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90
Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities
 Journal of Economic Theory
, 1999
"... In an auction with externalities, a buyer’s type is multidimensional and specifies the payoff he would get for each of the N+1 possible outcomes: the seller keeps the object or buyer i (i=1,..., N) gets the object. We provide a characterization of multidimensional incentive compatible mechanisms sim ..."
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Cited by 106 (18 self)
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In an auction with externalities, a buyer’s type is multidimensional and specifies the payoff he would get for each of the N+1 possible outcomes: the seller keeps the object or buyer i (i=1,..., N) gets the object. We provide a characterization of multidimensional incentive compatible mechanisms similar to that for onedimensional mechanisms. Although reservation utilities are endogenous and typedependent, the participation constraint is binding for only one ‘‘critical’ ’ type. A main difficulty in a multidimensional setting is the ‘‘integrability’ ’ condition. We present a geometric characterization for discontinuous conservative vector fields. In auctions where the buyers submit scalar bids and the seller transfers the object to one of the buyers for sure, a secondprice auction maximizes revenue. With two buyers, this auction remains optimal even if the seller can set a reservation price. Journal of
Multiparameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
 CoRR
"... We study the classic mathematical economics problem of Bayesian optimal mechanism design where a principal aims to optimize expected revenue when allocating resources to selfinterested agents with preferences drawn from a known distribution. In single parameter settings (i.e., where each agent’s pr ..."
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Cited by 65 (6 self)
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We study the classic mathematical economics problem of Bayesian optimal mechanism design where a principal aims to optimize expected revenue when allocating resources to selfinterested agents with preferences drawn from a known distribution. In single parameter settings (i.e., where each agent’s preference is given by a single private value for being served and zero for not being served) this problem is solved [20]. Unfortunately, these single parameter optimal mechanisms are impractical and rarely employed [1], and furthermore the underlying economic theory fails to generalize to the important, relevant, and unsolved multidimensional setting (i.e., where each agent’s preference is given by multiple values for each of the multiple services available) [25]. In contrast to the theory of optimal mechanisms we develop a theory of sequential posted price mechanisms, where agents in sequence are offered takeitorleaveit prices. We prove that these
Design and Analysis of the Progressive Second Price auction . . .
, 1999
"... We present the Progressive Second Price auction, a new decentralized mechanism for allocation of variablesize shares of a resource among multiple users. Unlike most mechanisms in the economics litterature, PSP is designed with a very small message space, making it suitable for realtime market pric ..."
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Cited by 57 (8 self)
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We present the Progressive Second Price auction, a new decentralized mechanism for allocation of variablesize shares of a resource among multiple users. Unlike most mechanisms in the economics litterature, PSP is designed with a very small message space, making it suitable for realtime market pricing of communication bandwidth. Under elastic demand, the PSP auction is incentive compatible and stable, in that it has a "truthful"Nash equilibrium where all players bid at prices equal to their marginal valuation of the resource. PSP is economically efficient in that the equilibrium allocation maximizes total user value. With simulations using a protype implementation of the auction game on the Internet, we investigate how convergence times scale with the number of bidders, as well as the tradeoff between engineering and economic efficiency. We also provide a ratedistortion
The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a BudgetConstrained Buyer
 Journal of Economic Theory
, 2000
"... This paper finds an optimal mechanism for selling a good to a buyer who may be budgetconstrained. We consider a seller with one unit of a good facing a buyer with a quasilinear utility function. If the buyer does not face a binding budget constraint, textbook monopoly pricing is optimal. By contras ..."
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Cited by 51 (5 self)
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This paper finds an optimal mechanism for selling a good to a buyer who may be budgetconstrained. We consider a seller with one unit of a good facing a buyer with a quasilinear utility function. If the buyer does not face a binding budget constraint, textbook monopoly pricing is optimal. By contrast, the possibility of a binding budget constraint can make it optimal for the seller to use nonlinear pricing, to commit to a declining price sequence, to require the buyer to disclose his budget, or to offer financing. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers:
Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
 In Proceedings 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC
, 2007
"... We consider the problem of makespan minimization on m unrelated machines in the context of algorithmic mechanism design, where the machines are the strategic players. This is a multidimensional scheduling domain, and the only known positive results for makespan minimization in such a domain are O(m) ..."
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Cited by 48 (12 self)
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We consider the problem of makespan minimization on m unrelated machines in the context of algorithmic mechanism design, where the machines are the strategic players. This is a multidimensional scheduling domain, and the only known positive results for makespan minimization in such a domain are O(m)approximation truthful mechanisms [22, 20]. We study a wellmotivated special case of this problem, where the processing time of a job on each machine may either be “low ” or “high”, and the low and high values are public and jobdependent. This preserves the multidimensionality of the domain, and generalizes the restrictedmachines (i.e., {pj, ∞}) setting in scheduling. We give a general technique to convert any capproximation algorithm to a 3capproximation truthfulinexpectation mechanism. This is one of the few known results that shows how to export approximation
Market Mechanisms for Network Resource Sharing
, 1999
"... The theme of this thesis is the design and analysis of decentralized and distributed market mechanisms for resource sharing in multiservice networks. The motivation for a marketbased approach is twofold. First, in modern multiservice networks, resources such as bandwidth and buffer space have dif ..."
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Cited by 42 (7 self)
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The theme of this thesis is the design and analysis of decentralized and distributed market mechanisms for resource sharing in multiservice networks. The motivation for a marketbased approach is twofold. First, in modern multiservice networks, resources such as bandwidth and buffer space have different value to different users, and these valuations cannot, in general, be accurately known in advance as users compete against each other for the resources. Second, the network resources themselves are distributed, and often, not subject to any single authority. We present
Efficient mechanism design
, 1998
"... We study Bayesian mechanism design in situations where agents ’ information may be multidimensional, concentrating on mechanisms that lead to efficient allocations. Our main result is that a generalization of the wellknown VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism maximizes the planner’s “revenue ” among al ..."
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Cited by 34 (0 self)
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We study Bayesian mechanism design in situations where agents ’ information may be multidimensional, concentrating on mechanisms that lead to efficient allocations. Our main result is that a generalization of the wellknown VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism maximizes the planner’s “revenue ” among all efficient mechanisms. This result is then used to study multiple object auctions in situations where bidders have privately known “demand curves” and extended to include situations with complementarities across objects or externalities across bidders. We also illustrate how the main result may be used to analyze the possibility of allocating both private and public goods efÞciently when budget balance considerations are important. The generalized VCG mechanism, therefore, serves to unify many results in mechansim design theory. 1