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When Physical Systems Realize Functions...
 MINDS AND MACHINES
, 1999
"... After briefly discussing the relevance of the notions "computation" and "implementation" for cognitive science, I summarize some of the problems that have been found in their most common interpretations. In particular, I argue that standard notions of computation together with ..."
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Cited by 18 (5 self)
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After briefly discussing the relevance of the notions "computation" and "implementation" for cognitive science, I summarize some of the problems that have been found in their most common interpretations. In particular, I argue that standard notions of computation together with a "statetostate correspondence view of implementation" cannot overcome difficulties posed by Putnam's Realization Theorem and that, therefore, a different approach to implementation is required. The notion "realization of a function", developed out of physical theories, is then introduced as a replacement for the notional pair "computationimplementation". After gradual refinement, taking practical constraints into account, this notion gives rise to the notion "digital system" which singles out physical systems that could be actually used, and possibly even built.
The Missing Link  Implementation And Realization of . . .
, 1999
"... The notion of computation has attracted researchers from a wide range of areas, cognitive psychology being one of them. The analogy underlying the (metaphorical) usage of "computer" in cognitive psychology can be succinctly summarized by saying that the mind is to the brain as the program ..."
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Cited by 2 (0 self)
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The notion of computation has attracted researchers from a wide range of areas, cognitive psychology being one of them. The analogy underlying the (metaphorical) usage of "computer" in cognitive psychology can be succinctly summarized by saying that the mind is to the brain as the program is to the hardware. Two main assumptions are buried in this analogy: 1) that the mind can somehow be understood computationally, and 2) that the same kind of relationthe implementation relationthat obtains between programs and computer hardware obtains between minds and brains too. While the first assumption has led to fertile research, the second remained mainly at the level of an assumption. Recently our
1Do Walls Compute After All? Challenging Copeland’s Solution to Searle’s Theorem against Strong AI
"... In this is paper I will briefly describe Searle’s criticism of “strong AI ” (which extends to computationalism in general) and review Copeland’s version of what he calls “Searle’s Theorem”, a claim made by Searle that “for any object there is some description of that object such that under that des ..."
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In this is paper I will briefly describe Searle’s criticism of “strong AI ” (which extends to computationalism in general) and review Copeland’s version of what he calls “Searle’s Theorem”, a claim made by Searle that “for any object there is some description of that object such that under that description the object is a digital computer”. Copeland’s own diagnosis and his solution to the paradox posed by Searle’s Theorem will then be examined more closely. An analysis of Copeland’s definition of what it means to implement a computation will yield a Searlelike counterexample of computing (extending an idea advanced by Putnam): under a certain interpretation walls will, after all, compute. A brief discussion and assessment of the consequences of my counterexample will—contrary to one’s expectation—provide an optimistic outlook for computationalism.