We present SpaceCase, a computational model of spatial preposition use that combines geometric and functional influences. SpaceCase treats spatial preposition use as governed by evidential rules, each representing influences of particular factors. Our model is unique in relying on both automatically constructed visual representations from sketched input, and drawing our functional representations from an independently derived large knowledge base, both of which reduce tailorability. SpaceCase can account for the results of Feist and Gentner (2003), whose experiments about in/on judgments in native English speakers showed the influence of four factors: (1) geometry of the ground, (2) animacy of the ground (3) animacy of the figure and (4) function of the ground. SpaceCase also captures Feist and Gentner’s (2001) result that memory for spatial relationships can be influenced by spatial language during encoding.

ssing. We suggest that some types of similarity are determined automatically. When the cognitive system recognizes similarities, they influence cognitive processing, even when the person does not intend for their processing to be affected by similarities. In order to support this claim, we first outline three different approaches to similarity. Then, we examine how similarity can influence both low-level processes like attention and memory retrieval and higher cognitive processes like analogical reasoning and decision making. Next, we explore a number of examples in which cognitive processing is influenced by the presence of similarities in a stimulus set. Finally, we broaden the discussion to include similarities in more deliberate cognitive processes. Three Approaches to Similarity Representation and Similarity When a person makes a similarity comparison, the result is typically both a judgment of similarity and also some awareness of the commonalities and differences of the pair com

Based on the theory of conceptual metaphor we investigated the evaluative consequences of a match (or mismatch) of different conceptual relations (good vs. bad; abstract vs. concrete) with their corresponding spatial relation (UP vs. DOWN). Good and bad words that were either abstract or concrete were presented in an up or down spatial location. Words for which the conceptual dimensions matched the spatial dimension were evaluated most favorably. When neither of the two conceptual dimensions matched the spatial dimension, ratings were not as favorable as when the dimensions did match, but were still significantly more favorable than when one conceptual category was matched

Cognitivism, the traditional approach to understanding cognition, has argued for the essential role of symbolic computations over internal mental representations. But this view has been criticized on a number of grounds, one in particular being the assumption of amodality: that the symbols involved in processing are arbitrarily related to their referents. An opposing view—the framework of Perceptual Symbol Systems—holds that the elements of thought should be treated not as amodal symbols, but rather as modality specific, analog representations that simulate particular aspects of perceptual experience. Though this approach has been gaining in popularity from intuitively appealing theoretical accounts, and suggestive empirical support, it has suffered from a lack of specificity for key constructs. To address this problem, this paper presents a more detailed study of the foundational concept of perceptual symbol. The proposal builds from recent work on the skill-based nature of visual perception (the Sensorimotor Contingency Theory), and research that provides tools for representing the inseparable link between

Prepositions such as in and on convey not only spatial relationships between objects, but also abstract relationships, such as ‘Mary is in love ’ and ‘Tim’s on a roll’. Although such uses are often thought to be purely idiomatic, we hypothesized that these abstract, non-spatial relationships might preserve one specific aspect of prepositions ’ spatial meaning: the degree to which the figure or the ground controls the figure-ground relationship (Coventry, 1992; Coventry, Carmichael & Garrod, 1994; Feist & Gentner, 1997, 1998, 2003). We found that locus of control distinguishes in and on in common abstract metaphorical contexts (e.g., in love/on a roll), matched abstract contexts (e.g., in/on time), and novel abstract contexts. These findings suggest that prepositions retain aspects of their spatial meaning when used abstractly.

Cognitive research on metaphoric concepts of time has focused on differences between moving Ego and moving time models, but even more basic is the contrast between Ego- and temporal-reference-point models. Dynamic models appear to be quasi-universal cross-culturally, as does the generalization that in Ego-reference-point models, FUTURE IS IN FRONT OF EGO and PAST IS IN BACK OF EGO. The Aymara language instead has a major static model of time wherein FUTURE IS BEHIND EGO and PAST IS IN FRONT OF EGO; linguistic and gestural data give strong confirmation of this unusual culture-specific cognitive pattern. Gestural data provide crucial information unavailable to purely linguistic analysis, suggesting that when investigating conceptual systems both forms of expression should be analyzed complementarily. Important issues in embodied cognition are raised: how fully shared are bodily grounded motivations for universal cognitive patterns, what makes a rare pattern emerge, and what are the cultural entailments of such patterns?