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34
Learning and the Emergence of Coordinated Communication
, 1997
"... this paper is on procedures whereby new (e.g., juvenile) members of a population could learn to communicate with the other members by observing their communicative behavior. Two apparently distinct issues are relevant to the evaluation of such learning procedures. First, the procedure must enable th ..."
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Cited by 31 (1 self)
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this paper is on procedures whereby new (e.g., juvenile) members of a population could learn to communicate with the other members by observing their communicative behavior. Two apparently distinct issues are relevant to the evaluation of such learning procedures. First, the procedure must enable the new members to accurately acquire the communication system of the population, even though their observations may be limited, noisy, or otherwise misleading. Second, the learning procedure used by its new members will affect the population's communication system over time. The use of a particular procedure might result in the population's communication increasing in coordination, ultimately yielding a nearly optimally coordinated system. If a learning procedure were to satisfy both criteria, it could explain how learned communication systems are maintained over time, as well as how they are established in the first place.
Fast, frugal, and rational: How rational norms explain behavior
 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES
, 2003
"... Much research on judgment and decision making has focussed on the adequacy of classical rationality as a description of human reasoning. But more recently it has been argued that classical rationality should also be rejected even as normative standards for human reasoning. For example, Gigerenzer an ..."
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Cited by 27 (1 self)
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Much research on judgment and decision making has focussed on the adequacy of classical rationality as a description of human reasoning. But more recently it has been argued that classical rationality should also be rejected even as normative standards for human reasoning. For example, Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) and Gigerenzer and Todd (1999a) argue that reasoning involves ‘‘fast and frugal’ ’ algorithms which are not justified by rational norms, but which succeed in the environment. They provide three lines of argument for this view, based on: (A) the importance of the environment; (B) the existence of cognitive limitations; and (C) the fact that an algorithm with no apparent rational basis, TaketheBest, succeeds in an judgment task (judging which of two cities is the larger, based on lists of features of each city). We reconsider (A)–(C), arguing that standard patterns of explanation in psychology and the social and biological sciences, use rational norms to explain why simple cognitive algorithms can succeed. We also present new computer simulations that compare TaketheBest with other cognitive models (which use connectionist, exemplarbased, and decisiontree algorithms). Although TaketheBest still performs well, it does not perform noticeably better than the other models. We conclude that these results provide no strong reason to prefer TaketheBest over alternative cognitive models.
Signalling games select Horn strategies
"... In this paper I will discuss why (un) marked expressions typically get an (un)marked interpretation: Horn's division of pragmatic labor. It is argued that it is a conventional fact the we use language this way. This convention will be explained in terms of equilibria of signalling games int ..."
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Cited by 17 (2 self)
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In this paper I will discuss why (un) marked expressions typically get an (un)marked interpretation: Horn's division of pragmatic labor. It is argued that it is a conventional fact the we use language this way. This convention will be explained in terms of equilibria of signalling games introduced by Lewis (1969) but now in an evolutionary setting. I will also relate this signalling game analysis with Blutner's (2000) bidirectional optimality theory and with Parikh's (1991, 2000) gametheoretical analysis of successful communication.
Game Relativity: How Context Influences Strategic Decision Making
"... Existing models of strategic decision making typically assume that only the attributes of the currently played game need be considered when reaching a decision. The results presented in this article demonstrate that the socalled “cooperativeness ” of the previously played prisoner’s dilemma games i ..."
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Cited by 9 (4 self)
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Existing models of strategic decision making typically assume that only the attributes of the currently played game need be considered when reaching a decision. The results presented in this article demonstrate that the socalled “cooperativeness ” of the previously played prisoner’s dilemma games influence choices and predictions in the current prisoner’s dilemma game, which suggests that games are not considered independently. These effects involved reinforcementbased assimilation to the previous choices and also a perceptual contrast of the present game with preceding games, depending on the range and the rank of their cooperativeness. A. Parducci’s (1965) range frequency theory and H. Helson’s (1964) adaptation level theory are plausible theories of relative judgment of magnitude information, which could provide an account of these context effects.
Evolving landscapes for population games
, 1997
"... We consider population games where the possible actions of each player are labeled by a real number that ranges over a finite interval. The adjustment dynamics of such games can be visualized as motion over a “landscape ” the surface defined by a payoff or fitness function. A leading example is gra ..."
