Many theorists have dismissed a priori the idea that distributional information could play a significant role in syntactic category acquisition. We demonstrate empirically that such information provides a powerful cue to syntactic category membership, which can be exploited by a variety of simple, psychologically plausible mechanisms. We present a range of results using a large corpus of child-directed speech and explore their psychological implications. While our results show that a considerable amount of information concerning the syntac-tic categories can be obtained from distributional information alone, we stress that many other sources of information may also be potential contributors to the identification of syntactic classes. I.

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In the last 40 years, research on models of spoken and written language has been split between two seemingly irreconcilable traditions: formal linguistics in the Chomsky tradition, and information theory in the Shannon tradition. Zellig Harris had advocated a close alliance between grammatical and information-theoretic principles in the analysis of natural language, and early formal-language theory provided another strong link between information theory and linguistics. Nevertheless, in most research on language and computation, grammatical and information-theoretic approaches had moved far apart. Today, after many years on the defensive, the information-theoretic approach has gained new strength and achieved practical successes in speech recognition, information retrieval, and, increasingly, in language analysis and machine translation. The exponential increase in the speed and storage capacity of computers is the proximate cause of these engineering successes, allowing the automatic estimation of the parameters of probabilistic models of language by counting occurrences of linguistic events in very large bodies of text and speech. However, I will argue that informationtheoretic and computational ideas are also playing an increasing role in the scientific understanding of language, and will help bring together formal-linguistic and information-theoretic perspectives.

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The natural language learning problem has attracted the attention of researchers for several decades. Computational and formal models of language acquisition have provided some preliminary, yet promising insights of how children learn the language of their community. Further, these formal models also provide an operational framework for the numerous practical applications of language learning. We will survey some of the key results in formal language learning. In particular, we will discuss the prominent computational approaches for learning different classes of formal languages and discuss how these fit in the broad context of natural language learning.

It is argued that theoretical approaches to the nature of the influence of early experience on personality development have been vitiated by incorrect metaphysical assumptions, of a sort historically characteristic of immature sciences. In particular, mind and mental phenomena are construed in terms of various sorts of substances and structures, instead of in terms of process ontologies. We show that these underlying metaphysical assumptions have prevented the most central problems of the influence of early experience from being addressed, and, therefore, from being answered as well. These aporia seriously infect such contemporary approaches as object relations theory, attachment theory, and cognitive behavioral theory. We outline an alternative process ontology of mind and intentionality — specifically, a process-functional ontology for representation — and explore the form of early influence offered within this new perspective. The Influence of Early Experience

Abstract: L. Cosmides and J. Tooby, leaders in the field of evolutionary psychology, have claimed that an evolutionary perspective toward psychology requires both that psychologists conceive of psychological processes as domain specific and that psychologists view all adaptive behavior as the product of cognition. In fact, we argue, an evolutionary perspective commits psychology to neither of these positions. The real value of evolutionary theory for psychology, we contend, lies in the heuristic role it plays in determining the function of psychological mechanisms and in the depth it contributes to explanations of why psychological processes have the properties they do. Quite unexpectedly, cognitive psychologists find their field intimately connected to a whole new intellectual landscape that had previously seemed remote, unfamiliar, and all but irrelevant. Yet the proliferating connections tying together the cognitive and evolutionary communities promise to transform both fields, with each supplying necessary principles, methods, and a species of rigor that

Devitt (2006) makes a sustained critique of Chomskyan linguistics, articulating persistent complaints about the “psychological reality ” of generative grammars. I suggest these complaints are merely terminological and that Devitt fails to appreciate the status of Chomsky’s computational formalisms found elsewhere in cognitive science. Devitt ascribes an intentional conception of representations that Chomsky repudiates and that is independently implausible. I argue that Devitt’s proposed alternative “linguistic reality ” constituted by physical symbol tokens neglects the problems of tokens as opposed to types and he misses the force of Chomsky’s case against Behaviourism and nominalism. I suggest that Devitt’s case against intuitions as data misunderstands their standard role throughout perceptual psychology. I argue that Devitt’s position exemplifies pervasive errors concerning mental representation seen throughout cognitive science.

Methodological questions concerning Chomsky’s generative approach to linguistics have been debated without consensus. The status of linguistics as psychology, the psychological reality of grammars, the character of tacit knowledge and the role of intuitions as data remain heatedly disputed today. I argue that the recalcitrance of these disputes is symptomatic of deep misunderstandings. I focus attention on Michael Devitt’s recent extended critique of Chomskyan linguistics and I suggest that his complaints are based on a failure to appreciate the special status of Chomsky’s computational formalisms found elsewhere in cognitive science. Devitt ascribes an intentional conception of representations that Chomsky repudiates and that is independently implausible. I argue that Devitt’s proposed “linguistic reality” as the proper subject matter of linguistics neglects the problems of tokens as opposed to types and he misses the force of Chomsky’s arguments against Behaviourism and nominalism. I suggest that Devitt’s case against intuitions as data misunderstands their standard role throughout perceptual psychology. Finally, of more general interest, I argue that Devitt’s position exemplifies compelling errors concerning mental representation seen throughout cognitive science and philosophy of mind.

ABSTRACT: Contemporary assessment practices in science education have undergone significant changes in recent decades. The basis for these changes and the resulting new assessment practices are the subject of this two-part paper. Part 1 considers the basis of assessment that, more than 25 years ago, was driven by the assumptions of decomposability and decontextualization of knowledge, resulting in a low-inference testing system, often described as “traditional. ” This assessment model was replaced not on account of direct criticism, but rather on account of a larger revolution—the change from behavioral to cognitive psychology, developments in the philosophy of science, and the rise of constructivism. Most notably, the study of the active cognitive processes of the individual resulted in a major emphasis on context in learning and assessment. These changes gave rise to the development of various contextual assessment methodologies in science education, for example, concept mapping assessment, performance assessment, and portfolio assessment. In Part 2, the literature relating to the assessment methods identified in Part 1 is reviewed, revealing that there is not much research that supports their validity and reliability. However, encouraging new work on selected-response tests is forming the basis for reconsideration of