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61
Joint Scheduling and Power Control for Wireless Adhoc Networks
, 2002
"... In this pape we introduce powe r control as a solution tothe multiple accel proble in conte tionbase wirenb adhocne works.The motivation for this study is two fold, limiting multiuse intej toincre single hop throughput, andrej powe r consumption to increj batte life We focus onne ne bor transmi ..."
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Cited by 283 (6 self)
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In this pape we introduce powe r control as a solution tothe multiple accel proble in conte tionbase wirenb adhocne works.The motivation for this study is two fold, limiting multiuse intej toincre single hop throughput, andrej powe r consumption to increj batte life We focus onne ne bor transmissions whes node are rej tose information packe  tothe re e e re e sub jej to a constraint on the signaltointealtoinjj ratio.The multiple acce  proble is solve via twoaltej phase name schej and powe r control.The sche algorithm isej tial to coordinate the transmissions ofinde ede t use inorde toejj strong intej (e.g selfinterference) that can not be ove by powe r control. On the othe hand, powe r control isej in adistribute fashion to dej the admissible powe r ve ifone ene that can be use bythe sche use to satisfy thei singlej transmissionrensmissi ts. This isdone for two type s ofne works, namej TDMA and TDMA/CDMA wire/CD adhocne works.
A utilitybased powercontrol scheme in wireless cellular systems
 IEEE/ACM TRANS. ON NETWORKING
, 2003
"... Distributed powercontrol algorithms for systems with hard signaltointerference ratio (SIR) constraints may diverge when infeasibility arises. In this paper, we present a powercontrol framework called utilitybased power control (UBPC) by reformulating the problem using a softened SIR requirement ..."
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Cited by 105 (3 self)
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Distributed powercontrol algorithms for systems with hard signaltointerference ratio (SIR) constraints may diverge when infeasibility arises. In this paper, we present a powercontrol framework called utilitybased power control (UBPC) by reformulating the problem using a softened SIR requirement (utility) and adding a penalty on power consumption (cost). Under this framework, the goal is to maximize the net utility, defined as utility minus cost. Although UBPC is still noncooperative and distributed in nature, some degree of cooperation emerges: a user will automatically decrease its target SIR (and may even turn off transmission) when it senses that traffic congestion is building up. This framework enables us to improve system convergence and to satisfy heterogeneous service requirements (such as delay and bit error rate) for integrated networks with both voice users and data users. Fairness, adaptiveness, and a high degree of flexibility can be achieved by properly tuning parameters in UBPC.
BAn energyefficient approach to power control and receiver design in wireless data networks,[
 IEEE Trans. Commun.,
, 2005
"... ..."
Power Control in TwoTier Femtocell Networks
, 2008
"... Two tier cellular networks, comprising of a central macrocell underlaid with short range femtocell hotspots offer an economical way to improve cellular capacity. With shared spectrum and lack of coordination between tiers, crosstier interference limits overall capacity. To quantify nearfar effects ..."
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Cited by 74 (6 self)
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Two tier cellular networks, comprising of a central macrocell underlaid with short range femtocell hotspots offer an economical way to improve cellular capacity. With shared spectrum and lack of coordination between tiers, crosstier interference limits overall capacity. To quantify nearfar effects with universal frequency reuse, this paper derives a fundamental relation providing the largest feasible macrocell SignaltoInterferencePlusNoise Ratio (SINR), given any set of feasible femtocell SINRs. A distributed utilitybased SINR adaptation at femtocells is proposed in order to alleviate crosstier interference at the macrocell from overlaid femtocell infrastructure. The FoschiniMiljanic (FM) algorithm is a special case of the adaptation. Each femtocell maximizes its individual utility consisting of a SINR based reward less an incurred cost (interference to the macrocell). Numerical results show greater than 30 % improvement in mean femtocell SINRs relative to FM. In the event that crosstier interference prevents a macrouser from obtaining its SINR target, an algorithm is proposed that adaptively curtails transmission powers of the strongest femtocell interferers. The algorithm ensures that a macrouser achieves its SINR target even with 100 femtocells/cellsite, and requires a worst case SINR reduction of only 16 % at femtocells. These results motivate design of power control schemes requiring minimal network overhead in twotier networks with shared spectrum.
