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165
The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
, 2006
"... We resolve the question of the complexity of Nash equilibrium by showing that the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in a game with 4 or more players is complete for the complexity class PPAD. Our proof uses ideas from the recentlyestablished equivalence between polynomialtime solvability of n ..."
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Cited by 238 (16 self)
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We resolve the question of the complexity of Nash equilibrium by showing that the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in a game with 4 or more players is complete for the complexity class PPAD. Our proof uses ideas from the recentlyestablished equivalence between polynomialtime solvability of normalform games and graphical games, and shows that these kinds of games can implement arbitrary members of a PPADcomplete class of Brouwer functions. 1
The Structure and Complexity of Nash Equilibria for a Selfish Routing Game
, 2002
"... In this work, we study the combinatorial structure and the computational complexity of Nash equilibria for a certain game that models sel sh routing over a network consisting of m parallel links. We assume a collection of n users, each employing a mixed strategy, which is a probability distribu ..."
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Cited by 109 (26 self)
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In this work, we study the combinatorial structure and the computational complexity of Nash equilibria for a certain game that models sel sh routing over a network consisting of m parallel links. We assume a collection of n users, each employing a mixed strategy, which is a probability distribution over links, to control the routing of its own assigned trac. In a Nash equilibrium, each user sel shly routes its trac on those links that minimize its expected latency cost, given the network congestion caused by the other users. The social cost of a Nash equilibrium is the expectation, over all random choices of the users, of the maximum, over all links, latency through a link.
Market Equilibrium via a PrimalDual Algorithm for a Convex Program
"... We give the first polynomial time algorithm for exactly computing an equilibrium for the linear utilities case of the market model defined by Fisher. Our algorithm uses the primaldual paradigm in the enhanced setting of KKT conditions and convex programs. We pinpoint the added difficulty raised by ..."
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Cited by 100 (22 self)
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We give the first polynomial time algorithm for exactly computing an equilibrium for the linear utilities case of the market model defined by Fisher. Our algorithm uses the primaldual paradigm in the enhanced setting of KKT conditions and convex programs. We pinpoint the added difficulty raised by this setting and the manner in which our algorithm circumvents it.
Efficient Computation of Equilibria for Extensive Twoperson Games
, 1996
"... The Nash equilibria of a twoperson, nonzerosum game are the solutions of a certain linear complementarity problem (LCP). In order to use this for solving a game in extensive form, the game must first be converted to a strategic description such as the normal form. The classical normal form, howev ..."
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Cited by 90 (7 self)
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The Nash equilibria of a twoperson, nonzerosum game are the solutions of a certain linear complementarity problem (LCP). In order to use this for solving a game in extensive form, the game must first be converted to a strategic description such as the normal form. The classical normal form, however, is often exponentially large in the size of the game tree. If the game has perfect recall, a linearsized strategic description is the sequence form. For the resulting small LCP, we show that an equilibrium is found efficiently by Lemke’s algorithm, a generalization of the Lemke–Howson method.
Computing Nash equilibria: Approximation and smoothed complexity
 In Proceedings of the 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS
, 2006
"... By proving that the problem of computing a 1/n Θ(1)approximate Nash equilibrium remains PPADcomplete, we show that the BIMATRIX game is not likely to have a fully polynomialtime approximation scheme. In other words, no algorithm with time polynomial in n and 1/ǫ can compute an ǫapproximate Nash ..."
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Cited by 74 (10 self)
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By proving that the problem of computing a 1/n Θ(1)approximate Nash equilibrium remains PPADcomplete, we show that the BIMATRIX game is not likely to have a fully polynomialtime approximation scheme. In other words, no algorithm with time polynomial in n and 1/ǫ can compute an ǫapproximate Nash equilibrium of an n×n bimatrix game, unless PPAD ⊆ P. Instrumental to our proof, we introduce a new discrete fixedpoint problem on a highdimensional cube with a constant sidelength, such as on an ndimensional cube with sidelength 7, and show that they are PPADcomplete. Furthermore, we prove that it is unlikely, unless PPAD ⊆ RP, that the smoothed complexity of the LemkeHowson algorithm or any algorithm for computing a Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game is polynomial in n and 1/σ under perturbations with magnitude σ. Our result answers a major open question in the smoothed analysis of algorithms and the approximation of Nash equilibria.
