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SOS: Secure overlay services
- In Proceedings of ACM SIGCOMM
, 2002
"... angelos,misra,danr¥ Denial of service (DoS) attacks continue to threaten the reliability of networking systems. Previous approaches for protecting networks from DoS attacks are reactive in that they wait for an attack to be launched before taking appropriate measures to protect the network. This lea ..."
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Cited by 180 (14 self)
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angelos,misra,danr¥ Denial of service (DoS) attacks continue to threaten the reliability of networking systems. Previous approaches for protecting networks from DoS attacks are reactive in that they wait for an attack to be launched before taking appropriate measures to protect the network. This leaves the door open for other attacks that use more sophisticated methods to mask their traffic. We propose an architecture called Secure Overlay Services (SOS) that proactively prevents DoS attacks, geared toward supporting Emergency Services or similar types of communication. The architecture is constructed using a combination of secure overlay tunneling, routing via consistent hashing, and filtering. We reduce the probability of successful attacks by (i) performing intensive filtering near protected network edges, pushing the attack point perimeter into the core of the network, where high-speed routers can handle the volume of attack traffic, and (ii) introducing randomness and anonymity into the architecture, making it difficult for an attacker to target nodes along the path to a specific SOS-protected destination. Using simple analytical models, we evaluate the likelihood that an attacker can successfully launch a DoS attack against an SOSprotected network. Our analysis demonstrates that such an architecture reduces the likelihood of a successful attack to minuscule levels.
Secure and Flexible Global File Sharing
- In Proceedings of the USENIX 2003 Annual Technical Conference, Freenix Track
, 2003
"... Trust management credentials directly authorize actions, rather than divide the authorization task into authentication and access control. Unlike traditional credentials, which bind keys to principals, trust management credentials bind keys to the authorization to perform certain tasks. ..."
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Cited by 13 (1 self)
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Trust management credentials directly authorize actions, rather than divide the authorization task into authentication and access control. Unlike traditional credentials, which bind keys to principals, trust management credentials bind keys to the authorization to perform certain tasks.
On the safety and efficiency of firewall policy deployment
- Proc. of IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
, 2007
"... Firewall policy management is challenging and error-prone. While ample research has led to tools for policy specification, correctness analysis, and optimization, few researchers have paid attention to firewall policy deployment: the process where a management tool edits a firewall’s configuration t ..."
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Cited by 6 (0 self)
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Firewall policy management is challenging and error-prone. While ample research has led to tools for policy specification, correctness analysis, and optimization, few researchers have paid attention to firewall policy deployment: the process where a management tool edits a firewall’s configuration to make it run the policies specified in the tool. In this paper, we provide the first formal definition and theoretical analysis of safety in firewall policy deployment. We show that naive deployment approaches can easily create a temporary security hole by permitting illegal traffic, or interrupt service by rejecting legal traffic during the deployment. We define safe and most-efficient deployments, and introduce the shuffling theorem as a formal basis for constructing deployment algorithms and proving their safety. We present efficient algorithms for constructing most-efficient deployments in popular policy editing languages. We show that in certain widelyinstalled policy editing languages, a safe deployment is not always possible. We also show how to leverage existing diff algorithms to guarantee a safe, mostefficient, and monotonic deployment in other editing languages. 1
Toward a broader view of security protocols
- In Proceedings of the 12th Cambridge International Security Protocols Workshop
, 2004
"... Computer and network security researchers usually focus on the security of computers and networks. Although it might seem as if there is more than enough insecurity here to keep all of us fully occupied for the foreseeable future, this narrow view of our domain may actually be contributing to the ve ..."
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Cited by 4 (1 self)
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Computer and network security researchers usually focus on the security of computers and networks. Although it might seem as if there is more than enough insecurity here to keep all of us fully occupied for the foreseeable future, this narrow view of our domain may actually be contributing to the very problems that we are trying to solve. We miss important insights from, and opportunities to make contributions to, a larger world that has been grappling with security since long before the computer was invented. This position paper initiates and advocates the study of “Human-Scale Security Protocols ” as a core activity of computing and network security research. The Human-Scale Security Protocols (HSSP) project treats “human scale ” security problems and protocols as a central part of computer science. Our aim is to identify, stimulate research on, analyze, and improve “non-traditional ” protocols that might either have something to teach us or be susceptible to improvement via the techniques and tools of computer security. There are compelling security problems across a wide spectrum of areas that do not outwardly involve computers or electronic communication and yet are remarkably similar in structure to the systems computer scientists routinely study. Interesting and relevant problem spaces that computer security has traditionally ignored range from the very serious (preventing terrorists from subverting aviation security) to the trivial and personal (ensuring that a restaurant serves the same wine that was ordered and charged for).
Managing Access Control in Large Scale Heterogeneous Networks
- IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATO NC3A SYMPOSIUM ON INTEROPERABLE NETWORKS FOR SECURE COMMUNICATIONS (INSC
, 2003
"... The design principle of maximizing local autonomy except when it conflicts with global robustness has led to a scalable Internet with enormous heterogeneity of both applications and infrastructure. These properties have not been achieved in the mechanisms for specifying and enforcing security polici ..."
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Cited by 2 (1 self)
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The design principle of maximizing local autonomy except when it conflicts with global robustness has led to a scalable Internet with enormous heterogeneity of both applications and infrastructure. These properties have not been achieved in the mechanisms for specifying and enforcing security policies. The STRONGMAN
Distributed Trust
, 2004
"... This chapter explores the concept of trust management in access control. We introduce the concepts behind trust management and discuss two such systems. The first, PolicyMaker [Blaze et al., 1996], first introduced the concepts of trust management, which were further explored in the work on the KeyN ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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This chapter explores the concept of trust management in access control. We introduce the concepts behind trust management and discuss two such systems. The first, PolicyMaker [Blaze et al., 1996], first introduced the concepts of trust management, which were further explored in the work on the KeyNote credential language [Blaze et al., 1999b]. We discuss some applications of trust management systems, as well as other related work. Our focus is on the concepts and design, rather than the details of particular approaches or mechanisms. Our goal is to impart enough information to the readers to make informed decisions as to how best to use the power and expressiveness of trust management.
Managing Access Control in Large Scale Heterogeneous Networks
- in Proceedings of the NATO NC3A Symposium on Interoperable Networks for Secure Communications (INSC
, 2003
"... The design principle of maximizing local autonomy except when it conflicts with global robustness has led to a scalable Internet with enormous heterogeneity of both applications and infrastructure. These properties have not been achieved in the mechanisms for specifying and enforcing security polici ..."
Abstract
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The design principle of maximizing local autonomy except when it conflicts with global robustness has led to a scalable Internet with enormous heterogeneity of both applications and infrastructure. These properties have not been achieved in the mechanisms for specifying and enforcing security policies.
Decentralized Access Control . . .
"... The Internet enables global sharing of data across organizational boundaries. Distributed file systems facilitate data sharing in the form of remote file access. However, traditional access control mechanisms used in distributed file systems are intended for machines under common administrative cont ..."
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The Internet enables global sharing of data across organizational boundaries. Distributed file systems facilitate data sharing in the form of remote file access. However, traditional access control mechanisms used in distributed file systems are intended for machines under common administrative control, and rely on maintaining a centralized database of user identities. They fail to scale to a large user base distributed across multiple organizations. We provide a survey of decentralized access control mechanisms in distributed file systems intended for large scale, in both administrative domains and users. We identify essential properties of such access control mechanisms. We analyze both popular production and experimental distributed file systems in the context of our survey.

