that cognitive agents are digital computers. This target article articulates the dynamical hypothesis and defends it as an open empirical alternative to the computational hypothesis. Carrying out these objectives requires extensive clarification of the conceptual terrain, with particular focus on the relation of dynamical systems to computers. Key words cognition, systems, dynamical systems, computers, computational systems, computability, modeling, time. Long Abstract The heart of the dominant computational approach in cognitive science is the hypothesis that cognitive agents are digital computers; the heart of the alternative dynamical approach is the hypothesis that cognitive agents are dynamical systems. This target article attempts to articulate the dynamical hypothesis and to defend it as an empirical alternative to the compu...

The nature of cognition is being re-considered. Instead of emphasizing formal operations on abstract symbols, the new approach foregrounds the fact that cognition is, rather, a situated activity, and suggests that thinking beings ought therefore be considered first and foremost as acting beings. The essay reviews recent work in Embodied Cognition, provides a concise guide to its principles, attitudes and goals, and identifies the physical grounding project as its central research focus.

The long-term goal of our field is the creation and understanding of intelligence. Productive research in AI, both practical and theoretical, benefits from a notion of intelligence that is precise enough to allow the cumulative development of robust systems and general results. This paper outlines a gradual evolution in our formal conception of intelligence that brings it closer to our informal conception and simultaneously reduces the gap between theory and practice. 1 Artificial Intelligence AI is a field in which the ultimate goal has often been somewhat ill-defined and subject to dispute. Some researchers aim to emulate human cognition, others aim at the creation of

This research was funded in part through fellowships from the Litton and Intel Corporations. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the sponsors.

The distinction between rule-based and similarity-based processes in cognition is of fundamental importance for cognitive science, and has been the focus of a large body of empirical research. However, intuitive uses of the distinction are subject to theoretical difficulties and their relation to empirical evidence is not clear. We propose a ‘core ’ distinction between ruleand similarity-based processes, in terms of the way representations of stored information are ‘matched ’ with the representation of a novel item. This explication captures the intuitively clear-cut cases of processes of each type, and resolves apparent problems with the rule/ similarity distinction. Moreover, it provides a clear target for assessing the psychological and AI literatures. We show that many lines of psychological evidence are less conclusive than sometimes assumed, but suggest that converging lines of evidence may be persuasive. We then argue that the AI literature suggests that approaches which combine rules and similarity are an important new focus for empirical work. © 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. Keywords: Similarity-based process; Rule-based process 1.

Expressive AI is a new interdiscipline of AI-based cultural production combining art practice and AI research practice. This paper explores the notion of expressive AI by comparing it with other AI discourses, describing how it borrows notions of interpretation and authorship from both art and AI research practice, and by providing preliminary desiderata for the practice.

Introduction 3 9 ( & 24223-6 & 4472 % (%%& 9 - #. % 1070 - " 0423 &!/& " & ! " " " 3 & "- - % # % % %&/ 270 /& &! *2. & & 32 . % "- 3254 . (" %%" 327 - " ! - " " % & " !%% 50 !" - " /&" - " # 2 2 / 5*6# 7 !""/ ( & - " 37 "

Abstract not found

This thesis presents a study of the provision of emotions for artificial agents with the ultimate aim of enhancing their autonomy, i.e. making them more flexible, robust and self-sufficient. In recent years, the importance of emotions and their assistance to cognition has been increasingly acknowledged. Emotions are no longer considered undesirable or simply useless. Their role in various aspects of human and animal cognition like perception, attention, memory, decision-making and social interaction has been recognised as essential. The importance of emotions is much more evident insocial interaction and therefore much of the emotions research done in artificial systems focuses on the expression and recognition of emotions. However, recent neurophysiological research suggests that emotions also play a crucial part in cognition itself. This thesis investigates ways in which artificial emotions can improve autonomous behaviour in the domain of a simple, but complete, solitary learning agent. For this purpose, a non-symbolic emotion model was designed and implemented. It takes the form of a recurrent artificial neural network where emotions influence the perception

The adaptive value of emotions in nature indicates that they might also be useful in artificial creatures. Experiments were carried out to investigate this hypothesis in a simulated learning robot. For this purpose, a non-symbolic emotion model was developed that takes the form of a recurrent artificial neural network where emotions both depend on and influence the perception of the state of the world. This emotion