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Cited by 8 (3 self)
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We consider population games where the possible actions of each player are labeled by a real number that ranges over a finite interval. The adjustment dynamics of such games can be visualized as motion over a “landscape ” the surface defined by a payoff or fitness function. A leading example is gradient dynamics, in which the speed with which a player changes action is proportional to the gradient (or slope) of the landscape at his current action. We show that gradient dynamics arise from individual optimizations, given the costs of changing actions. We also show that the time behavior of the action distribution in gradient dynamics is described by a class of nonlinear integropartial differential equations with deviating spatial arguments. We solve these equations analytically for some interesting choices of payoff functions. Cases are exhibited in which the distribution of actions develops compression and rarefaction shock waves. The results of numerical simulations are presented. We characterize the limiting probability distributions of classes of population games, and find sufficient conditions for convergence to pure Nash equilibrium and for convergence to distributions with full support. Applications are suggested in economics and population biology. 1
Stability and Explanatory Significance of Some Simple Evolutionary Models” Philosophy of Science 67
, 1999
"... dynamics. First there are questions of dynamical stability of the equilibrium that are internal to the dynamical system in question. Is the equilibrium locally stable, so that states near to it stay near to it, or better, asymptotically stable, so that states near to it are carried to it by the dyna ..."
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Cited by 7 (5 self)
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dynamics. First there are questions of dynamical stability of the equilibrium that are internal to the dynamical system in question. Is the equilibrium locally stable, so that states near to it stay near to it, or better, asymptotically stable, so that states near to it are carried to it by the dynamics? If not, we should not expect to see this equilibrium. But
Evolution of Conventional Meaning and Conversational Principles
"... In this paper we study language use and language organisation by making use of Lewisean signalling games. Standard game theoretical approaches are contrasted with evolutionary ones to analyze conventional meaning and conversational interpretation strategies. It is argued that analyzing successful ..."
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Cited by 3 (0 self)
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In this paper we study language use and language organisation by making use of Lewisean signalling games. Standard game theoretical approaches are contrasted with evolutionary ones to analyze conventional meaning and conversational interpretation strategies. It is argued that analyzing successful communication in terms of standard game theory requires agents to be very rational and fully informed. The main goal of the paper is to show that in terms of evolutionary game theory we can motivate the emergence and selfsustaining force of (i) conventional meaning and (ii) some conversational interpretation strategies in terms of weaker and, perhaps, more plausible assumptions.
Adaptive dynamics with vectorvalued strategies
"... Question: We examine strategy dynamics for evolutionary games with vectorvalued strategies. Mathematical methods: We use the fitnessgenerating function (Gfunction) to derive ESS maximum principle and strategy dynamics along multidimensional adaptive landscapes. We apply the dynamics to two model ..."
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Question: We examine strategy dynamics for evolutionary games with vectorvalued strategies. Mathematical methods: We use the fitnessgenerating function (Gfunction) to derive ESS maximum principle and strategy dynamics along multidimensional adaptive landscapes. We apply the dynamics to two models of coevolution of competitors and one model of predator–prey coevolution. Results: When several traits evolve simultaneously (vectorvalued strategies), a trait changes according to the product of each trait’s fitness gradient and the matrix of covariances between the trait and the other traits. Only when these covariance terms are small does each trait in the strategy vector change in the direction of that trait’s fitness gradient, similar to the scalar case. In the models, convergent stable points may be minima, maxima or saddle points. And the ESS may ultimately contain one, two or many species at distinct peaks of the adaptive landscape. The predator–prey model illustrates how the ESS strategy for the predator can result in an ESS for the prey that allows for any number of prey species to exist along a (flat) rim of a crater in the prey’s adaptive landscape. Key conclusions: In going from a scalar to a vectorvalued strategy, the adaptive dynamics become more complicated with respect to fitness gradients, the bestiary associated with convergent stable points increases, the avenues for adaptive speciation and achieving an ESS increase, and the number of nonESS species that can coexist ecologically increases. By increasing the dimensionality of the adaptive surface, vectorvalued strategies increase the opportunity for frequencydependent selection to produce the number of species and the appropriate trait combinations for an ESS.