This paper presents a signalling model in which high-quality firms underprice at the initial public offering (IPO) in order to obtain a higher price at a seasoned offering. The main assumptions are that low-quality firms must invest in imitation expenses to appear to be high-quality firms, and that with some probability this imitation is discovered between offerings. Underpricing by high-quality firms at the IPO can then add sufficient signalling costs to these imitation expenses to induce low-quality firms to reveal their quality voluntarily. The model is consistent with several documented empirical regnlarities and offers new testable implications. In addition, the paper provides empirical evidence that many firms raise substantial amounts of additional equity capital in the years after their IPO.

We review the theory and evidence on IPO activity: why firms go public, why they reward first-day investors with considerable underpricing, and how IPOs perform in the long run. Our perspective is threefold: First, we believe that many IPO phenomena are not stationary. Second, we believe research into share allocation issues is the most promising area of research in IPOs at the moment. Third, we argue that asymmetric information is not the primary driver of many IPO phenomena.

This paper examines aftermarket trading of underwriters and unaffiliated market makers in the three month period after an IPO. We find that the lead underwriter is always the dominant market maker, he takes substantial inventory positions in the aftermarket trading, and co-managers play a negligible role in aftermarket trading. The lead underwriter engages in stabilization activity for less successful IPOs, and uses the overallotment option to reduce his inventory risk. Compensation to the underwriter arises primarily from fees, but aftermarket trading does generate positive profits, which are positively related to the degree of underpricing.

Pittsburgh is gratefully acknowledged. JEL classification: G24, C21

We examine the strong cycles in the number of initial public offerings (IPOs) and in the average initial returns realized by investors who participated in the IPOs. At the aggregate level, initial returns are predictably related to past initial returns and also to future IPO volume from 1960-1997. To understand these patterns, we use firm-level data from 1985-97 to model the initial return. Our results show that aggregate IPO cycles occur because of the time it takes to complete an IPO, the clustering of similar types of IPOs in time, and information spillovers among IPOs.

IPO initial returns reached astronomical levels during 1999-2000. We show that the regime shift in initial returns and other elements of pricing behavior can be at least partially accounted for by a variety of marked changes in pre-IPO ownership structure and insider selling behavior over the period, which reduced key decision-makers ’ incentives to control underpricing. After controlling for these changes, the difference in underpricing between 1999-2000 and the preceding three years is much reduced. Our results suggest that it was firm characteristics that were unique during the “dot-com bubble ” and that pricing behavior followed from incentives created by these characteristics.

We provide evidence that firms attempting IPOs condition offer terms and the decision whether to carry through with an offering on the experience of their primary market contemporaries. Moreover, while initial returns and IPO volume are positively correlated in the aggregate, the correlation is negative among contemporaneous offerings subject to a common valuation factor. Our findings are consistent with investment banks implicitly bundling offerings subject to a common valuation factor to achieve more equitable internalization of information production costs and thereby preventing coordination failures in primary equity markets.

: This paper implements a model for the valuation of the default risk implicit in the prices of corporate bonds. The analytical approach considers the two essential ingredients in the valuation of corporate bonds: interest rate uncertainty and default risk. The former is modeled as a diffusion process. The latter is modeled as a spread following a diffusion process, with the magnitude of this spread impacting on the probability of a Poisson process governing the arrival of the default event. We apply two variants of this model to the valuation of fixed-for-floating swaps. In the first, the swap is default-free, and the spread represents the appropriate discounted expected value of the instantaneous TED spread; in the second, we allow the swap to incorporate default risk. We propose to test our models using the entire term structure of corporate bonds prices for different ratings and industry categories, as well as the term structure of fixed-for-floating swaps. The Marketing of Close...

We analyze institutional allocation in initial public offerings (IPOs) using a new dataset of US offerings between 1997 and 1998. We document a positive relation between institutional allocation and day 1 IPO returns: for instance, institutions get under 60% of overpriced issues but about 75% of underpriced issues. The positive relation is partly explained by the practice of giving institutions more shares in IPOs with strong pre-market demand, as predicted by book-building theories. However, our tests suggest that institutional allocation also contains private information about first-day IPO returns not reflected in pre- market demand and other public information. Our evidence supports bookbuilding theories of IPO underpricing, but suggests that institutional allocation in underpriced issues is in excess of that explained by book-building alone.

The views expressed are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Department of the Treasury, or their staffs. We thank Andy Kaplowitz and David Roderer for exceptional research support. We also acknowledge the suggestions made by seminar participants at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Reserve Banks of Atlanta and New York, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the January 1998 ASSA sessions sponsored by the Atlantic Economic Society. The Informational Advantage of Specialized Monitors: The Case of Bank Examiners Abstract: Large commercial banking firms are monitored by specialized private-sector monitors and by specialized government examiners. Previous research suggests that bank exams produce little useful information that is not already reflected in market prices. In this article, we apply a new research methodology to a unique data set, and find that government exams of large national banks produce significant new information which financial markets do not fully internalize for several additional months. Our results indicate that specialized government monitors can identify value-relevant information about private firms, even if those firms are already actively followed by investors and their private-sector agents. The asymmetry of information between firm insiders and outside investors constitutes an important problem in corporate finance. When individual investors find it costly to obtain