The purpose of this article is to explain the spread between spot rates on corporate and government bonds. We find that the spread can be explained in terms of three elements: (1) compensation for expected default of corporate bonds (2) compensation for state taxes since holders of corporate bonds pay state taxes while holders of government bonds do not, and (3) compensation for the additional systematic risk in corporate bond returns relative to government bond returns. The systematic nature of corporate bond return is shown by relating that part of the spread which is not due to expected default or taxes to a set of variables which have been shown to effect risk premiums in stock markets Empirical estimates of the size of each of these three components are provided in the paper. We stress the tax effects because it has been ignored in all previous studies of corporate bonds. 1

This paper estimates recent default risk premia for U.S. corporate debt, based on a close relationship between default probabilities, as estimated by Moody's KMV EDFs, and default swap (CDS) market rates. The default-swap data, obtained through CIBC from 22 banks and specialty dealers, allow us to establish a strong link between actual and risk-neutral default probabilities for the 69 firms in the three sectors that we analyze: broadcasting and entertainment, healthcare, and oil and gas. We find dramatic variation over time in risk premia, from peaks in the thrid quarter of 2002, dropping by roughly 50% to late 2003.

Corporate credit rating analysis has attracted lots of research interests in the literature. Recent studies have shown that Artificial Intelligence (AI) methods achieved better performance than traditional statistical methods. This article introduces a relatively new machine learning technique, support vector machines (SVM), to the problem in attempt to provide a model with better explanatory power. We used backpropagation neural network (BNN) as a benchmark and obtained prediction accuracy around 80% for both BNN and SVM methods for the United States and Taiwan markets. However, only slight improvement of SVM was observed. Another direction of the research is to improve the interpretability of the AI-based models. We applied recent research results in neural network model interpretation and obtained relative importance of the input financial variables from the neural network models. Based on these results, we conducted a market comparative analysis on the differences of determining factors in the United States and Taiwan markets.

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This paper is adapted and updated from E. Altman, "Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy," Journal of Finance, September 1968; and E. Altman, R. Haldeman and P. Narayanan, "Zeta Analysis: A New Model to Identify Bankruptcy Risk of Corporations," Journal of Banking & Finance, 1, 1977. Predicting Financial Distress of Companies: Revisiting the Z-Score and ZETA Models Background This paper discusses two of the venerable models for assessing the distress of industrial corporations. These are the so-called Z-Score model (1968) and ZETA 1977) credit risk model. Both models are still being used by practitioners throughout the world. The latter is a proprietary model for subscribers to ZETA Services, Inc. (Hoboken, NJ). The purpose of this summary are two-fold. First, those unique characteristics of business failures are examined in order to specify and quantify the variables which are effective indicators and predictors of corporate distress. By doing so, I hope to highlight the analytic as well as the practical value inherent in the use of financial ratios. Specifically, a set of financial and economic ratios will be analyzed in a corporate distress prediction context using a multiple discriminant statistical methodology. Through this exercise, I will explore not only the quantifiable characteristics of potential bankrupts but also the utility of a much-maligned technique of financial analysis: ratio analysis. Although the models that we will discuss were developed in the late 1960's and mid-1970's, I will extend our tests and findings to include application to firms not traded publicly, to non-manufacturing entities, and also refer to a new bond-rating equivalent model for emerging markets corporate bonds. The latter util...

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We develop a structural bond valuation model to simultaneously capture liquidity and credit risk. Our model implies that renegotiation in financial distress is influenced by the illiquidity of the market for distressed debt. As default becomes more likely, the components of bond yield spreads attributable to illiquidity increase. When we consider finite maturity debt, we find decreasing and convex term structures of liquidity spreads. Using bond price data spanning 15 years, we find evidence of a positive correlation between the illiquidity and default componentsofyieldspreadsaswellassupportfordownward-slopingtermstructuresof liquidity spreads. Credit risk and liquidity risk have long been perceived as two of the main justifications for the existence of yield spreads above benchmark Treasury notes or bonds (see Fisher (1959)). Since Merton (1974), a rapidly growing body of literature has focused on credit risk. 1 However, while concern about market liquidity issues has become increasingly marked since the autumn of 1998, 2 liquidity remains a relatively unexplored topic, in particular, liquidity for defaultable securities. 3 This paper develops a structural bond pricing model with liquidity and credit risk. The purpose is to enhance our understanding of both the interaction between these two sources of risk and their relative contributions to the yield spreads on corporate bonds. Throughout the paper, we define liquidity as the ability to sell a security promptly and at a price close to its value in frictionless markets, that is, we think of an illiquid market as one in which a sizeable discount may have to be incurred to achieve immediacy. We model credit risk in a framework that allows for debt renegotiation as in Fan and Sundaresan (2000). Following François and Morellec (2004), we also introduce

Using a set of structural models, we evaluate the price of default protection for a sample of US corporations. Credit default swaps (CDS) are commonly thought to be less influenced by non-default factors, making them an interesting source of data for evaluating models of default risk. In contrast to previous evidence from corporate bond data, CDS premia are not systematically underestimated. In fact, one of our studied models has little difficulty on average in predicting their level. For robustness, we perform the same exercise for bond spreads by the same issuers on the same trading date. As expected, bond spreads are systematically underestimated, consistent with their being driven by significant non-default components. Considering theoretical and market levels alone is insufficient to evaluate the models’ performance, as other factors might be at play in both markets. With this in mind, we relate the models’ residuals by means of linear regressions to default and non-default proxies. We find little evidence of any default risk component in either bond or CDS residuals. However, in the residuals for bonds, we find strong evidence for non-default components, in particular an illiquidity premium. CDS residuals reveal no such

Recent research has shown that default risk accounts for only a part of the total yield spread on risky corporate bonds relative to their risk-less benchmarks. One candidate for the unexplained portion of the spread is a premium for liquidity. We investigate this possibility by relating the liquidity of corporate bonds, as measured by their ease of market access, to the basis between the credit default swap (CDS) price of the issuer and the par-equivalent corporate bond yield spread. The ease of access of a bond is measured using a recently developed measure called latent liquidity, which is defined as the weighted average turnover of funds holding the bond, where the weights are their fractional holdings of the bond. We find that bonds with higher latent liquidity are more expensive relative to their CDS contracts, after controlling for other realized measures of liquidity. Additionally, we document the positive effects of liquidity in the CDS market on the CDS-bond basis. We also find that several firm-level variables related to credit risk negatively affect the basis, indicating that the CDS price does not fully capture the credit risk of the bond. Furthermore, we find that when default risk of a firm is high, its illiquid bonds are more expensive. We also document that bond-level variables related to features of the contract that may be related to credit risk, such as the presence of covenants, have a negative impact on the