The Edinburgh Logical Framework (LF) provides a means to define (or present) logics. It is based on a general treatment of syntax, rules, and proofs by means of a typed -calculus with dependent types. Syntax is treated in a style similar to, but more general than, Martin-Lof's system of arities. The treatment of rules and proofs focuses on his notion of a judgement. Logics are represented in LF via a new principle, the judgements as types principle, whereby each judgement is identified with the type of its proofs. This allows for a smooth treatment of discharge and variable occurrence conditions and leads to a uniform treatment of rules and proofs whereby rules are viewed as proofs of higher-order judgements and proof checking is reduced to type checking. The practical benefit of our treatment of formal systems is that logic-independent tools such as proof editors and proof checkers can be constructed.

this paper and the LF. In particular the idea of having an operator T : Prop ! Type appears already in De Bruijn's earlier work, as does the idea of having several judgements. The paper [24] describes the basic features of the LF. In this paper we are going to provide a broader illustration of its applicability and discuss to what extent it is successful. The analysis (of the formal presentation) of a system carried out through encoding often illuminates the system itself. This paper will also deal with this phenomenon.

Linear and other relevant logics have been studied widely in mathematical, philosophical and computational logic. We describe a logical framework, RLF, for defining natural deduction presentations of such logics. RLF consists in a language together, in a manner similar to that of Harper, Honsell and Plotkin's LF, with a representation mechanism: the language of RLF is the lL-calculus; the representation mechanism is judgements-as-types, developed for relevant logics. The lL-calculus type theory is a first-order dependent type theory with two kinds of dependent function spaces: a linear one and an intuitionistic one. We study a natural deduction presentation of the type theory and establish the required proof-theoretic meta-theory. The RLF framework is a conservative extension of LF. We show that RLF uniformly encodes (fragments of) intuitionistic linear logic, Curry's l I -calculus and ML with references. We describe the Curry-Howard-de Bruijn correspondence of the lL-calculus with a s...

The lL-calculus is a dependent type theory with both linear and intuitionistic dependent function spaces. It can be seen to arise in two ways. Firstly, in logical frameworks, where it is the language of the RLF logical framework and can uniformly represent linear and other relevant logics. Secondly, it is a presentation of the proof-objects of BI, the logic of bunched implications. BI is a logic which directly combines linear and intuitionistic implication and, in its predicate version, has both linear and intuitionistic quantifiers. The lL-calculus is the dependent type theory which generalizes both implications and quantifiers. In this paper, we describe the categorical semantics of the lL-calculus. This is given by Kripke resource models, which are monoid-indexed sets of functorial Kripke models, the monoid giving an account of resource consumption. We describe a class of concrete, set-theoretic models. The models are given by the category of families of sets, parametrized over a small monoidal category, in which the intuitionistic dependent function space is described in the established way, but the linear dependent function space is described using Day's tensor product.