Much of economic analysis stems from the joint assumptions of rationality and individual greed. Common sense and experimental and field evidence point to the limits of this

Understanding the mechanisms that can lead to the evolution of cooperation through natural selection is a core problem in biology. Among the various attempts at constructing a theory of cooperation, game theory has played a central role. Here, we review models of cooperation that are based on two simple games: the Prisoner’s Dilemma, and the Snowdrift game. Both games are two-person games with two strategies, to cooperate and to defect, and both games are social dilemmas. In social dilemmas, cooperation is prone to exploitation by defectors, and the average payoff in populations at evolutionary equilibrium is lower than it would be in populations consisting of only cooperators. The difference between the games is that cooperation is not maintained in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, but persists in the Snowdrift game at an intermediate frequency. As a consequence, insights gained from studying extensions of the two games differ substantially. We review the most salient results obtained from extensions such as iteration, spatial structure, continuously variable cooperative investments, and multi-person interactions. Bridging the gap between theoretical and empirical research is one of the main challenges for future studies of cooperation, and we conclude by pointing out a number of promising natural systems in which the theory can be tested experimentally.

We present a general model for the Prisoner's Dilemma in which variable degrees of cooperation are possible, and payo!s are scaled accordingly. We describe a continuous strategy space, and divide this space into strategy families. We derive the payo! function for these families analytically, and study the evolutionary outcome when a wide range of strategies play against each other. Our results show that the initial degree of cooperation o!ered by a strategy is a decisive factor for evolutionary robustness: the most successful strategies in our model o!er full cooperation as an initial move, but thereafter cooperate fully only if their opponent does the same. These strategies gradually raise the stakes when playing a strategy which is initially reticent to cooperate, but di!er from the strategies predicted by other continuous models in that they are not only generous, but are also consistently optimistic and uncompromising. � 1999 Academic Press 1.

The emergence and maintenance of cooperation by natural selection is an enduring conundrum in evolutionary biology, which has been studied using a variety of game theoretical models inspired by different biological situations. The most widely studied games are the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Snowdrift game and by-product mutualism for pairwise interactions, as well as Public Goods games in larger groups of interacting individuals. Here, we present a general framework for cooperation in social dilemmas in which all the traditional scenarios can be recovered as special cases. In social dilemmas, cooperators provide a benefit to the group at some cost, while defectors exploit the group by reaping the benefits without bearing the costs of cooperation. Using the concepts of discounting and synergy for describing how benefits accumulate when more than one cooperator is present in a group of interacting individuals, we recover the four basic scenarios of evolutionary dynamics given by (i) dominating defection, (ii) coexistence of defectors and cooperators, (iii) dominating cooperation and (iv) bi-stability, in which cooperators and defectors cannot invade each other. Generically, for groups of three or more interacting individuals further, more complex, dynamics can occur. Our framework provides the first unifying approach to model cooperation in different kinds of social dilemmas.

Conspicuous displays of consumption and benevolence might serve as “costly signals ” of desirable mate qualities. If so, they should vary strategically with manipulations of mating-related motives. The authors examined this possibility in 4 experiments. Inducing mating goals in men increased their willingness to spend on conspicuous luxuries but not on basic necessities. In women, mating goals boosted public—but not private—helping. Although mating motivation did not generally inspire helping in men, it did induce more helpfulness in contexts in which they could display heroism or dominance. Conversely, although mating motivation did not lead women to conspicuously consume, it did lead women to spend more publicly on helpful causes. Overall, romantic motives seem to produce highly strategic and sex-specific self-presentations best understood within a costly signaling framework. Key words: costly signaling, altruism, conspicuous consumption, mating goals, self-presentation We should often blush at our noblest deeds if the world were to see all their underlying motives.—Francois de La Rochefoucauld On Valentine’s Day 2003, America’s leading authority on philanthropy announced that real estate mogul Donald Trump had pledged $1 million to charity (Foundation Center, 2003). A few

Social dilemmas and the evolutionary conundrum of cooperation are traditionally studied through various kinds of game theoretical models such as the prisoner’s dilemma, public goods games, snowdrift games or by-product mutualism. All of them exemplify situations which are characterized by different degrees of conflicting interests between the individuals and the community. In groups of interacting individuals, cooperators produce a common good benefitting the entire group at some cost to themselves, whereas defectors attempt to exploit the resource by avoiding the costly contributions. Based on synergistic or discounted accumulation of cooperative benefits a unifying theoretical framework was recently introduced that encompasses all games that have traditionally been studied separately (Hauert, Michor, Nowak, Doebeli, 2005. Synergy and discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas. J. Theor. Biol., in press.). Within this framework we investigate the effects of spatial structure with limited local interactions on the evolutionary fate of cooperators and defectors. The quantitative effects of space turn out to be quite sensitive to the underlying microscopic update mechanisms but, more general, we demonstrate that in prisoner’s dilemma type interactions spatial structure benefits cooperation—although the parameter range is quite limited—whereas in snowdrift type interactions spatial structure may be beneficial too, but often turns out to be detrimental to cooperation.

this paper: Simpson's paradox can be an emergent of the prisoner's dilemma. "Appropriate conditions" refers to appropriate PD payoff parameter values and initial conditions of group structure.

Abstract- We discuss the evolution of strategies in a spatial iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) game in which each player is located in a cell of a two-dimensional grid-world. Following the concept of structured demes, two neighborhood structures are used. One is for the interaction among players through the IPD game. A player in each cell plays against its neighbors defined by this neighborhood structure. The other is for mating strategies by genetic operations. A new strategy for a player is generated by genetic operations from a pair of parent strings, which are selected from its neighboring cells defined by the second neighborhood structure. After examining the effect of the two neighborhood structures on the evolution of cooperative behavior with standard pairing in gameplaying, we introduce a random pairing scheme in which each player plays against a different randomly chosen neighbor at every round (i.e., every iteration) of the game. Through computer simulations, we demonstrate that small neighborhood structures facilitate the evolution of cooperative

The action of natural selection results in organisms that are good at surviving and reproducing. We show how this intuitive idea can be given a formal definition in terms of fitness and reproductive value. An optimal strategy maximizes fitness, and reproductive value provides a common currency for comparing di#erent actions. We provide a broad review of models and methods that have been used in this area, stressing the conceptual issues and exposing the logic of evolutionary explanations.

The n-player prisoner's dilemma (PD) is a useful model of multilevel selection for altruistic traits. It highlights the non zero-sum interactions necessary for the evolution of altruism as well as the tension between individual and group-level selection. The parameters of the n-player PD can be directly related to the Price equation as well as to a useful alternative selection decomposition. Finally, the n-player PD emphasizes the expected equilibrium condition of mutual defection in the absence of higher levels of organization and selection.