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A BGPbased Mechanism for LowestCost Routing
, 2002
"... The routing of traffic between... this paper, we address the problem of interdomain routing from a mechanismdesign point of view. The application of mechanismdesign principles to the study of routing is the subject of earlier work by Nisan and Ronen [15] and Hershberger and Suri [11]. In this pape ..."
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Cited by 227 (16 self)
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The routing of traffic between... this paper, we address the problem of interdomain routing from a mechanismdesign point of view. The application of mechanismdesign principles to the study of routing is the subject of earlier work by Nisan and Ronen [15] and Hershberger and Suri [11]. In this paper, we formulate and solve a version of the routingmechanism design problem that is different from the previously studied version in three ways that make it more accurately reflective of realworld interdomain routing: (1) we treat the nodes as strategic agents, rather than the links; (2) our mechanism computes lowestcost routes for all sourcedestination pairs and payments for transit nodes on all of the routes (rather than computing routes and payments for only one sourcedestination pair at a time, as is done in [15,11]); (3) we show how to compute our mechanism with a distributed algorithm that is a straightforward extension to BGP and causes only modest increases in routingtable size and convergence time (in contrast with the centralized algorithms used in [15,11]). This approach of using an existing protocol as a substrate for distributed computation may prove useful in future development of Internet algorithms generally, not only for routing or pricing problems. Our design and analysis of a strategyproof, BGPbased routing mechanism provides a new, promising direction in distributed algorithmic mechanism design, which has heretofore been focused mainly on multicast cost sharing.
NonCooperative Multicast and Facility Location Games
"... We consider a multicast game with selfish noncooperative players. There is a special source node and each player is interested in connecting to the source by making a routing decision that minimizes its payment. The mutual influence of the players is determined by a cost sharing mechanism, which in ..."
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Cited by 35 (2 self)
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We consider a multicast game with selfish noncooperative players. There is a special source node and each player is interested in connecting to the source by making a routing decision that minimizes its payment. The mutual influence of the players is determined by a cost sharing mechanism, which in our case evenly splits the cost of an edge among the players using it. We consider two different models: an integral model, where each player connects to the source by choosing a single path, and a fractional model, where a player is allowed to split the flow it receives from the source between several paths. In both models we explore the overhead incurred in network cost due to the selfish behavior of the users, as well as the computational complexity of finding a Nash equilibrium. The existence of a Nash equilibrium for the integral model was previously established by the means of a potential function. We prove that finding a Nash equilibrium that minimizes the potential function is NPhard. We focus on the price of anarchy of a Nash equilibrium resulting from the bestresponse dynamics of a game course, where the players join the game sequentially. For a game with n players, we establish an upper bound of O ( √ n log 2 n) on the price of anarchy, and a lower bound of Ω(log n/log log n). For the fractional model, we prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium via a potential function and give a polynomial time algorithm for computing an equilibrium that minimizes the potential function. Finally, we consider a weighted extension of the multicast game, and prove that in the fractional model, the game always has a Nash equilibrium.
Mechanism Design for Online RealTime Scheduling
 In Proc. ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC’04
, 2004
"... For the problem of online realtime scheduling of jobs on a single processor, previous work presents matching upper and lower bounds on the competitive ratio that can be achieved by a deterministic algorithm. However, these results only apply to the nonstrategic setting in which the jobs are rel ..."
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Cited by 32 (0 self)
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For the problem of online realtime scheduling of jobs on a single processor, previous work presents matching upper and lower bounds on the competitive ratio that can be achieved by a deterministic algorithm. However, these results only apply to the nonstrategic setting in which the jobs are released directly to the algorithm. Motivated by emerging areas such as grid computing, we instead consider this problem in an economic setting, in which each job is released to a separate, selfinterested agent. The agent can then delay releasing the job to the algorithm, inflate its length, and declare an arbitrary value and deadline for the job, while the center determines not only the schedule, but the payment of each agent. For the resulting mechanism design problem (in which we also slightly strengthen an assumption from the nonstrategic setting), we present a mechanism that addresses each incentive issue, while only increasing the competitive ratio by one. We then show a matching lower bound for deterministic mechanisms that never pay the agents.
