A BDI-based continuous-time modelling approach for intracellular dynamics is presented. It is shown how temporalised BDI-models make it possible to model intracellular biochemical processes as decision processes. By abstracting from some of the details of the biochemical pathways, the model achieves understanding in nearly intuitive terms, without losing veracity: classical intentional state properties such as Beliefs, Desires and Intentions, are founded in reality through precise biochemical relations. In an extensive example, the complex regulation of Escherichia coli vis-à-vis lactose, glucose and oxygen is simulated as a discrete-state, continuous-time temporal decision manager. Thus a bridge is introduced between two different scientific areas: the area of BDI-modelling and the area of intracellular dynamics.

In this chapter we establish what it is for something to be implicit or explicit. The approach to implicit knowledge is taken from Dienes and Perner (1999), which relates the implicit-explicit distinction to knowledge representations. What it is for a representation to represent something implicitly or explicitly is defined and those concepts are applied to knowledge. Next we will show how maximally explicit knowledge is naturally associated with consciousness. We argue that each step in a hierarchy of explicitness is related to the unity of consciousness and that fully explicit knowledge should be associated with a sense of being part of a unified consciousness. New evidence indicating the extent of people's implicit or explicit knowledge in an implicit learning paradigm will then be presented. This evidence will indicate people can be consistently correct in dealing with a context-free grammar while lacking any knowledge that they have knowledge. 1.

This paper assesses the current status of Piaget's theory of sensorimotor intelligence in relation to three persistent issues about the abilities of human infants: the nature of initial mechanisms � the traditional view that re-presentational functioning is the outcome of infant development � and the place of generalpurpose developmental processes. Varela's view of three successive paradigms for cognitive science | cognitivism, emergence and enaction | is introduced as a means for locating Piaget's ideas on action and epigenesis in relation to approaches of particular relevance to understanding infancy. The contribution of work that aims to understand how situated systems can be organized to function as autonomous agents exhibiting adaptive behaviour is considered through examples of computational work in behaviour-based robotics. This supports Piaget's stress on action, but challenges his assumptions about the outcome of infant development. Finally, the relevance to infancy, and to Piaget's theory, of Karmilo-Smith's proposals for cognitive development through a process of

In this chapter we establish what it is for something to be implicit. The approach to implicit knowledge is taken from Dienes and Perner (1999) and Perner and Dienes (1999), which relates the implicit-explicit distinction to knowledge representations. To be clear about exactly what our claims are we first discuss what a representation is, what it is for a representation to represent something implicitly or explicitly and apply those concepts to knowledge. Next we show how maximally explicit knowledge is naturally associated with consciousness (according to the higher order thought theory). Then we discuss the relationships between explicit knowledge and metacognition, where metacognition is considered in terms of both its monitoring and control aspects, to shed light on conscious and unconscious perception, episodic memory, and volitional control. We will then show how implicit learning should be viewed in metacognitive terms, and conclude that people' s relative lack of metaknowledge in implicit learning paradigms justifies the claim that people have acquired genuinely implicit knowledge. In Izaute, M., Chambres, P., Marescaux, P.-J. (Eds), Metacognition: Process, function, and use. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, forthcoming. 1.

this paper the internal dynamics of mental states based on beliefs, desires and intentions, is formalised using a temporal language. The use of a software environment to specify, simulate and analyse temporal dependencies between these intentional states in relation to behavioral traces is addressed. 1. INTRODUCTION Dynamics has become an important focus within Cognitive Science in recent years; e.g., (Port & van Gelder, 1995). As one of the aspects, the dynamics of the interaction with the external world, and its implications for the representational content and dynamics of mental states have received attention; e.g., (Bickhard, 1993; Christensen & Hooker, 2000). Another important aspect is the internal dynamics of mental states, as can be found, for example in the dynamics of intentional notions (such as beliefs, desires and intentions) and their interaction with each other and with the external world. An example of a pattern for such internal dynamics is: if a desire an

In this paper a temporal trace language is defined in which statements can be expressed that provide an external temporal grounding of intentional notions. Justifying conditions are presented that formalise criteria that a (candidate) statement must satisfy in order to qualify as an external representation of a belief, desire or intention. Using these conditions, external representation statements for intentional notions can be identified.

There is an apparent anomaly in the notion that connectionism, which is fundamentally a new technology, has considerable philosophical significance. Nonetheless, connectionism has been widely viewed as having implications for symbol grounding, notions of structured representation and compositionality, as well as the issue of nativism. In this paper, we consider each of these issues in detail, and find that the current state of connectionism does not warrant the magnitude of many of the philosophical conclusions drawn from it. We argue that connectionist models are no more “grounded” than their classical counterparts. In addition, since connectionist representations typically are ascribed content through semantic interpretation based on correlation, connectionism is prone to a number of well-known philosophical problems facing any kind of correlational semantics. However, we suggest that philosophy may be ill-advised to ignore the development of connectionism, particularly if connectionist systems prove to be able to learn to handle structured representations.

Let us say, with Quine, Davidson and Dennett among others, that a person's language and psychological attitudes have their identities fixed with the theories generated by an idealized interpreter of that person (Quine, 1960; Davidson, 1984, 1986a, 1986b, 1989a, 1989b, 1990a; Dennett, 1978, 1987a, 1991a). A reason for saying this is that it will help us see how the capacities to entertain attitudes and to communicate linguistically can be natural capacities, capacities we may happily attribute to creatures who fall squarely within the scope of evolutionary biology. This, at any rate, is Rorty's principal reason. The interpretivist strategy permits us, Rorty suggests, to give an account of persons which introduces no breaks in the hierarchy of increasingly complex adjustments to novel stimulation—the hierarchy which has amoebae adjusting themselves to changed water temperature at the bottom, bees dancing and chess players check-mating in the middle, and political revolutions at the top. (Rorty 1991b, 109) How does it do this? I will develop an answer emphasizing the naturalistic motivations of the interpretivist strategy, an answer that is also intended to draw out and situate some of the commitments underpinning the view of philosophy that Rorty has worked out over the last thirty

The success of a piece of behaviour is often explained by its being caused by a true representation (similarly, failure falsity). In some simple organisms, success is just survival and reproduction. Scientists explain why a piece of behaviour helped the organism to survive and reproduce by adverting to the behaviour’s having been caused by a true representation. That usage should, if possible, be vindicated by an adequate naturalistic theory of content. Teleosemantics cannot do so, when it is applied to simple representing systems (Godfrey-Smith 1996). Here it is argued that the teleosemantic approach to content should therefore be modified, not abandoned, at least for simple representing systems. The new ‘infotel-semantics ’ adds an input condition to the output condition offered by teleosemantics, recognising that it is constitutive of content in a simple representing system that the tokening of a representation should correlate

A comparison of Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) approaches and Ψ-theory (Psi) with respect to the agent architectures proposed, focussing on intention and utility in the regulation of action PICS