The waterfilling game in fading multipleaccess channels
 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY
, 2008
"... A gametheoretic framework is developed to design and analyze the resource allocation algorithms in fading multipleaccess channels (MACs), where the users are assumed to be selfish, rational, and limited by average power constraints. The maximum sumrate point on the boundary of the MAC capacity ..."
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Cited by 47 (0 self)
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A gametheoretic framework is developed to design and analyze the resource allocation algorithms in fading multipleaccess channels (MACs), where the users are assumed to be selfish, rational, and limited by average power constraints. The maximum sumrate point on the boundary of the MAC capacity region is shown to be the unique Nash equilibrium of the corresponding waterfilling game. This result sheds a new light on the opportunistic communication principle. The base station is then introduced as a player interested in maximizing a weighted sum of the individual rates. A Stackelberg formulation is proposed in which the base station is the designated game leader. In this setup, the base station announces first its strategy defined as the decoding order of the different users, in the successive cancellation receiver, as a function of the channel state. In the second stage, the users compete conditioned on this particular decoding strategy. This formulation is shown to be able to achieve all the corner points of the capacity region, in addition to the maximum sumrate point. On the negative side, it is shown that there does not exist a base station strategy in this formulation that achieves the rest of the boundary points. To overcome this limitation, a repeated game approach, which achieves the capacity region of the fading MAC, is presented. Finally, the study is extended to vector channels highlighting interesting differences between this scenario and the scalar channel case.
Mandayam, “Pricing for enabling forwarding in selfconfiguring ad hoc networks
 IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
, 2005
"... Abstract—The assumption that all nodes cooperate to relay packets for each other may not be realistic for commercial wireless ad hoc networks. An autonomous (selfish) node in a wireless network has two disincentives for forwarding for others: energy expenditure (real cost) and possible delays for it ..."
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Cited by 36 (2 self)
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Abstract—The assumption that all nodes cooperate to relay packets for each other may not be realistic for commercial wireless ad hoc networks. An autonomous (selfish) node in a wireless network has two disincentives for forwarding for others: energy expenditure (real cost) and possible delays for its own data (opportunity cost). We introduce a mechanism that “fosters cooperation through bribery ” in the context of forwarding in ad hoc networks. Using a microeconomic framework based on game theory, we design and analyze a pricing algorithm that encourages forwarding among autonomous nodes by reimbursing forwarding. Taking a joint networkcentric and usercentric approach, the revenue maximizing network and utility (measured in bitsperJoule) maximizing nodes interact through prices for channel use, reimbursements for forwarding, transmitter power control, as well as forwarding and destination preferences. In a threenode (twosources, oneaccesspoint) network, the network converges to an architecture that induces forwarding only when the network geometries are such that forwarding is likely to increase individual benefits (network revenue and node utilities). For other geometries, the network converges to architectures that do not favor forwarding. We then generalize to a multinode network, where it is seen that the nodes ’ willingness to forward decrease for large ratios of the average internodal distance to the smallest distance between the access point and any source node. Pricing with reimbursement generally improves the network aggregate utility (or aggregate bitsperJoule), as well as utilities and revenue compared with the corresponding pricing algorithm without reimbursement. Index Terms—Cooperation, incentive for forwarding, noncooperative game, pricing, revenue maximization, Stackelberg game, utility. I.
Resource Control for Elastic Traffic in CDMA Networks
 Proceedings of MOBICOM’02
, 2002
"... We present a framework for resource control in CDMA networks carrying elastic tra#c, considering both the uplink and the downlink direction. The framework is based on microeconomics and congestion pricing, and seeks to exploit the joint control of the transmission rate and the signal quality in orde ..."
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Cited by 33 (6 self)
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We present a framework for resource control in CDMA networks carrying elastic tra#c, considering both the uplink and the downlink direction. The framework is based on microeconomics and congestion pricing, and seeks to exploit the joint control of the transmission rate and the signal quality in order to achieve e#cient utilization of network resources, in a distributed and decentralized manner. An important feature of the framework is that it incorporates both the congestion for shared resources in wireless and wired networks, and the cost of battery power at mobile hosts. We prove that for elastic tra#c, where users value only their average throughput, the user's net utility maximization problem can be decomposed into two simpler problems: one involving the selection of the optimal signal quality, and one involving the selection of the optimal transmission rate. Based on this result, the selection of signal quality can be performed as done today using outer loop power control, while rate adaptation can be integrated with rate adaptation at the transport layer.