Pure Nash Equilibria: Hard and Easy Games
"... In this paper we investigate complexity issues related to pure Nash equilibria of strategic games. We show that, even in very restrictive settings, determining whether a game has a pure Nash Equilibrium is NPhard, while deciding whether a game has a strong Nash equilibrium is Stcomplete. We then s ..."
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Cited by 70 (3 self)
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In this paper we investigate complexity issues related to pure Nash equilibria of strategic games. We show that, even in very restrictive settings, determining whether a game has a pure Nash Equilibrium is NPhard, while deciding whether a game has a strong Nash equilibrium is Stcomplete. We then study practically relevant restrictions that lower the complexity. In particular, we are interested in quantitative and qualitative restrictions of the way each player's move depends on moves of other players. We say that a game has small neighborhood if the &quot; utility function for each player depends only on (the actions of) a logarithmically small number of other players, The dependency structure of a game G can he expressed by a graph G(G) or by a hypergraph II(G). Among other results, we show that if jC has small neighborhood and if II(G) has botmdecl hypertree width (or if G(G) has bounded treewidth), then finding pure Nash and Pareto equilibria is feasible in polynomial time. If the game is graphical, then these problems are LOGCFLcomplete and thus in the class _NC ~ of highly parallelizable problems. 1 Introduction and Overview of Results The theory of strategic games and Nash equilibria has important applications in economics and decision making [31, 2]. Determining whether Nash equilibria exist, and effectively computing
An application of boolean complexity to separation problems in bounded arithmetic
 Proc. London Math. Society
, 1994
"... We develop a method for establishing the independence of some Zf(a)formulas from S'2(a). In particular, we show that T'2(a) is not VZ*(a)conservative over S'2(a). We characterize the Z^definable functions of T2 as being precisely the functions definable as projections of polynomial ..."
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Cited by 58 (15 self)
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We develop a method for establishing the independence of some Zf(a)formulas from S'2(a). In particular, we show that T'2(a) is not VZ*(a)conservative over S'2(a). We characterize the Z^definable functions of T2 as being precisely the functions definable as projections of polynomial local search (PLS) problems. Although it is still an open problem whether bounded arithmetic S2 is finitely axiomatizable, considerable progress on this question has been made: S2 +1 is V2f+1conservative over T'2 [3], but it is not V2!f+2conservative unless £f+2 = Ylf+2 [10], and in addition, T2 is not VZf+1conservative over S'2 unless LogSpace s? = Af+1 [8]. In particular, S2 is not finitely axiomatizable provided that the polynomialtime hierarchy does not collapse [10]. For the theory S2(a) these results imply (with some additional arguments) absolute results: S'2 + (a) is V2f+,(a)conservative but not VZf+2(a)conservative over T'2(a), and T'2(a) is not VZf+i(c*)conservative over S'2(a). Here a represents a new uninterpreted predicate symbol adjoined to the language of arithmetic which may be used in induction formulas; from a computer science perspective, a represents an oracle. In this paper we pursue this line of investigation further by showing that T'2(a) is also not V2f(a)conservative over S'2(a). This was known for / = 1, 2 by [9,17] (see also [2]), and our present proof uses a version of the pigeonhole principle similar to the arguments in [2,9]. Perhaps more importantly, we formulate a general method (Theorem 2.6) which can be used to show the unprovability of other 2f(a)formulas from S'2(a). Our methods are analogous in spirit to the proof strategy of [8]: prove a witnessing theorem to show that provability of a Zf+1(a)formula A in S'2(a) implies that it is witnessed by a function of certain complexity and then employ techniques of boolean complexity to construct an oracle a such that the formula A cannot be witnessed by a function of the prescribed complexity. Our formula A shall be 2f(a) and thus we can use the original witnessing theorem of [2]. The boolean complexity used is the same as in [8], namely Hastad's switching lemmas [6].