Incentivecompatible interdomain routing
 Proc. of the 7th Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC’06), 2006
, 2006
"... The routing of traffic between Internet domains, or Autonomous Systems (ASes), a task known as interdomain routing, is currently handled by the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [17]. Using BGP, autonomous systems can apply semantically rich routing policies to choose interdomain routes in a distributed ..."
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Cited by 29 (11 self)
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The routing of traffic between Internet domains, or Autonomous Systems (ASes), a task known as interdomain routing, is currently handled by the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [17]. Using BGP, autonomous systems can apply semantically rich routing policies to choose interdomain routes in a distributed fashion. This expressiveness in routingpolicy choice supports domains ’ autonomy in network operations and in business decisions, but it comes at a price: The interaction of locally defined routing policies can lead to unexpected global anomalies, including route oscillations or overall protocol divergence (see, e.g., [20]). Networking researchers have addressed this problem by devising constraints on policies that guarantee BGP convergence without unduly limiting expressiveness and autonomy (see, e.g., [7, 8]). In addition to taking this engineering or “protocoldesign ” approach, researchers have approached interdomain routing from an economic or “mechanismdesign ” point of view. It is known that lowestcostpath (LCP) routing can be implemented in a truthful, BGPcompatible manner [3] but that several other natural classes of routing policies cannot [2, 5]. In this paper, we present a natural class of interdomainrouting policies that is more realistic than LCP routing and admits incentivecompatible, BGPcompatible implementation. We also present several positive steps toward a general theory of incentivecompatible interdomain routing.
An Efficient CostSharing Mechanism for the PrizeCollecting Steiner Forest Problem
"... In an instance of the prizecollecting Steiner forest problem (PCSF) we are given an undirected graph G = (V,E), nonnegative edgecosts c(e) for all e ∈ E, terminal pairs R = {(si,ti)}1≤i≤k, and penalties π1,...,πk. A feasible solution (F,Q) consists of a forest F and a subset Q of terminal pairs s ..."
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Cited by 18 (4 self)
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In an instance of the prizecollecting Steiner forest problem (PCSF) we are given an undirected graph G = (V,E), nonnegative edgecosts c(e) for all e ∈ E, terminal pairs R = {(si,ti)}1≤i≤k, and penalties π1,...,πk. A feasible solution (F,Q) consists of a forest F and a subset Q of terminal pairs such that for all (si,ti) ∈ R either si,ti are connected by F or (si,ti) ∈ Q. The objective is to compute a feasible solution of minimum cost c(F) + π(Q). A gametheoretic version of the above problem has k players, one for each terminalpair in R. Player i’s ultimate goal is to connect si and ti, and the player derives a privately held utility ui ≥ 0 from being connected. A service provider can connect the terminals si and ti of player i in two ways: (1) by buying the edges of an si,tipath in G, or (2) by buying an alternate connection between si and ti (maybe from some other provider) at a cost of πi. In this paper, we present a simple 3budgetbalanced and groupstrategyproof mechanism for the above problem. We also show that our mechanism computes client sets whose social cost is at most O(log 2 k) times the minimum social cost of any player set. This matches a lowerbound that was recently given by Roughgarden and Sundararajan (STOC ’06).
Towards truthful mechanisms for binary demand games: a general framework
 In Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
, 2005
"... The family of VickreyClarkeGroves (VCG) mechanisms is arguably the most celebrated achievement in truthful mechanism design. However, VCG mechanisms have their limitations. They only apply to optimization problems with a utilitarian objective function, and their output should optimize the objectiv ..."
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Cited by 15 (10 self)
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The family of VickreyClarkeGroves (VCG) mechanisms is arguably the most celebrated achievement in truthful mechanism design. However, VCG mechanisms have their limitations. They only apply to optimization problems with a utilitarian objective function, and their output should optimize the objective function. For many optimization problems, finding the optimal output is computationally intractable. If we apply VCG mechanisms to polynomialtime algorithms that approximate the optimal solution, the resulting mechanisms may no longer be truthful. In light of these limitations, it is useful to study whether we can design a truthful nonVCG payment scheme that is computationally tractable for a given output method O. In this paper, we focus our attention on binary demand games in which the agents’ only available actions are to take part in the a game or not to. For these problems, we prove that a truthful mechanism M = (O, P) exists (with proper payment method P) if and only if O satisfies a certain monotone property. We also provide several general algorithms to compute the payments efficiently for various types of output. In particular, we show how a truthful payment can be computed through “or/and ” combinations, roundbased combinations, and some more complex combinations of outputs from subgames.
Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design
, 2003
"... Distributed algorithmic mechanism design (DAMD) is an approach to designing distributed systems that takes into account both the distributedcomputational environment and the incentives of autonomous agents. In this dissertation, we study two problems, multicast cost sharing and interdomain routing. ..."
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Cited by 12 (2 self)
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Distributed algorithmic mechanism design (DAMD) is an approach to designing distributed systems that takes into account both the distributedcomputational environment and the incentives of autonomous agents. In this dissertation, we study two problems, multicast cost sharing and interdomain routing. We also touch upon several issues important to DAMD in general, including approximation, compatibility with existing protocols, and hardness that results from the interplay of incentives and distributed computation.
Cost Sharing and Strategyproof Mechanisms for Set Cover Games
"... We develop for set cover games several general costsharing methods that are approximately budgetbalanced, core, and/or groupstrategyproof. We first study the cost sharing for a single set cover game, which does not have a budgetbalanced core. We show that there is no cost allocation method that ..."
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Cited by 12 (3 self)
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We develop for set cover games several general costsharing methods that are approximately budgetbalanced, core, and/or groupstrategyproof. We first study the cost sharing for a single set cover game, which does not have a budgetbalanced core. We show that there is no cost allocation method that can of the total cost if we require the cost sharing being a core. Here n is the number of all players to be served. We give an efficient cost 1 allocation method that always recovers of the total cost, where dmax is ln dmax the maximum size of all sets. We then study the cost allocation scheme for all induced subgames. It is known that no cost sharing scheme can always recover more than 1 of the total cost for every subset of players. We give an efficient cost n sharing scheme that always recovers at least 1 of the total cost for every subset 2n of players and furthermore, our scheme is crossmonotone. When the elements to be covered are selfish agents with privately known valuations, we present a strategyproof charging mechanism, under the assumption that all sets are simple sets, such that each element maximizes its profit when it reports its valuation truthfully; further, the total cost of the set cover is no more than ln dmax times that of an optimal solution. When the sets are selfish agents with privately known costs, we present a strategyproof payment mechanism in which each set maximizes its profit when it reports its cost truthfully. We also show how to fairly share the payments to all sets among the elements. always recover more than 1 ln n 1
Designing Multicast Protocols for NonCooperative Networks
"... Conventionally, most network protocols assume that the network entities who participate in the network activities will always behave as instructed. However, in practice, most network entities are selfish: they will try to maximize their own benefits instead of altruistically contributing to the netw ..."
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Cited by 10 (7 self)
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Conventionally, most network protocols assume that the network entities who participate in the network activities will always behave as instructed. However, in practice, most network entities are selfish: they will try to maximize their own benefits instead of altruistically contributing to the network by following the prescribed protocols. Thus, new protocols should be designed for the noncooperative network that is composed of selfish entities. In this paper, we specifically show how to design truthful multicast protocols for noncooperative networks such that these selfish entities will follow the protocols out of their own interests. By assuming that every entity has a fixed cost for a specific multicast, we give a general framework to decide whether it is possible and how, if possible, to transform an existing multicast protocol to a truthful multicast protocol by designing a proper payment protocol. We then show how the payments to those relay entities are shared fairly among all receivers so that it encourages collaboration among receivers. As running examples, we show how to design truthful multicast protocols for several multicast structures that are currently used in practice.
Optimal costsharing mechanisms for steiner forest problems
 In Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE
, 2006
"... Abstract. Könemann, Leonardi, and Schäfer [14] gave a 2budgetbalanced and groupstrategyproof mechanism for Steiner forest costsharing problems. We prove that this mechanism also achieves an O(log 2 k)approximation of the social cost, where k is the number of players. As a consequence, the KLS mec ..."
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Cited by 8 (0 self)
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Abstract. Könemann, Leonardi, and Schäfer [14] gave a 2budgetbalanced and groupstrategyproof mechanism for Steiner forest costsharing problems. We prove that this mechanism also achieves an O(log 2 k)approximation of the social cost, where k is the number of players. As a consequence, the KLS mechanism has the smallestpossible worstcase efficiency loss, up to constant factors, among all O(1)budgetbalanced Moulin mechanisms for such cost functions. We also extend our results to a more general network design problem. 1