ARC: An Integrated Admission and Rate Control Framework for CDMA Data Networks Based on Noncooperative Games
, 2003
"... The competition among wireless data service providers brings in an option for the customers to switch their providers, due to unsatisfactory service or otherwise. However, the existing resource management algorithms for wireless networks fail to fully capture the farreaching impact of this competit ..."
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Cited by 32 (10 self)
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The competition among wireless data service providers brings in an option for the customers to switch their providers, due to unsatisfactory service or otherwise. However, the existing resource management algorithms for wireless networks fail to fully capture the farreaching impact of this competitiveness. From this perspective, we propose an integrated admission and rate control (ARC) framework for CDMA based wireless data networks. The admission control is at the session (macro) level while the rate control is at the link layer packet (micro) level. The ARC framework is based on a novel game theoretic formulation which defines noncooperative games between the service providers and the customers. A user’s decision to leave or join a provider is based on a finite set of strategies. A service provider can also construct its game strategy set so as to maximize the utility (revenue) yet attaining
A Nash game algorithm for SIRbased power control in 3G wireless CDMA networks
 IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKING
, 2005
"... We propose a new algorithm for distributed power control in cellular communication systems. We define a cost for each mobile that consists of a weighted sum of power and square of signaltointerference ratio (SIR) error and obtain the static Nash equilibrium for the resulting costs. The algorithm ..."
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Cited by 29 (2 self)
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We propose a new algorithm for distributed power control in cellular communication systems. We define a cost for each mobile that consists of a weighted sum of power and square of signaltointerference ratio (SIR) error and obtain the static Nash equilibrium for the resulting costs. The algorithm requires only interference power measurements and/or SIR measurements from the base station, and converges even in cases where limits on available power render the target SIR’s unattainable. Examples generated using realistic data demonstrate that in demanding environments, the Nash equilibrium power provides substantial power savings as compared to the power balancing algorithm, while reducing achieved SIR only slightly. Additional simulations show that the benefit of the Nash equilibrium power control over the power balancing solution increases as receiver noise power or number of users in the cell increases. The algorithm has the advantage that it can be implemented distributively. An additional benefit of the algorithm is that based on their chosen cost function, mobiles may choose to “opt out”, i.e. stop transmitting, if they determine that the power required to achieve their SIR objectives is more expensive to them than not transmitting at all.
The waterfilling game in fading multiple access channels
 Online]. Available
, 2005
"... We adopt a game theoretic approach for the design and analysis of distributed resource allocation algorithms in fading multiple access channels. The users are assumed to be selfish, rational, and limited by average power constraints. We show that the sumrate optimal point on the boundary of the mul ..."
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Cited by 18 (0 self)
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We adopt a game theoretic approach for the design and analysis of distributed resource allocation algorithms in fading multiple access channels. The users are assumed to be selfish, rational, and limited by average power constraints. We show that the sumrate optimal point on the boundary of the multipleaccess channel capacity region is the unique Nash Equilibrium of the corresponding waterfilling game. This result sheds a new light on the opportunistic communication principle and argues for the fairness of the sumrate optimal point, at least from a game theoretic perspective. The basestation is then introduced as a player interested in maximizing a weighted sum of the individual rates. We propose a Stackelberg formulation in which the basestation is the designated game leader. In this setup, the basestation announces first its strategy defined as the decoding order of the different users, in the successive cancellation receiver, as a function of the channel state. In the second stage, the users compete conditioned on this particular decoding strategy. We show that this formulation allows for achieving all the corner points of the capacity region, in addition to the sumrate optimal point. On the negative side, we prove the nonexistence of a basestation strategy in this formulation that achieves the rest of the boundary points. To overcome this limitation, we present a repeated game approach which achieves the capacity region of the fading multiple access channel. Finally, we extend our study to vector channels highlighting interesting differences between this scenario and the scalar channel case. 1